The democratization of Poland affords a rare opportunity to study industrial collective action amid sweeping and rapid institutional change. Under state socialism, the legacy of industrial strikes is well known, dating back to the violent Poznan crisis of 1956 and culminating in the strike waves of 1988 that led to Eastern Europe's first democratic transition. Ironically, this rich tradition has provided a blueprint for staging disruptive, anti-reform challenges against successive post-communist democratic governments. While much of the transition literature has focused on the weakness of democratic institutionalization (Gross 1992; Linz and Stepan 1996; Ost 1993), the socio-political sources and persistence of strikes in post-transition Poland remain poorly understood. Austerity-induced yet proactive and seemingly organized strikes have occurred in the midst of union divisiveness, party fragmentation, and generalized political demobilization. Grievances persist but have yet to become institutionalized through more routine forms of political participation.

That new material and political interests remain unorganized is paradoxical in light of Poland's long-standing tradition of independent civil society and democratic opposition (Ost 1993). But the strong anti-party legacy of Solidarity has undermined interest group formation, while its early post-communist fragmentation helped to demobilize the labor movement (Bernhard 1990; Bielasiak 1992; Ost 1993). The failure to sufficiently aggregate and define such interests led to extreme electoral volatility and
nonvoting in the first phase of Poland's transition. These dramatic political and institutional changes, however, have equally important implications for shaping the dynamics of strike mobilization. While short, defensive and reactionary strikes were prevalent in 1987–90, the shape of aggregate strike activity had changed considerably by 1991. The number of work-days lost in strikes increased more than threefold, accompanied by only a slight rise in number of incidents (Glowny Urzad Statystyczny 1991–1995). Strikes now appear to be longer, better organized, and increasingly associated with state-dominated heavy industries in contrast to their episodic and spontaneous character under socialist Poland.

The purpose of this chapter is to examine the institutional sources of industrial strike mobilization in pre and post-transition Poland. Strike mobilization refers to attitudes surrounding support and legitimacy of strikes as well as actual participation in strikes. Although conceptually distinct, strike support is treated as an important stage in the emergence of protest potential and action and thus is central in understanding collective action phenomena (Barnes and Kaase 1979).

This chapter is organized around several major research questions. First, how has Poland's democratic-market transition changed the process by which individuals are mobilized to support and participate in strike events? Second, how does strike mobilization occur in organizationally weak societies that encounter resource deficits? Third, what are the bases of interest formation following democratic transition in the absence of programmatic political parties and institutionalized interest groups? Fourth, how is strike mobilization possible in the context of a weak and fragmented post-transition labor movement?

These questions are addressed in an analysis of strike mobilization in the immediate pre and post-transition phases, specifically the years 1987–1993. This period captures several important events, including the implementation of the "second stage" reform efforts of the late 1980s, subsequent strike waves in the spring and summer of 1988, and the introduction of economic stabilization measures and freely elected parliamentary bodies under the early post-communist Solidarity governments. I proceed below by first presenting a brief historical account of the distinctive institutional contexts and strike actions of the post-martial law period and first phase of transition. I then propose a broad theoretical scheme that extends political process and polity models of collective action to the case of state-socialist regimes. In doing so, I confront the paradoxical issue of how collective action emerges in relatively closed, authoritarian polities. The central argument is that state socialist and market-democratic environments generate distinctive forms of political opportunities, grievances and organ-
izational resources that produce contrasting strike mobilization processes. Finally, I specify and test several hypotheses from this argument relating to individual-level strike support and participation.

**Strikes and the Context of Institutional Change**

*Strikes in Communist Poland, 1987–1988*

The general tendency toward episodic and spontaneous collective action under state socialism stems in part from chronic macroeconomic and participatory crises and the associated failures of systemic reform efforts. According to Janossy (1971), state socialist regimes invariably confront macroeconomic growth crises as they progress from extensive to intensive industrialization strategies, which results in investment imbalances, consumer shortages, and declining standards of living. The firm-level autonomy and decentralization required of intensive industrialization place contradictory demands on the “leading role” of communist parties, leading to the dilution of self-management and limitations on workplace decision making (Biezenski 1994; Feher, Heller and Markus 1983; Gregory 1990; Wu 1990).

The problems of multiple, simultaneous economic and participatory crises and the centralized, command role of the communist party focus mass grievances against the state, thereby undermining party legitimacy (Parkin 1976). However, I argue that it is the *politicization* of these grievances through cumulative, failed reforms that becomes the central determinant of socialist opposition and protest. The cyclical attempts among these regimes to employ cooptive reforms following economic crisis and unrest represent legitimation strategies designed to restore the ideological basis of the workers’ state. These reforms include attempts to introduce consumerism and productivity incentives as well as workplace democratization and other forms of “limited pluralism” and are typically based on promises of economic improvement (Bielasiak 1988; Kwiatkowski 1992; Rigby 1982). Such strategies, however, are contradictory to central planning and paternalistic party control and are therefore rendered impotent and only symbolically significant. The failure to grant genuine political access and meet expectations for better standards of living delegitimates the state. Since reform campaigns serve to increase expectations and mobilize awareness of worker interests and political access, reform failures have the unintended effect of centralizing and projecting blame back to the party.

Indeed, the 1988 strikes that preceded the collapse the Polish United Workers’ Party (PUWP) are best understood in the context of the failed,
successive reform campaigns of the 1980s. Economic reforms introduced in
the early post-martial law period were designed primarily to rectify price
distortions but also featured limited, small-scale privatization measures
(Milanovic 1992; Poznanski 1992). Importantly, they did not address the
privatization of strategic state-run enterprises.

The introduction of associated political reforms at this time was also
limited but is important for understanding the reemergence of labor strife
later in the decade. The legitimacy problems inherited from the pre-Sol-
idarity period, followed by the demobilizing tendencies of martial law,
compelled the Jaruzelski regime to initiate a pervasive strategy of political
incorporation. These strategies included the creation of the consensus-
building Patriotic Movement for National Rebirth (PRON), the increased
representation and influence of coalitional parties, union decen-
tralization and restructuring, and the reintroduction of worker self-man-
gerement (Kolankiewicz 1988; Kwiatkowski 1992; Mason 1987). Like PRON,
the functions of the official unions and self-management councils were
ambiguous. Unions were initially granted restricted rights to strike but, in
general, the nature of these organizations was non-political and limited to
increasing efficiency and production (Kolankiewicz 1988; Morawski 1991).

The reform effort was re-ignited with the introduction of “second-stage”
reforms in 1987. Second-stage reforms, designed to deal more forcefully
with price control issues, were implemented in early 1988 as part of the Price
and Income Operation (Winiecki 1992). The proposed price increases were
softened considerably, however, after the measures failed to win support
among a majority of eligible voters in a November 1987 referendum
(Milanovic 1992). The second-stage reform program proved to be both
a larger and costlier failure than earlier reform, fueling wage-price spirals
and leading to major strike waves in the spring and summer of 1988.
Although these strikes were dominated by wage demands, calls for the
reinstatement of Solidarity and trade union pluralism also emerged. These
calls were consistent with the rise in general oppositional attitudes among
the population since the mid-1980s (Blaszkiewicz et al. 1994; de Weydenthal

Unlike the 1980–81 crisis, however, the 1988 strikes suffered from
limited organizational capacity and repressive police tactics. They occurred
as part of a fragmented and decentralized Solidarity underground move-
ment and were staged by spontaneous, ad-hoc committees (de Weydenthal
1988a; Grabowski 1996; Ost 1990). Throughout the post-martial law
period, much of Solidarity’s activity consisted of uncoordinated publishing
of oppositional materials financed in part by the Catholic Church and
distributed by small entrepreneurs. The proliferation of underground
literature helped create an intellectual front against the government that obscured the militant working-class character of Solidarity’s origins (Zubek 1991b). Although the 1988 strike waves enjoyed public support from Walesa and the moderate Solidarity leadership, the main participants were part of a younger, more radical faction. Most strikes did not involve Solidarity activists, many of whom were surprised by their outbreaks (de Weydenthal 1988a, 1988b; Zubek 1991b).

The majority of the strikers, however, remained committed to the ethos of Solidarity, embracing the movement as a means to achieve trade union autonomy and material aspirations. While these strikes were partly a reaction against the austerity of economic reform (Ost 1990), they also reflected a deep sense of political alienation. Ethnographic accounts suggest that grievances were rooted in the meaninglessness of work experiences and poor interpersonal relations with superiors. Strikers objected to their non-involvement in the organization of their work environments. As a workers’ movement, Solidarity thus offered freedom from workplace injustices while guaranteeing a greater role in influencing society (Blaszkiewicz et al. 1994).

**Strikes in the First Phase of Democratic Transition**

In early 1990, Solidarity leaders quickly imposed a set of market reforms remarkably similar to those they had denounced and rejected just three years earlier. The basic components of the “Balcerowicz plan” called for macroeconomic stabilization, currency devaluation, price reform, mass privatization and industrial restructuring (Kramer 1995; Kaminski 1991; Winiecki 1992). Although the program led to initially high inflation, employment decline and a lower standard of living, strikes were surprisingly limited, dropping from nearly 900 in 1989 to the range of 200–300 in 1990–1991 (Glowny Urzad Statystyczny 1991, 1992; International Labor Office 1992). The brief respite from strike activity in 1990 was consistent with strong approval ratings enjoyed by the Mazowiecki government but also with the organizational decay and demobilization of Solidarity’s trade union.

The union’s organizational weakness was partially rooted in the decentralization of its previously underground counterpart but also in the generational and radical-moderate splits that persisted since the 1988 strikes (Misztal and Jenkins 1995; Zubek 1991b). These splits were solidified by the formation of the Walesa-led Solidarity Citizens’ Committees in preparation for the Round Table election campaign. This, in turn, led to the defection of the movement’s extremists, some of whom later formed the anti-incor-
poratist Solidarity '80 union (Bernhard 1990; Zubek 1991b). These early divisions, however, failed to disengage a united campaign front mounted by Solidarity's mainstream factions against the PUWP in 1989. Solidarity's campaign strategy appealed strongly to anti-regime sentiment. It avoided detailed discussions of reform proposals on which it shared similar positions with the PUWP. While the rhetorical thrust of the Solidarity campaign helped demobilize factional struggles, it also steered the movement further away from its historical labor-union identity (Barany and Vinton 1990; Heyns and Bialecki 1991; Zubek 1991b).

The defeat of the PUWP made these identity problems even more apparent as the Mazowiecki-Balcerowicz stabilization program produced unprecedented unemployment levels by mid-1990, thus shifting the burden of market reforms to the state-sector working class. Ironically, industrial-labor interests received little parliamentary representation among newly elected members of the Solidarity coalition. Instead, the Citizens' Parliamentary Caucus (OKP) was disproportionately dominated by the intelligentsia which, surprisingly, received its strongest electoral support from largely Catholic, peasant-agricultural sectors (Heyns and Bialecki 1991).

Labor issues became further displaced throughout the 1990 presidential campaign which showcased an emerging power struggle between the center-right and pro-market intelligentsia factions of Solidarity, represented by candidates Walesa and Mazowiecki, respectively. Attacks on personal style and the suppression of economic issues weakened the union identity of Solidarity and contributed to low voter turnout in the December 1990 election (Misztal and Jenkins 1995; Zubek 1991a, 1992). This process was exacerbated by the union's organizational decay; the union faced regional mobilizing challenges from the former official union (OPZZ) and the radical Solidarity '80 group (Bernhard 1990; Zubek 1991b). The intensification of the identity and organizational problems of post-communist Solidarity throughout 1990 led to mostly defensive strikes over restricted wage growth (Kloc 1992). The intensity and shape of strikes would gradually begin to change, however, in response to restructuring issues and the electoral campaign for Parliament in late 1991.

Following Walesa's presidential victory, the basic principles of the Balcerowicz plan were continued under Jan Bielecki's government in early 1991, further isolating the trade-union base of Solidarity. Despite early restructuring successes, recessionary conditions continued and attention began to shift increasingly toward the role of unprofitable state-sector enterprises in undermining the strict monetary policies of the reform plan (Poznanski 1992). Pre-existing informal linkages between large firms and
state banks produced liberal lending practices that, in turn, fueled excessive wage growth. Rapid privatization was thus seen as a necessary condition for achieving the goals of broader macroeconomic policies (Winiecki 1992).

The general resistance to privatization among workers' councils and state-sector workers and the slow, haphazard implementation of privatization reflected new sources of conflict tied to the internal characteristics of firms and their market location. The divisiveness of privatization was exacerbated by the actions of the Bielecki government which sought to continue a strict monetary policy and retain the Popiwek (excess wage) tax on state firms (Kloc 1992). This contributed to moderate strike increases in 1991 that occurred under an increasingly pluralistic union environment. As Solidarity weakened and lost membership, OPZZ and the more militant Solidarity '80 union emerged as important competitors for worker loyalty.

Despite the increasing fragmentation of the labor movement in the first phase of transition, a number of specific strike actions reflected joint endorsement and collaborative organizing efforts at the local level and, in some cases, at the industry level over basic changes in economic and tax policy (Bernhard 1990; Gazeta Wyborcza 1991b, 1991c; PAP News Wire 1991). Aggregate data are consistent with the emergence of longer and better organized strikes. While the number of strikes increased by only 20% in 1991, the number of work-days lost in strikes grew by almost 250% (Glowny Urzad Statystyczny 1990, 1991, 1992).

Labor, however, failed to mount a sustained and unified movement at the national level, largely because of ideological differences among unions and struggles between unions and factory councils over enterprise restructuring strategies. In the early post-transition period, Solidarity adopted a pragmatic approach to reform and rejected cooperative ties with the former communist OPZZ, eventually fielding parliamentary candidates who supported the government's marketization policies. In contrast, the OPZZ played a more confrontational role by appealing to discontented state-sector workers and establishing local strike ties with the offshoot Solidarity '80 union (Gazeta Wyborcza 1992; Kramer 1995; Marciniak 1992). Solidarity's general support for reform at the national level also conflicted with worker councils' resistance to privatization at the enterprise level (Marciniak 1992).

The nature of union-council relations within the firm ultimately depended on its size and financial position. Among smaller firms, the immediate need for change often created policy differences over the extent of restructuring necessary for survival. In large firms with greater financial reserves, the unions and councils typically formed oppositional alliances that prolonged state ownership and preserved existing power structures.
Thus, the interests of factory activists were often inconsistent with those of Solidarity’s leadership, underscoring the union’s post-transition identity problems.

The development of a broader labor movement was further limited by the extreme fragmentation surrounding the October 1991 parliamentary elections. Although the election was widely contested, most parties clustered around a few, core ideological themes (Gazeta Wyborcza 1991a; Millard 1992; Taras 1993). Despite the potential for concrete economic alternatives, however, the campaign featured non-ideological appeals, personal attacks and narrowly framed policy issues (Millard 1992; Zubek 1993). The non-programmatic nature of the campaign resulted in a fractious parliament elected by only 43 percent of eligible voters, with no party receiving more than 13 percent of the vote.

The Democratic Union (UD), which represented the broad liberal-market interests of the urban-intellectual wing of Solidarity, won the greatest percentage of votes among the 29 parties gaining representation in parliament. It was plagued, however, by competing clerical and social-democratic factions, attesting to the diverse socio-cultural heritage of pre-transition Solidarity. The former communist SLD, representing social welfare and protectionist interests, achieved a close second place; the SLD was followed by an eclectic mix of peasant, center-right, nationalist and Catholic parties. The communist successor parties benefited from pre-existing organizational networks and the more extensive membership of the affiliated OPZZ trade union. They were also aided by growing anti-reform sentiment and stronger protectionist appeals as indicated by the strong, positive association between provincial unemployment and SLD-PSL support (Wade, Lavelle and Groth 1995). But the electoral power of labor was diluted by cross-cutting loyalties and the general ideological confusion of the campaign. The surprising success of the right-wing and nationalist KPN, for example, enjoyed support among skilled workers by advocating Keynesian-style spending policies and strong pension guarantees (Lewis 1994; Millard 1992).

In short, the 1991 elections ushered in a weakly institutionalized party system that inherited a rich anti-party legacy from the pre-transition Solidarity movement (Lewis 1994; Tymowski 1993). The election also produced successively weaker governing coalitions, ineffectual policy-making and a new wave of industrial conflict. Following the dismissal of Jan Olszewski’s government, a center-right, majority governing coalition eventually formed under Prime Minister Hanna Suchocka in mid-1992. Although the coalition included more centrist elements, including Suchocka’s
UD and the ideologically similar KLD, it excluded the former communist parties and any unambiguous representation of labor interests. Despite a gradual economic expansion that began in early 1992, the Suchocka government encountered intensified discontent over the Balcerowicz program, increasingly disruptive strikes, and union resistance to its corporatist initiatives. In addition, strikes over restructuring issues and declining real wages in heavy industry became much longer and more frequent throughout 1992 (Glowny Urzad Statystyczny 1993); this tendency was exemplified by widespread strikes in the mining industry at the beginning of Suchocka’s tenure (Kloc 1992). Labor remained divided under the Suchocka government as militant offshoot and regional unions continued to stage strikes that delayed consideration of a major corporatist pact on state enterprises in parliament (Kramer 1995).

Following Walesa’s dissolution of Parliament, new elections were held in September 1993. Sensing a growing volatility among the electorate, the communist successor parties made strong interventionist appeals to those most discontented with economic reform. This platform proved to be successful, as the SLD and PSL won the greatest percentage of parliamentary seats among all parties, solidifying their position in Polish post-communist politics. Both parties also benefited from the mobilization of new voters, reflecting the instability of the 1991 alignments and the greater organizational strength of the former communists (Wade, Lavelle and Groth 1995). Polling data indicated that leftist orientations and anti-privatization sentiments were positively associated with support for the SLD (Bulletin of Electoral Statistics 1994). However, the coalition also won a greater percentage of the white-collar and entrepreneurial vote than any other party (Tworzecki 1994). The SLD had thus benefited from a broadly framed platform that pledged a continuation of economic reform but with social guarantees and slower-paced restructuring.

While the threshold rules and post-election mergers among the new Solidarity opposition led to a more consolidated system, political identifications remained weak and unstable after the 1993 elections. In 1994, the SLD-PSL ruling alliance experienced its own divisions over the pace of large-scale privatization, leading to continued disarray within Poland’s labor movement (Kramer 1995; Polityka 1994; Tygodnik Solidarnosc 1993; Zycie Warszawy 1994). While the OPZZ, the coalition’s trade union partner, began to discourage strikes, Solidarity adopted an increasingly militant stance toward the new government’s support for the stalled enterprise pact and continuation of the Balcerowicz reforms. This contributed to a resurgence of larger and more protracted strikes in heavy industries similar to those staged in 1991–1992 (Glowny Urzad Statystyczny 1995).
Strike Mobilization in Transitional Poland: An Integrated Framework

This historical narrative suggests that the sources of strikes in socialist Poland are located in chronic macroeconomic and political contradictions arising from the crisis of transition to intensive industrialization. Stagnant economic growth and weak participatory linkages create grievances that become politicized through failed reform policies. Cyclical reform campaigns are a generic feature of state socialist societies and represent attempts to restore regime legitimacy. The failure of these reforms to resolve systemic contradictions produces intensive forms of anti-regime sentiment. Since authoritarian regimes lack autonomous interest groups, legitimacy crises give way to loosely organized and highly reactive strike actions.

In contrast, market reforms, privatization and restructuring in the first phase of transition have created a growing sense of reform discontent associated largely with heavy industrial sectors. Grievances have emerged over the threat of mass layoff, wage tax policies, and various privatization proposals. These grievances have been the basis of an upsurge in strikes between 1991–1993, facilitated by electoral appeals from pro-labor and the communist successor parties. While leftist party appeals have helped sustain union mobilization, union fragmentation has weakened the labor movement and prevented agreement on state corporatist pacts.

Below, two conceptual models are developed that locate the sources of pre- and post transition strike mobilization in the context of these institutional changes. Specifically, the focus is on strike support and participation at the individual level, treating both as components of a broader process of mobilization and protest. What follows from the historical analysis is a synthesis of political process theory and its recent institutionalist critiques. I argue that the political environments of state socialism and emergent market democracy produce distinctive relationships between the state and strike participants, and that institutional change alters the character of workplace grievances and the organizational strength with which labor advances political claims.

Political process theory has recently enjoyed broad popularity in the collective action and industrial protest literatures. Political process theories emphasize macro political conditions, political institutions and organizational resources as the chief determinants of movement emergence (Jenkins and Klandermans 1995; Jenkins and Schock 1992; Kriesi, Koopmans, Duyvendak and Giugni 1992; McAdam 1982; Rule 1988; Tilly 1978). These ideas are traceable to Tilly’s (1978) polity and mobilization models and related theories of resource mobilization (Jenkins 1983;
Oberschall 1978). According to Tilly (1978: 52–54) polities are composed of contenders for power, including both “members” and “challengers.” Members enjoy routine access to government; challengers are excluded. Mobilization is defined as “the process by which a group secures collective control over the resources needed for collective action” (Jenkins 1983: 532). Successful and sustained challenges among excluded groups depend largely on the extent of resource mobilization, of which pre-existing and indigenous organization is the major determinant (see also, Morris 1984). Well-organized groups exhibit strong mobilization capacities because of shared identities, collective incentives and network densities (Oberschall 1978; Tilly 1978).

Mobilization capacities are determined not only by organizational structure but also by broader political-institutional conditions. Challenges emerge when political opportunity structures are favorable (Jenkins 1985; Kriesi 1996; Piven and Cloward 1977; Tarrow 1989; Tilly 1978). These opportunities refer generally to aspects of an institutional and regime structure that facilitate or inhibit collective action. The notion of political opportunity was first conceptualized as the relative openness of municipal institutions (Eisinger 1973) and later expanded to include such constructs as party systems, electoral realignments and coalitions (Amenta and Zylan 1991; Jenkins 1985; Piven and Cloward 1977), divided elites (Tarrow 1989; Tilly 1978), and institutional structure (Kriesi, Koopmans, Duyvendak and Giugni 1992). There is considerable empirical evidence confirming the relationship between these conditions and collective action (Jenkins and Schock 1992), while several macro-historical analyses of strikes have demonstrated the general importance of political-organizational forces in shaping industrial protest (Aminzade 1984; Bordogna, Cella, and Provasi 1989; Korpi and Shalev 1979).

Political process theories of collective action are based on rational actor (Lichbach 1989) models of motivation in which such actions are viewed as purposeful attempts to challenge inequitable power distributions. Political opportunities help determine the relative cost and benefit of protest. Protest actions are considered rational to the extent that they result from favorable opportunities and the expectation of reward. Rational actor models contrast sharply with deprivation theories of protest which emphasize grievances and frustration-aggression as independent sources of action. Instead, rational actor theorists hold that deprivation is, by itself, an insufficient condition for protest (Klandermans and Tarrow 1988; Lichbach 1989).

Many analyses of differential protest participation and recruitment at the individual level support rational-actor models and link participation to perceived political opportunities, normative and organizational incentives,
and expectancy of success (Klandermans 1984; Klandermans and Oegema 1987; Muller, Dietz and Finkel 1991; Opp and Gern 1993; Wallace and Jenkins 1995). Opp, Finkel, Muller, Wolfsfield, Dietz and Green (1995), for example, find that the link between ideological self-placements and protest can be explained by the relationship between extremism and the perceived efficacy of such action and solidarity incentives to participate. Post-recruitment participation in social movement organizations is also associated with organizational-network and public goods incentives (Barkan, Cohn and Whitaker 1995). However, Oegema and Klandermans (1994) report that erosion and nonconversion among predisposed participants is likely to occur in the absence of mobilization attempts, perceptions of non-supportive environments and right-party identification. Likewise, Wallace and Jenkins (1995) present evidence for a relationship between left-party identification and protest in several West European countries. In sum, these findings underscore the importance of network incentives and collective rationality in determining protest likelihoods.

Political process and rational actor models of social movements and participation have recently been criticized for neglecting the role of collective identity and related cultural bases of action (Feree 1992; Melucci 1988; Mueller 1992; Noonan 1995; Stoecker 1995). Collective identity theorists argue that participants actively construct movement identities through shared grievances and interactions, beliefs, values and rituals. Collective identities encompass the scope of grievances and oppositional strategies but are continuously reconstructed and disputed as activists interact with new audiences and members (Stoecker 1995). Collective identity researchers thus emphasize frame alignment processes of recruitment, mobilization strategies that create identity convergence among organizers and movement recruits (Snow and Benford 1988; Snow, Rochford, Worden and Benford 1986). These approaches downplay incentive-based motivation, stressing instead that individuals are likely to join movements when collective action frames are congruent with their own values and identities.

Another major challenge facing political process approaches is their extension to state-socialist and transitional regimes (Brockett 1991; Jenkins 1983; Jenkins and Schock 1992; Noonan 1995; Tarrow 1988; 1991; Zhou 1993; Zuo and Benford 1995). The traditional focus on pre-existing organization, coalitions, and electoral opportunities fails to account for the nature of collective action under non-democratic or exclusionary polities characterized by resource deficits, state repression and limited institutional access. Political process theories have also been criticized for conflating state actors and polity members as well as failing to consider the potential
autonomy of the state and its ability to independently shape political interests and grievances (Jenkins 1995; Zhou 1993).

This chapter presents an alternative framework that confronts these weaknesses and the general problem of collective action under authoritarian regimes while retaining an emphasis on the determinative role of political opportunities. I argue that the character of opportunities is historically contingent and, therefore, I follow Tarrow's (1988; 1991) suggestion that the concept be differentially specified and operationalized by regime type and institutional setting. These settings determine (1) the character of grievances and their relative importance as sources of protest actions and (2) the character and form of mobilizing contexts. A similar scheme is proposed by Rucht (1996) who defines movement structures and context structures as generic aspects of social movements. Context structures are ecological elements (cultural, social and political) that determine the style and content of the movement, including the type of movement structure. Movement structures may consist either of decentralized and informal networks or more formal organizations like political parties and lobby groups. Changes in context structure over time account for the shifting organizational bases and strategies of movements.

In this study, I treat the legitimation crises and reform strategies of socialist regimes as the core external features of the pre-transition context that produced a highly politicized society prone to episodic outbursts of collective action. Labor unrest was mobilized by relatively loose movement structures consisting of community networks and action frames constructed around past protest experiences. In post-socialist Poland, marketization, firm restructuring and the emergence of trade union and political pluralism now define a new context structure within which class interests are mobilized by political parties and autonomous trade unions.

Hypothesized Sources of Strike Mobilization in Pre-Transition Poland

Workplace Exclusion and the Reform Crisis

This study treats the politicization of worker exclusion as the most critical political opportunity in the stages immediately prior to multiple strike waves in 1988. Worker exclusion refers to a structural exclusion from "decisional arenas" (Weatherford 1992) at the workplace level. In the Polish case, the most important dimensions included regime dilution and co-optation of self-management, restricted ability to influence pay, hiring and
shopfloor conditions, the preclusion of trade-union pluralism within enterprises, and the establishment of non-autonomous branch unions in the post-Martial Law period.

Drawing on recent institutionalist theories of protest and rebellion (Amenta and Zylan 1991; Goodwin and Skocpol 1989; Zhou 1993), I argue that state socialist regimes politicize exclusion through reform cycles. The 1988 strikes occurred in the wake of several failed reforms establishing weak incorporating institutions for industrial workers (Kolankiewicz and Lewis 1988; Kolankiewicz 1988; Kwiatkowski 1992; Mason 1987; Staniszkis 1984). The limited scope and autonomy of these institutions undermined their effectiveness and legitimacy. Established as “consultative” bodies in the mid-1980s, institutions such as the Patriotic Front of National Rebirth (PRON) and the official trade unions developed into mere appendages of the party denied formal power-sharing and access to state decision-making (Kwiatkowski 1992).

These institutions politicized grievances by promoting an awareness of worker interests, yet blocked decisional access. I contend that this conjunction of “consultative democracy” and existing exclusionary mechanisms provided the structural basis of protest orientations in Poland in the late 1980s. In short, this conceptualization treats political opportunities under socialism as emanating from the state and varying with reform cycles over time. The state incites opposition by establishing exclusionary linkages that relegate mass incorporating institutions to symbolic bodies, and thereby the state undermines reform.

Reform and Legitimation Crisis

I further argue that failed reform attempts are linked to strike orientations through perceptions of weak regime legitimacy. The relationship between legitimacy and regime transition has been widely discussed in the democratization literature, but the empirical link between legitimacy, political opportunities, and collective action has not been systematically examined. According to Weatherford (1992), subjective evaluations of systemic legitimacy center around three major categories: political interest, trust, and system responsiveness. System responsiveness incorporates perceptions of fairness and efficiency (Weatherford 1992) and thus I consider it most relevant to socialist regimes in crisis. These dimensions tap both the political and economic reform crises of the Jaruzelski regime. Procedural fairness refers to problems of decisional access and representation, while distributive fairness taps issues of economic allocation and equality (see also, Oberschall 1996). I refer to the fairness dimensions together as system alienation.
Distributive efficiency captures aspects of macro-economic performance. Negative evaluations of these system-level processes are the main source of grievances in the pre-transition model of strike support.

In communist Poland, these two issues became inextricably linked in the late 1980s. While the “second-stage” reforms involved extensive market mechanisms and privatization, they were coercively imposed from the center without regard to issues of self-management and workplace democratization. Ironically, Solidarity urged caution with respect to market transition strategies. Opposition economists instead couched economic reform in terms of populist appeals to mass yearnings for self-management and enterprise reform (Zubek 1994). In effect, reform-induced material grievances became politicized through the regime’s failure to confront the problem of political exclusion. I contend that this produced legitimation failures on the two responsiveness dimensions already described; these are (1) problems of equality and access (i.e., procedural and distributive fairness, or system alienation) and (2) problems of economic efficiency (i.e., distributive efficiency).

Informal Mobilizing Contexts in Pre-Transition Poland

While problems of worker exclusion give rise to legitimacy crises, their link to strike support is also mediated by informal network and community settings in which micromobilization occurs. Micromobilization contexts are “small group settings in which processes of collective attribution are combined with rudimentary forms of organization to produce mobilization for collective action” (McAdam, McCarthy and Zald 1988: 709). As such, they capture the processes of frame alignment and cultural identity-building through which individuals are recruited into movement activity. Much of the existing literature on this concept, however, fails to capture either its distinctiveness under authoritarian regimes or how its mobilizing contexts develop under the opportunity structures of repressive politics (see Zuo and Benford 1995, for an exception). In the absence of autonomous interest groups and trade unions, I assert that micromobilization contexts in pre-1989 Poland were loosely and informally organized, primarily around skilled-trade solidarities, urban-intellectual milieus and pre-existing Solidarity networks.

The importance of skilled industrial occupational groups as a basis for micromobilization potential is reflected in their relatively higher strike participation rates in 1980–81 (Adamski 1993). Several factors make skilled workers distinctively strike-prone under state socialism. Most are technically trained, relatively well educated and paid, and occupy positions of
strategic importance in industrializing socialist economies. In Poland, these attributes have generated greater internal efficacy among highly skilled workers and have contributed historically to their ideological support for self-management initiatives (Biezenski 1994). These workers thus share important craft-based political identities as well as common historical experiences and political action. Although strike mobilization among all workers in 1980–81 was facilitated mainly through Solidarity affiliation, the distinctive character of skilled workers should increase their mobilization potential under conditions of more limited organizational capacity.

In pre-transition Poland, another key context for informal mobilization was geographical proximity to urban-intellectual environments. The historical importance of urban centers is typified most clearly by pre-1980 Gdansk where dense networks of oppositional intelligentsia staged commemorative demonstrations, published oppositional statements and forged alliances with workers (Karabel 1993). By 1987, the Polish government had become remarkably tolerant of various underground publications, many of which reported on the 1988 strike wave and made explicit calls for the regularization of Solidarity (Kaminski 1991; Ost 1990; Zubek 1991b).

Independent press statements were distributed widely in larger factories and those located within the major urban, oppositional centers. This promoted ideological unity across oppositional factions which was reflected in the success of several electoral boycotts orchestrated by Solidarity intellectuals (Ost 1990; Smolar 1989). Most importantly, the underground press served to integrate informal factory networks (Smolar 1989) so as to frame worker grievances in anti-regime terms. This would be especially the case among skilled workers, whose structural exclusion was exacerbated by the persistent dilution of self-management. The significance of urban-intellectual milieus as mobilization contexts was thus a by-product of a weak regime that allowed for explicit ideological critiques of its own reform efforts.

Finally, I argue that strike mobilization in the late 1980s relied partially on pre-existing, plant-level Solidarity networks. While martial law had created a fractious and uncoordinated movement, Solidarity activists exerted limited influence at the factory level, primarily through the organization of spontaneous strikes. The majority of the workers remained sympathetic to the movement and either created or reactivated Solidarity Founding Committees during the 1988 strike wave (Blaszkiewicz et al. 1994; Smolar 1989). Therefore, integration into Solidarity networks most likely served to increase the perceived efficacy of strikes and provide increased opportunities for interpersonal contacts and sharing of common grievances and sentiments. Further, to the extent that Solidarity activism is indicative
of prior involvement in strikes, such activism should relate to an increased familiarity with the experience of striking and with knowledge of its utility in effecting change. This positive effect of prior activism would be consistent with other findings from Western-democratic settings (McAdam, McCarthy and Zald 1988).

**Hypotheses: Pre-Transition**

The major hypothetical links of this model are summarized in Figure 9.1. The model hypothesizes that decisional exclusion and legitimation crises are the major bases of strike mobilization during the reform phases of state socialist regimes. Reform campaigns politicize and intensify chronic exclusion and thus provide political opportunities favorable to the development of mobilization potential. At the same time, reform campaigns unwittingly organize negative evaluations of systemic responsiveness and economic efficiency. Micromobilization contexts and pre-existing network affiliations play an important intervening role between grievances and strike support. These are of an informal nature and provide non-material and normative incentives for protest action. These contexts and affiliations are also the collective settings in which group members frame issues and legitimate protest strategies.

**Figure 9.1. Theoretical Model of Strike Support**

The political process literature emphasizes electoral-institutional opportunities, coalitional arrangements, and elite instability as central in collective action formation; this literature also emphasizes that such factors must be subjectively perceived at the level of individual actors (Tarrow 1988). I argue instead that in closed authoritarian polities, opportunities are more state-centered and stem from regime legitimation crises. In order to test and control for more conventional hypotheses from political process theory, I conceptualize the broader political position or conventional “polity status” of workers in pre-transitional Poland in two ways: (1) participation
in the heavy industrial sectors of the economy and (2) identification with the Walesa-led reform faction of Solidarity.

Typically, heavy industry is the most privileged sector in command economies and those involved often gain access to state decision-making through informal bargaining arrangements. Investment decisions usually favor heavy industry. As such, workers in these industries encounter favorable macro opportunities by virtue of bureaucratic access and their economic position relative to investment bias. In a similar way, the 1989 Round Table accords provided new opportunities to advance political claims. As regime changes unfold, new groups contend for political power. Under conventional political process and rational actor models, these struggles should increase perceived efficacy and provide positive incentives for collective action (Opp and Gern 1993; Tarrow 1989). Latent support for the reformist Round Table agenda should have likewise increased perceptions of the influence of protest in accelerating such reform. In contrast, I argue that state socialist regimes experience distinctive styles of collective action because they limit political access. This dynamic is best captured by the politicizing effects of reform cycles through which exclusion becomes the basis of personal evaluations of regime performance. Thus, after controlling for these alternative explanations, I expect strike mobilization to stem from workplace exclusion.

The infrastructural deficits and repressive controls on associational activity encountered by oppositional groups in socialist states point to the importance of informal mobilizing contexts. I expect that firm-level exclusion and legitimacy orientations are mediated by urban-intellectual environments, trade solidarities and informal Solidarity networks. These settings represent sources of micromobilization and framing contexts wherein subjectively defined grievances are translated into support for strikes. They also provide the normative and group incentives that increase the rationality of protest. However, the episodic and confrontational character of strikes under socialism suggests that legitimacy crises and anti-regime grievances may play a more direct role and provide for spontaneous organization and uncoordinated protest actions.

Finally, I expect that the effects of exclusion, legitimacy and informal organization intensify over time as reform cycles mature. Socialist states pursue legitimation strategies that rely, in part, on promises of economic improvement and better standards of living in the future (Ekiert 1992). They also engage in limited forms of mass mobilization as part of the strategy of "consultative democracy." As economic reforms begin to falter, grievances sharpen and become increasingly politicized. The faltering legitimacy of the second-stage reforms intensified with sharp price increases in early 1988,
following the November 1987 referendum campaign designed to mobilize popular support. Consistent with this dynamic, I expect stronger effects of exclusion and legitimacy over time. However, I also expect these effects to be more contingent on micromobilization processes. The specific hypotheses are as follows:

H1.1. Decisional exclusion and legitimacy failures have significant, positive effects on strike support, net of socio-demographic controls.

H1.2. Work-based decisional exclusion is more important than heavy industry and Solidarity support in determining strike support. These variables have non-significant effects on strike support, controlling for exclusion effects.

H1.3. The effects of both exclusion and legitimacy on strike support are partially attenuated, but remain significant, when the effects of mobilization capacity are introduced.

H1.4. Informal mobilizing contexts have significant, positive effects on strike support, net of controls, exclusion, and legitimacy failures.

H1.5. The effects of exclusion and legitimacy orientations on strike support increase in magnitude over time as reform failures intensify.

H1.6. In the later stages of reform, the effects of exclusion and legitimacy are increasingly contingent on mobilizing contexts. Informal mobilization should minimize the independent effects of both variables.

Hypothesized Sources of Strike Mobilization in Post-Transition Poland

Party Development and the Political Position of Labor

The upsurge in strikes in Poland in 1991–93 is best understood in the democratizing context of emergent interests and party system development. In contrast to the anti-system actions of communist Poland, these strikes were rooted in economic grievances and tied largely to the electoral maneuvering and appeals of the post-communist Left. While party development leading up to the fragmented 1991 parliamentary elections was largely non-programmatic, new cleavages began to emerge over restructuring and privatization. As the basic thrust of the Balcerowicz market reforms continued, the persistence of renewed strike activity encountered by the Suchocka government of 1992–93 reflected these cleavages. Although represented in parliament by the Democratic Left Alliance (the main communist successor party), labor interests were largely excluded from successive governing coalitions during 1991–1993.
Increased union support of the strikes occurred in the context of labor's political exclusion at the national level. Economic fears about privatization and job protection were exacerbated by the government's proposal for a corporatist pact on state enterprises, which drew a hostile and militant response among local union activists (Kramer 1995). I argue that the post-communist Left encouraged and sustained strikes and union mobilization by making electoral appeals for a more relaxed reform strategy. Meanwhile, the Polish Peasants' Party, a partner in the post-communist coalition, made protectionist appeals to farm interests. As Kriesi (1996) notes, left oppositional parties tend to facilitate challenges because they represent potential electoral alliances. The extreme volatility and impending realignment among the post-1991 electorate thus created a new form of political opportunity in that a more disciplined left mounted a coalitional bid for power leading up to the 1993 parliamentary elections. I argue that the competitive mobilization of labor votes among left parties should have increased the perceived efficacy of strikes, thereby encouraging such action. In contrast to the pre-transition model, this conceptualization is more consistent with how opportunities have been traditionally defined under Western-democratic polities.

*Market Reform and Restructuring Grievances in Post-Transition Poland*

While the economic and corporatist failures of pre-transition Poland generated widespread and cross-cutting anti-regime sentiment, the market transition gradually produced narrower forms of economic grievances tied to firm restructuring and sectoral interests. I contend that these grievances were most relevant to strikes beginning after 1990.

Despite an austerity-imposed recession, declining real incomes, and a growing threat of unemployment, the Mazowiecki government of 1989-90 encountered few strikes and broad public support. Along with low voter turnout in local and presidential elections in 1990, the absence of strikes signified the politically demobilizing effects of the early transition and the erosion of Solidarity's union identity. As union organizing efforts became displaced by the growing non-ideological and personal struggles between the Walesa and intelligentsia factions of Solidarity, a barrage of structurally and politically diverse unions emerged. This extreme fragmentation was later expressed in the 1991 parliamentary elections, which prompted many to observe that the development of civil society and interest articulation in the post-transition are inherently blocked by the destruction of class inequalities and economic interests under socialism (Ekiert 1992; Ost 1993).
Further, the first post-Round Table governments of 1989–91 had inherited a rich anti-party legacy stemming from the oppositional consciousness of the original Solidarity movement. The weak development of interest aggregation became pronounced during the 1991 campaign as a bewildering array of poorly organized parties launched seemingly contradictory agendas centered around narrow policy issues (Lewis 1994; Zubek 1993). Basic economic cleavages were suppressed. By 1991, economic interests were only very loosely tied to politics.

In contrast, the 1991–1993 period was marked by increased strikes of longer duration and a gradual consolidation of interests leading up to the 1993 parliamentary elections. Grievances became increasingly industry-specific and rooted in policies targeted toward state workers. The most important of these were the prolonged effects of the popiwek wage tax, long-delayed privatization measures and proposals for a corporatist pact on state enterprises. I argue that these grievances became more clearly articulated by 1993 by new forms of electoral-institutional opportunities. This is consistent with the electoral resurgence of the post-communist Left which benefited greatly from the support of discontented industrial workers and the mobilization of new voters (Wade, Lavelle and Groth 1995). Although grievances were translated into strikes against government policies, they were not anti-systemic as in communist Poland. Indeed, restructuring grievances have produced more routinized strikes unaccompanied by a broader, unifying anti-market ideology.

Unions as Mobilizing Contexts

In contrast to the pre-transition model above, I argue that unions, as formal and legal organizations, are now more important contexts through which grievances and party linkages are translated into strike participation. Since trade unions promote networking, shared identities, and inclusiveness, they tend to be highly organized and thus potentially strong mobilizing contexts for collective action (Tilly 1978; Oberschall 1978). Mobilization refers to the collective control of resources, including both tangible and normative, that help to sustain protest. Although my focus is on individual participation, union affiliation is an important mobilizing context because of the greater potential for recruitment appeals and the perceived efficacy of organized action (McAdam, McCarthy and Zald 1988). Unions provide the major pre-existing setting in which micromobilization processes occur.

In addition to organizational memberships, I argue that the structural determinants of post-transition strikes also stem from an individual’s prior experience and involvement in collective action. Further, prior involvement
should be especially important in union settings where dense communicational networks promote the sharing of protest traditions. This is especially relevant to the Polish case where the historical efficacy of strikes is well known.

**Hypotheses: Post-Transition**

The major hypotheses of the post-transition model of strike participation are summarized in Figure 9.2. I first overview the relationship between the constructs presented above and then present a more detailed set of hypotheses. The emergence of market and democratic institutions in Poland has created a new form of political opportunity by which excluded group interests and economic reform grievances are aggregated by new political parties. Following an initial phase of ideological demobilization, competitive voter mobilization by left parties creates an increased awareness of group interests and provides opportunities for union-sponsored strikes. In turn, unions provide the formal settings in which grievances and collective interests are framed and members are recruited into those strikes. The efficacy of strikes, however, may also be constructed from an individual's own personal history or recollection of collective action. Based on this model, the following specific hypotheses are proposed:

**Figure 9.2. Theoretical Model of Strike Participation**

ELECTORAL OPPORTUNITIES/EXCLUDED GROUP INTERESTS  \[\rightarrow\] PROTEST TRADITION/FORMAL ORGANIZATION  \[\rightarrow\] STRIKE PARTICIPATION

- **H2.1.** Privatization and restructuring grievances are more important than anti-market ideology in determining strike participation. Anti-market ideologies have non-significant effects, net of socio-demographic controls.

- **H2.2.** Electoral opportunities, group interests, grievances and mobilizing contexts have positive effects on strike participation, net of socio-demographic controls. The effects of opportunities and group interests are mediated by grievances and mobilizing contexts.
H2.3. The magnitude of the relationship between grievances and participation is attenuated when the effects of protest traditions and union membership are introduced.

H2.4. Prior strike participation has positive, additive effects on participation, net of formal organization.

H2.5. The effects of opportunities, interests, grievances and prior strike history are interactive by union membership status in their effects on strike participation.

H2.6. The effects of grievances and organizational resources are interactive by industry status in their effects on strike participation.

Measures and Design

Although political process theories emphasize group conflict and the macro-level emergence of collective action over time, my analytic focus is on differential mobilization at the individual level. These levels of analysis, however, are not unrelated (McAdam et al. 1988) and frequently employ similar theoretical terms. For example, deprivation and related forms of discontent are treated as subjective in individual analyses of protest (Finkel, Muller and Opp 1989; Muller, Dietz, Finkel 1991; Muller and Opp 1986; Opp 1989) but considered objective in several macro studies (e.g., Gurr 1970; Gurr and Lichbach 1986; Muller and Seligson 1987). Likewise, resource mobilization constructs have been operationalized in micro studies (e.g., Klandermans 1989; Opp 1989) but also in cross-national and ecological analyses (e.g., Boswell and Dixon 1990; Jenkins and Kposowa 1990; Shorter and Tilly 1974).

I use the concept of strike legitimacy to refer to both attitudinal support for the right to strike as a means of protecting worker interests and as approval for the use of strikes as an appropriate means of broader political protest. The concept of strike support is related empirically to that of trade union pluralism and self-management and thus represents part of a broader notion of worker empowerment. Strike demands for free trade unions date back to 1970 (Laba 1986), while trade union pluralism and shopfloor democracy were major points of contention around which the Solidarity opposition boycotted cooptive reforms of the 1980s. After 1989, self-management bodies provided organizational support for worker resistance to various privatization proposals. At the same time, various post-communist parliamentary blocs have sought to legislate against the disruptive influence of trade unions in general. The fact that perceptions regarding the importance of strikes cohere with these other related dimensions underscores the reliability of the measure.
The dependent variable of strike support is measured using a single item that taps respondents' favorability toward the importance of the right to strike. As discussed above, this analysis treats strike approval as a critical dimension of collective action processes, consistent with the finding that support for the means and goals of protest is a precondition for later involvement in recruitment networks and protest events (Klandermans and Oegema 1987). The study of approval is also important to the extent that the effectiveness and success of collective action depend on the broader scope of such approval (Schumaker 1975; Turner 1969). The dependent variable in the post-transition analysis is actual strike participation which is measured as having participated in at least one strike action between 1990 and 1993.

Independent Variables: Pre-Transition

Definitions and descriptive data for the independent variables used in the pre-transition analysis are presented in Table 9.1. Decisional exclusion is measured through the dimensions of firm-level influence and membership in OPZZ (National Trade Union Accord), the party-sponsored trade unions of the post-Martial Law period. Firm-level influence is a scaled measure that taps the degree of influence over wage levels, shopfloor organization, and position appointments in the firm (reliability coefficient = 0.78). Membership in OPZZ is a dummy variable, capturing identification with one of the major linkage institutions of the 1980s reform phase. I argue that non-membership represents a rejection of the reform process and thus the perceived failure of such reforms to provide formal decisional access to the regime.

Polity status, on the other hand, is measured through employment in mining and heavy industry and the percent vote for Solidarity in the 1989 Round Table elections in the respondent's province of residence. The latter taps exposure to local, community networks in which latent support for the moderate wing of Solidarity was strong. Grievances are defined as legitimacy orientations and are captured by a series of single-item variables gauging personal evaluations of system responsiveness. These include items relating to perceptions of global system alienation (i.e., distributive and procedural fairness) and distributive efficiency.

Informal organization and the control variables are operationalized in a straightforward, conventional manner. Occupational status is coded one if the respondent's permanent, full-time job is defined as a craft or related skilled-trade occupation. Urban is operationalized as the percent of urban population in the respondent's province of residence. Solidarity membership is a dummy variable coded one if the respondent reported member-
Table 9.1. Means and Standard Deviations of Variables Used in Pre-Transition Analysis

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>1987–1988 Sample</th>
<th>1988 Sample</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mean</td>
<td>Standard deviation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dependent variable</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strike support: The right to strike is an important right of all employees(^a)</td>
<td>2.91</td>
<td>0.97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independent variables</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Solidarity vote, 1989: Voting for Solidarity in region of residence (%)</td>
<td>64.58</td>
<td>7.98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Firm-level influence: In your present job can you influence wage levels, shop floor organization, appointments to any position?(^b)</td>
<td>2.33</td>
<td>1.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Distributive efficiency: If economic difficulties are to be avoided: the authorities should not lose control over society, or society should not lose control over authorities, or both conditions are equally important(^c)</td>
<td>2.09</td>
<td>0.65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>System alienation: In your opinion, did the socialist system bring most people in Poland only losses, more losses than gains, the same amount of gains and losses, more gains than losses, or only gains?(^d)</td>
<td>2.94</td>
<td>0.86</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^a\) From strongly disagree (1) to strongly agree (4).
\(^b\) Four-point scale, from 0 to 3.
\(^c\) From the authorities should not lose control over society (1) to society should not lose control over authorities (3), with both conditions are equally important in the middle.
\(^d\) From only gains (1) to only losses (5).

Ship in a Solidarity-related trade union in 1980–81. The socio-demographic control variables include gender, age, education and communist party membership status. Gender and party status are dummy variables, both coded one if respondents are male or are party members at the time of the survey, respectively. Including party membership status helps control for the potentially confounding effects of party/non-party power differentials in the workplace. Age is defined in terms of year of birth, while education is a categorical variable representing major educational threshold levels.
**Independent Variables: Post-Transition**

Definitions and descriptive data for the independent variables used in the post-transition analysis are presented in Table 9.2. *Group interests* are defined by heavy industry employment (coded one if respondent is employed in heavy industry), left party mobilization and group-conflict orientation. Left party mobilization is a dummy variable scored as one if either of the following conditions holds: (1) the respondent reported voting for a labor or communist successor party in 1991 and intends to vote (party

<p>| Table 9.2. Means and Standard Deviations of Variables Used in Post-Transition Analysis |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>1993 Sample Mean</th>
<th>Standard deviation</th>
<th>1992–1993 Sample Mean</th>
<th>Standard deviation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Dependent variable</strong></td>
<td>Strike participation: Respondent participated in a strike, 1990–1993 = 1, otherwise = 0</td>
<td>0.12</td>
<td>0.33</td>
<td>0.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Independent variables</strong></td>
<td>Left party mobilization: Respondent voted for communist successor party in 1991 or intended to vote for such party in 1993 = 1, otherwise = 0</td>
<td>0.16</td>
<td>0.37</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Group conflict orientation: Respondent's assessment of conflicts among rich versus poor, non-manual versus manual workers, supervisors versus supervisees, and rulers versus ruled</td>
<td>3.22</td>
<td>0.76</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Generalized market discontent: Respondent's assessment of changes in Poland on five-point scale</td>
<td>1.41</td>
<td>0.79</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Anti-market orientation: Respondent's opinion that the prices of basic foodstuffs should be under control of government</td>
<td>2.09</td>
<td>1.09</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Negative evaluation of change: Respondent's assessment that life was better 4–5 years ago and that the changes bring more threats</td>
<td>3.59</td>
<td>0.83</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Opposition to market sale of firm: Respondent opposed free market sale of large enterprises = 1, otherwise = 0</td>
<td>0.55</td>
<td>0.50</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Restructuring grievances: Respondent's assessment that the changes in workplace were clearly for worse</td>
<td>0.30</td>
<td>0.46</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
not specified) in 1993 or (2) the respondent did not vote in 1991 and intends
to vote for a labor or communist successor party in 1993. Group-conflict
orientation represents the mean response on five items that tap the degree of
perceived conflict between various societal and work-related groups (reliabil-
ity coefficient = 0.66).

Three variables are used to define the general concept of market
discontent. Negative evaluation of change is a single-item, ordinal meas-
ure tapping perception of system alienation since 1989. Anti-market
orientation is a single-item dummy variable gauging the respondent’s
attitude toward market determination of food prices. Finally, generalized
market discontent is a two-item scale combining prospective assessments
of market opportunities and evaluation of present material condition
versus well-being before 1989 (reliability coefficient = 0.68). Firm-level
grievances are operationalized through a dummy variable that taps
occurrence of organizational change in the respondent’s firm and the
respondent’s opinion of that change. Privatization grievances are also
measured through a dummy variable coded one if respondents are
 unfavorably toward the privatization of large enterprises through free
market sales.

Organizational mobilization is defined on the levels of formal organiza-
tion and protest tradition. The protest tradition variables include prior strike
involvement and skilled occupational status, while union membership and
firm size are used to measure formal organization. Prior strike experience is
measured as a dummy variable coded one if the respondent reported
participating in a strike in 1980–81. Although this variable is subject to
recall bias, strike participation in an authoritarian setting is presumably
a dramatic and memorable event in an individual’s life and thus a reliable
indicator of prior activism. Union membership status is a dummy variable
coded one if the respondent reports belonging to Solidarity, OPZZ or any
other union since 1988 but not beginning after 1990; this is done in order to
rule out union membership subsequent to the window of post-transition
strike opportunity in 1990–1993. Skilled workers are defined as described
above, while firm size is an interval-level variable defined as the reported
number of employees in the respondent’s firm of employment through
which he or she has been employed since 1990. The control variables are the
same as used above, except that they include a control for labor force status
in the post-transition analysis. This measure is a dummy variable coded one
if the respondent is not employed but reports that he or she is seeking
permanent work.
**Design**

For the pre-transition analysis, I treat the second-stage reform phase of communist Poland as a macro-context characterized by the conjunction of state-level policy shifts and systemic legitimacy crises (Muller, Dietz and Finkel 1991). Since survey data preclude direct measurement of these constructs, my analytic focus is on the corresponding individual-level attributes of these systemic processes that are linked to differential support of strikes.

As part of the design strategy, I first estimate two ordinary least squares (OLS) regression models based on pooled survey data from 1987–1988. Although the dependent variable is ordinal, OLS in this case is appropriate given the relative non-skewness of the response distribution. Further, OLS has been used with ordinal dependent variables in other similar contexts without producing bias (see Grant and Wallace 1991). These models provide a baseline set of results that help evaluate the hypotheses asserted in Figure 9.1. I then estimate identical models using 1988 data alone in order to examine the stability of the results in the context of the period immediately preceding the 1988 strike waves. In both analyses, I introduce theoretically related variables in a block entry format and control for important socio-demographic attributes.

In the second part of the analysis, I test the theoretical arguments presented in Figure 9.2 specifying the sources of actual strike participation. I use logistic regression analysis since the dependent variable is dichotomous (i.e., participation or non-participation in a strike in 1990–1993). The multivariate models throughout the analysis specify the log odds of strike participation in 1990–1993 as a function of electoral opportunities/group interests, restructuring grievances, mobilizing contexts and the socio-demographic controls.

In this section, I first estimate several logistic regression models using 1993 survey data that address the relationships hypothesized in Figure 9.2. The 1993 survey includes the measures tapping group and party identification as well as market discontent and privatization orientations. This part of the analysis, therefore, tests for the electoral opportunity arguments and allows for an evaluation of generalized market versus firm-specific grievance effects. I then estimate a series of similar models, splitting the sample by union and non-union membership status. This allows for an examination of interaction effects by mobilizing context, as measured by union status. The second part of the post-transition analysis pools the 1993 data together with data from a separate 1992 sample of the Polish adult population, surveyed as part of a comparative study of Poland and Ukraine (Slomczynski et al. 1999). In this analysis, I have restricted the sample to permanent, non-farm workers in order to examine industrial sector effects.
The sample restrictions allow for an analysis of the relationship between firm-restructuring grievances and strike participation and an examination of how the effects of restructuring vary by heavy industry employment status.

Results: Pre-Transition Strike Support

If my arguments concerning reform cycles are correct, then the policy failures of the mid-1980s should have had a strong politicizing effect on Polish workers, leading those excluded from key decisional arenas to support strikes. These reform failures should have also been the basis of multiple legitimation crises, promoting strike approval among workers with anti-regime sentiment. My hypotheses concerning the type of movement structure in pre-transition Poland hold that community and informal networks are the main settings in which anti-regime grievances are framed and activated in the mobilization of strike support.

Table 9.3. Regression Analysis of Strike Support, 1987-1988

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>1987-1988 Sample</th>
<th>1988 Sample</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Basic model</td>
<td>Full model</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Standardized coefficients</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Demographic variables
- Gender (male = 1) 0.137** 0.108** 0.157** 0.109**
- Age (year of birth) 0.026* 0.037* 0.026 0.033*

Control variables
- Education 0.131** 0.144** 0.146** 0.171**
- PUWP membership (yes = 1) -0.068** -0.060** -0.088** -0.078**

Opportunities: polity status
- Solidarity vote, 1989 0.026* 0.030* 0.024 0.024
- Heavy industry (yes = 1) 0.057** 0.027* 0.066** 0.035*

Opportunities: exclusion
- Firm-level influence 0.043** 0.041** 0.056** 0.052**
- OPZZ non-member 0.071** 0.064** 0.077** 0.071**

Grievances: legitimacy
- System alienation 0.160** 0.153** 0.062** 0.059**
- Distributive efficiency 0.137** 0.131** 0.152** 0.148**

Informal organization
- Skilled worker (yes = 1) 0.058** 0.092**
- Urban residence 0.046** 0.029
- Solidarity member 0.096** 0.106**

Adjusted $R^2$ 0.108 0.121 0.090 0.107

*p<0.05  **p<0.01
Throughout the analysis presented in Table 9.3, the samples are restricted to the economically active, non-agricultural, non-self employed population in order to examine the effects of firm-level exclusion. The 1988 base model presents the direct effects of exclusion and grievances, net of traditional polity status and socio-demographic controls. The results show that males and better-educated individuals exhibit higher levels of strike support, while party members have lower levels. The higher support among males reflects traditional gender-based commitments to labor militancy as well as the disproportionate representation of males in strike-prone occupations and industries. The strong positive effect of education is consistent with analyses of protest potential in Western-democratic countries, indicating that higher levels of self-direction and internal efficacy promote strike approval. It may also indicate, however, that education is related to support for systemic change and the perceived likelihood to benefit from market reform. Concerning the effects of age, younger workers report greater support for strikes, but the effect is weak and non-significant. This finding is unexpected, given that the 1988 strikes demonstrated a strong generational bias. It suggests that support for strikes was not based narrowly in younger age cohorts. Older workers, whose formative experiences were shaped largely by the Solidarity movement, also exhibited pro-strike attitudes. Finally, the strong, negative effects of communist party membership on strike support are not surprising, given their favorable access to material rewards and disproportionate allocation to managerial positions.

The base model also reveals that the exclusion variables are strongly significant and in the expected direction. Lack of workplace influence and non-participation in the official communist unions promote strike approval. The effects of firm influence underscore the importance of blocked decisional access as a basis of workplace conflict under socialism. Although self-management, as one component of access, was a secondary concern among workers during the Solidarity movement, intellectuals promoted it after 1981 as one means of effecting enterprise decentralization and eventual market reform (Biezenski 1994; Ost 1990). However, the diluted version of self-management implemented after martial law evoked a widespread loss of confidence in the concept (Mason 1987). The conjunction of mass aspirations for workplace democracy and the failure to successfully incorporate workers into the regime’s reform institutions had a radicalizing effect on those most excluded from firm-level decision-making. The firm influence effect is also consistent with ethnographic evidence on the sources of actual strike participation in 1988. Although price increases were among the major precipitating causes, strikers cited dissatisfaction with authority relations, meaningfulness of work, and lack of influence as their main grievances;
these grievances contributed to a deep sense of political alienation and
demands for the reinstatement of Solidarity (Blaszkiewicz et. al. 1994).

The base model further reveals that OPZZ non-membership is an even
more important determinant of strike support. This variable more directly
captures the failure of the regime's limited inclusion strategy and suggests
that those who boycotted the post-Solidarity unions developed pro-strike
attitudes over their lack of decisional access. The introduction of new
ministerial branch unions after 1981 as a means of combating the hori-
zontalist tradition of Solidarity typified the exclusionary nature of the 1980s
reform institutions. The branch structure promoted centralization within
industrial sectors, blocking the development of regional ties characteristic of
Solidarity's structure (Kolankiewicz and Lewis 1988; Mason 1987). On the
one hand, this facilitated the consultative strategy of the party by which
workers' opinions and interests were solicited. On the other hand, it
undermined union autonomy and enterprise decentralization. Following an
initial surge in membership in the mid-1980s, recruitment declined by
1987–88 (Kolankiewicz and Lewis 1988). This is consistent with the
reported upsurge in public confidence in the unions between 1984–85,
followed by a sharp decline over the next three years (Jasiewicz and
Zukowski 1992). These findings suggest that following initial interest in the
unions, an increasing perception of their ineffectiveness fostered pro-strike
attitudes among non-members.

The moderately strong effects of the exclusion variables endure even
after controlling for alternative polity explanations of strike mobilization. It
could be argued, for example, that because heavy industries enjoy favorable
access to investment decisions in socialist economies, strikes are likely to
be employed as a defensive means of protecting bureaucratic privilege
during economic reform. Membership in heavy industry thus provides
a "meaningful access point" (Brockett 1991) within the central planning
process that could encourage strikes. Although the strongly significant
effect of heavy industry supports this notion, its effects do not compete with
the exclusion variables. The contextual effects of Solidarity identification,
however, do not support an electoral opportunity argument regarding
pre-transition strike mobilization. In fact, strike rates at the aggregate level
are inversely related to overall voter turnout in the 1989 election (Jasiewicz
and Zukowski 1992) and are consistent with the emerging radical-neocor-
poratist split in the Solidarity movement prior to the transition.

Finally, the 1987–88 base model also reports the direct effects of the
legitimacy variables, net of the controls. As expected, negative evaluations
of overall system alienation and distributive efficiency exert strong positive
effects on strike approval. The results suggest that problems of respon-
siveness and economic performance lead to distinctive sources of instability in socialist states. Since legitimation strategies emphasize improved economic growth, better standards of living for workers and egalitarian principles, problems of stagnation and political access are blamed on the state. Periodic mass mobilization campaigns exacerbate legitimacy crises because they act to organize and centralize anti-regime grievances. Consistent with my hypotheses, the results indicate that strike support was based strongly in both economic grievances as well as broader egalitarian values. More importantly, they point to the central role of legitimacy failures in producing oppositional attitudes, despite the party’s increasingly pro-market stance in 1988-89 and relaxed controls on dissent.

The fully specified model in Table 9.3 includes the effects of informal mobilization contexts. The purpose of this strategy is twofold: first, to assess the main effects of informal organization on strike support; and second, to determine the extent to which these variables mediate exclusionary effects and anti-regime grievances. In the first case, the results confirm my earlier hypotheses. Former Solidarity members, skilled workers, and those living in urban areas are all more likely to endorse strikes. Overall, the findings point to multiple bases of mobilization. On the one hand, the urban effect suggests that exposure to dissident publication networks and urban-intellectual communities increased opportunities for the development of anti-system frames. This would be consistent with the urban character of street demonstrations in the late 1980s (see Misztal 1990) as well as the historical propensity of the intelligentsia to articulate economic and political problems and propose alternative solutions. On the other hand, the class effect demonstrates the persistence of collectivism and narrow trade solidarities among skilled workers with a long-standing tradition of strike participation in Poland. The dichotomous coding, however, could be masking the effects of increased participation among less skilled workers in the 1988 strikes. It could also be reflecting a broader industry effect. Nonetheless, the effect is independent of Solidarity status and points to the role of cohesive occupational groups and shared identities in promoting pro-strike attitudes.

The results also reveal that former Solidarity membership has significant positive effects on strike support. In fact, the magnitude of the standardized coefficient indicates that it is the most important mobilizing context included in the analysis. The finding suggests that prior involvement in Solidarity provided a cumulative repertoire of strike exposure and experience which served to increase the perceived legitimacy of such actions. It also points to the possibility that former members maintained their involvement in pre-existing communication networks that, in turn, increased the likelihood of mobilization contacts with strike organizers and activists. In this
sense, the result fits the classic resource mobilization argument that recruitment is facilitated by existence of internal organization and communicational ties based on common experiences (Freeman 1973; Oberschall 1973).

Contrary to my expectations, there is no evidence that informal mobilization processes mediate exclusion-based grievances, nor do they reduce the effects of legitimacy orientations. But these results are still striking in a number of ways. First, the alternative polity status effects are weak and only marginally significant, suggesting that heavy industry has little independent importance in shaping pre-transition strike attitudes. Instead, its earlier effects appear mainly due to greater concentrations of former Solidarity members. Second, the fact that strong, direct exclusion effects endure in the final model supports the notion that the reforms produced widespread exclusionary grievances irreducible to occupational location or pre-existing Solidarity affiliation.

The most remarkable results concern the legitimacy variables. Not only are the effects robust in the fully specified model, they also emerge as the most important determinants of strike approval. The results suggest that the impact of anti-regime attitudes on the creation of strike potential is not necessarily contingent on network and group incentives. It could be argued that potential strikers encounter barriers to actual participation in the absence of such incentives (see Klandermans and Oegema 1987). However, the importance of network incentives may be less critical in shaping "unorganized" protest actions in authoritarian settings with resource-poor environments (Opp and Gern 1993). This would be consistent with the spontaneous character of the 1988 strikes, which erupted without Solidarity sponsorship. As these results demonstrate, anti-regime sentiment was sufficiently strong that it generated diffuse pro-strike orientations independent of existing organizational affiliations.

The second part of Table 9.3 extends this analysis by presenting separate regression estimates for the 1988 sample. The purpose is to isolate the opportunity, grievance and organization effects in 1988, just prior to the outbreak of widespread strikes. Although the time span is limited, rapid social changes in Poland during this period are well documented. The Polacy surveys, for example, demonstrate substantial declines in coefficients of confidence regarding key government institutions and regime leaders during 1985–1988, including Jaruzelski, Rakowski, parliament, the communist party, and the official trade unions (Jasiewicz and Zukowski 1992). I argue that this short-term change in public opinion is consistent with the trajectory of the reform cycle and, thus the decline in regime confidence should also be reflected in my results.
The results from these models, however, provide only mixed support for these arguments. The base model suggests that while strike support in 1988 became increasingly associated with education, gender, employment by heavy industries, and firm-level exclusion, the effects of system alienation declined substantially in relative importance. The weaker effects of alienation may be indicative of the nature of the regime's increasingly pro-market policies in 1988 which relied on severe austerity measures and associated price reforms. These policies may have mitigated the effects of alienation but exacerbated perceived problems of distributive efficiency.

Contrary to expectations, the results in the full model show no evidence that grievances became increasingly contingent on micromobilization processes. They further reveal sharply divergent findings among the informal organization variables. While skilled workers are much more likely to endorse strikes in 1988, the urban residence effect is not significant and is seemingly inconsistent with the urban basis of strikes in 1988. Oppositional attitudes apparently became more geographically diffuse by 1988 as Solidarity gained greater national prominence leading up to the Round Table talks.

On the other hand, the much greater tendency among skilled workers to support strikes in 1988 is consistent with the mildly stronger effects of Solidarity membership. This supports the argument that the strike mobilization process intensified (at least with regard to group incentives) as the economic and political crises of the Jaruzelski regime worsened. The hyperinflationary conditions at the start of 1988 may have led former Solidarity members and skilled workers to legitimize strikes because they invoked images of previously successful protests against price increases. The Solidarity member effects are also consistent with the reorganization of Solidarity's national elite. The leadership's calls to boycott the 1987 popular reform referendum may have mobilized interest in protest action, thereby creating new incentives to support strikes. Boycotting was, in fact, strongly related to former Solidarity membership (Adamski 1993).

Overall, the results of this analysis lend support to the major theoretical arguments presented in Figure 9.1. The exclusion, legitimacy, and organizational variables all exhibit strongly significant, positive effects on strike support in the 1987–88 pooled sample. While the results generally fail to support the hypothesized mediating influences of informal organization, strike support became increasingly associated with skilled-worker milieux and former Solidarity membership on the eve of the 1988 strikes.
Results: Strike Participation in the First Phase of Transition

Figure 9.2 presents a model of strike participation that draws largely on traditional political process and resource mobilization models. The model incorporates the basic political process components of group interest, mobilization capacity and the opportunity to realize group interests. As argued above, these conceptual models are linked through their joint emphasis on the relationship between context and movement structures. If my arguments concerning strike mobilization in the post-transition are

Table 9.4. Logistic Regression Analysis of Strike Participation, 1990–93

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Independent variables</th>
<th>Model I*</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th>Model II*</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
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<td>Exp(B)</td>
<td>B</td>
<td>Standard error</td>
<td>Exp(B)</td>
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<tr>
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<td>1.024**</td>
<td>0.027</td>
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<td>1.027*</td>
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<td>1.183**</td>
<td>0.171</td>
<td>0.040</td>
<td>1.186**</td>
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<td>0.193</td>
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<td>1.749**</td>
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<tr>
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<tr>
<td>Opposition to market sale of firm f</td>
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<tr>
<td>Protest tradition</td>
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<tr>
<td>Participated in strike, 1980–1981</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Skilled worker (yes = 1)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Formal organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>Union membership g</td>
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<td></td>
<td>-4.865</td>
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Table 9.4. Logistic Regression Analysis of Strike Participation, 1990–93 – Continued

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<th>Independent variables</th>
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<th>Model II</th>
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<td></td>
<td>B</td>
<td>Standard error</td>
<td>Exp(B)</td>
<td>B</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Demographic variables</strong></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender (male = 1)</td>
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<td>0.084</td>
<td>1.148</td>
<td>-0.025</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age (year of birth)</td>
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<td>0.009</td>
<td>1.025**</td>
<td>0.031</td>
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<td><strong>Control variables</strong></td>
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<td>1.191**</td>
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<td>0.739*</td>
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<td><strong>Group interests</strong></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Heavy industry (yes = 1)</td>
<td>0.343</td>
<td>0.114</td>
<td>1.409**</td>
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<tr>
<td>Left party mobilizationc</td>
<td>0.230</td>
<td>0.108</td>
<td>1.259*</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Group conflict orientationd</td>
<td>0.232</td>
<td>0.120</td>
<td>1.261*</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Market discontent</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Generalized market discontente</td>
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<tr>
<td>Anti–market orientatione</td>
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<tr>
<td>Negative evaluation of changee</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Privatization grievances</strong></td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Opposition to market sale of firmf</td>
<td>0.246</td>
<td>0.086</td>
<td>1.279**</td>
<td>0.157</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protest tradition</td>
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<tr>
<td>Participated in strike, 1980–1981</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.232</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Skilled worker (yes = 1)</td>
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<td>0.123</td>
<td>1.290*</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Formal organization</strong></td>
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<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Union membershipg</td>
<td>0.662</td>
<td>0.089</td>
<td>1.939**</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Constant</strong></td>
<td>-4.456</td>
<td>0.543</td>
<td></td>
<td>-4.760</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

-2 log likelihood       | 1020.98 |                 |         | 918.17          |                 |         |
Change in likelihood ratio | 8.43  |                 |         | 57.45           |                 |         |
P-value of likelihood test | 0.004 |                 |         | 0.000           |                 |         |

q 0.05 p 0.01

\[ a \] Dependent variable: respondent participated in a strike, 1990–1993 = 1, otherwise = 0.
\[ b \] Categories coded from 1 (elementary or less) to university degree (9).
\[ c \] Respondent voted for communist successor party in 1991 or intended to vote for such party in 1993 = 1, otherwise = 0.
\[ d \] Four questionnaire items pertaining to conflicts among people.
\[ e \] See Table 9.2.
\[ f \] Respondent opposed free market sale of large enterprises = 1, otherwise = 0.
\[ g \] Respondent reported membership in a trade union since 1988 = 1, otherwise = 0.

p 0.05 **p 0.01
correct, then the electoral volatility of 1991–1993 should have provided new political opportunities (i.e., context structure) for the aggregation of excluded group interests and reform grievances. Based on my assertions regarding the contrasting movement structures of the pre and post-transition contexts, I expect to find strong mediation effects by way of union mobilization. However, the shared identities arising from common prior strike experience should provide an alternative source of strike mobilization. Finally, the democratic-market transition has produced new sources of grievances that are based largely in industrial sector and firm location. In other words, grievances in the post-transition should be much less diffuse and much more contingent on mobilizing contexts.

Table 9.4 present results from a series of logistic regression models based on the 1993 data, while Table 9.5 shows results from an analysis of both the 1993 data and a pooled 1992-1993 sample described above. Results in Table 9.4 are based on the full sample, including farm workers and non-labor force respondents, while Table 9.5 splits the sample by union membership and heavy industry status. The first equation shows the effects of group interests on strike participation, net of education, gender, age and labor force status. Considering the socio-demographic effects, the coefficients show that education and age (inversely coded) are positively associated with strike participation, which is consistent with findings in Western-democratic contexts that link increased knowledge of grievances, self-direction and biographical availability with protest. The results are also strongly consistent with the persistent, positive effects of education throughout the pre-transition models. Although men are more likely than women to strike, the result is non-significant and contrasts sharply with the strong gender role effect found in the pre-transition analysis. Structural force changes and the emergence of teacher strikes in 1992–1993 has clearly weakened the historic gender bias of strikes in Poland. Those seeking permanent work were less likely to have participated in a strike since 1990, though the coefficient is not significant.

The impact of the group interest measures in the first model of Table 9.4 are all consistent with my hypotheses. As expected, support for leftist parties (i.e., previous support for or expressed intent to vote for communist successor parties or UP in next elections) and perceptions of group conflict have significant and positive effects on strike participation. Further, sectoral interests, as measured by heavy industry, exert very strong effects on the likelihood of striking. Those employed in heavy industries are 75 percent more likely to have participated in a strike than their non-heavy counterparts. These findings suggest that by mid-1993, industrial protest had become responsive to stronger ideological appeals made by the Left.
Table 9.5. Odds Ratios of Strike Participation by Union Membership and Sector Location, 1990–93

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Independent variables</th>
<th>Union membership</th>
<th>Sector locationa</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Non-members Exp(B)</td>
<td>Members Exp(B)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Demographic variables</strong></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender (male = 1)</td>
<td>0.949</td>
<td>1.025</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age (year of birth)</td>
<td>1.047**</td>
<td>1.020*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Control variables</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Educationb</td>
<td>1.135*</td>
<td>1.259**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seeking employment (yes = 1)</td>
<td>0.544*</td>
<td>0.977</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Group interests</strong></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Heavy industry (yes = 1)</td>
<td>1.689**</td>
<td>1.264*</td>
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<tr>
<td>Left party mobilizationc</td>
<td>1.294</td>
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<tr>
<td>Group conflict orientationd</td>
<td>1.026</td>
<td>1.493**</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Market and privatization grievances</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Negative opinion on firm restructuringe</td>
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<td>1.102</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Opposition to market sale of firmf</td>
<td>1.186</td>
<td>1.141</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Protest tradition</strong></td>
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<td>1.171</td>
<td>1.411**</td>
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<td>Union membershipg</td>
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</table>

b Categories coded from 1 (elementary or less) to university degree (9).
c Respondent voted for communist successor party in 1991 or intended to vote for such party in 1993 = 1, otherwise = 0.
d Four questionnaire items pertaining to conflicts among people; see Table 9.2.
e Respondent's general opinion on restructuring his or her workplace on the four-point scale.
f Respondent opposed free market sale of large enterprises = 1, otherwise = 0.
g Respondent reported membership in a trade union since 1988 = 1, otherwise = 0.
h Number of employees in respondent's firm.

*p < 0.05   **p < 0.01

Those appeals created a heightened awareness of economic interests, forming a loose, collective incentive to engage in strike action. In contrast to communist Poland, these findings demonstrate how strike actions have become increasingly based in electoral instability.

The next two equations estimated in Table 9.4 present the findings from alternative grievance models of strike participation, controlling for socio-demographic effects. The purpose of these models is to test hypotheses...
concerning the main effects of market-related grievances on differential participation. The results reveal interesting and robust distinctions in the nature of market grievances and their role in shaping strike actions in post-communist Poland. There is strong support for my arguments about the increasing importance of firm and industry-specific grievances in determining strike participation. Opposition to the market sale of firms (as one proposed type of privatization) has a strong, positive effect on participation. Respondents opposed to free market sales of state enterprises are 28 percent more likely to participate in a strike than those unopposed. Mass commercialization programs were swiftly rejected by firm-level Employee Councils, which viewed the plans as state-imposed assaults on their decision-making control over firm assets (Dabrowski et al. 1991). The relationship between opposition to such plans and labor militancy suggests an awareness of the uncertainties surrounding privatization and perceived threats to worker interests.

Remarkably, however, none of the market discontent variables is an important determinant of strike action. These results are strongly consistent with my earlier hypotheses regarding grievances. Anti-market ideologies and negative evaluations of the transition fail as motivational sources of strikes. In the pre-transition analysis, however, global anti-system grievances have strong effects on strike support. The findings from the discontent and grievance models are consistent with the nature of post-socialist, democratic transitions. In the early phases of transition, the demobilization of economic cleavages that accompany transitional governments allows for broad support of harsh austerity programs, despite their negative effect on personal well-being. Although interests gradually begin to consolidate, the persistence of oppositional consciousness sustains support for a pro-reform ideology based largely on value orientations and historical identities (Bennhard 1996). In contrast, the effect of the privatization measure underscores the importance of narrower forms of economic grievances tied more to the structural location of enterprises.

The final model presented in Table 9.4 includes the effects of protest traditions and union membership on strike participation, net of group interests, firm-level grievances and controls. Market discontent variables are excluded since they were shown earlier to have non-significant effects. The purposes of this model are to demonstrate the direct impact of organizational contexts and to assess the mediating relationships depicted in Figure 9.2.

If my hypotheses are correct regarding organizational resources, then normative and utilitarian incentives arising from trade solidarities and strike repertoires should exert significant effects on post-transition participation.
Similarly, the network density of formal union organizations should also provide a highly mobilized setting in which strike action may occur. As predicted, the results show moderately to strongly significant effects of informal affiliations and membership in a post-transition union on strike participation.

The more striking finding is that union membership renders the effect of the privatization variable only marginally significant. This contrasts sharply with the pre-transition results in which legitimacy perceptions exert strong effects on strike support independent of network and group incentives. On the other hand, the role of left party identification and group identities is not diminished by controlling for privatization grievances and organizational resources, failing to support the hypothesized mediating role of these measures. The enduring effects of group interests in the full model indicate their independent role in determining strike involvement. These results do suggest, however, that in post-socialist Poland, both formal organizational affiliations and protest traditions from the Solidarity era have an important role in framing post-reform grievances in collective action terms.

In order to further explore the specific mobilizing effects of union membership, the first two models of Table 9.5 report findings from a similar set of fully specified models split by union status. The first model presents results based on the non-member sample, while the second equation is estimated for union members only. The market discontent variables are excluded since their effects are non-significant in Table 9.4. The purpose of the analysis is to assess the extent to which party/group identities, industrial sector, grievances and prior activism vary with union membership in their effects on strike participation.

The key question is whether the coefficients differ in magnitude between members and non-members. Table 9.4 reveals that unions effectively frame and translate grievances into strike action. As an important corollary, I asserted earlier that union settings should act to intensify the effect of grievances, prior activism and party/group identities on strike participation. Dense, overlapping networks increase the importance of normative and collective incentives that compel members to act on their grievances and interests. The results, however, provide only limited support for this notion. Although union members strike because of their stronger perceptions of group conflict, the effects of privatization grievances do not vary by union status. Further, left party identification is only marginally significant among union members.

The absence of left party-union ties (see Table 9.4) and grievance interaction effects underscores the fractious and decentralized character of trade unions in Poland in 1991–1993. While the OPZZ and the Coal Miners’
Union Federation, for example, opposed reforms, Solidarity union representatives in the 1991 parliament favored expanding them. Solidarity also rejected the OPZZ's overtures for a consolidated opposition against the government, which reflected Solidarity's enduring anti-communist sentiment (Kramer 1995). Further, the resurgence of Employee Councils, often dominated by union members, in the privatization debate contributed to the decentralization of labor interests, giving enterprise reforms an idiosyncratic quality (Dabrowski et al 1991; Kloc 1992).

As unions proliferated in Poland after 1989, labor in general became fragmented and divided along party lines. As described in the historical analysis, union alliances did emerge at the enterprise level, but political integration at the national level remained weak or non-existent. The contradictory political and union identities of Solidarity and the failure of Solidarity and OPZZ to cooperate as a unified political force prevented the development of a sustained labor movement. Further, both unions suffered from weak organizational and affective ties between rank and file members and national structures in the early transition period (Kramer 1995). Not until the sharpening of discontent and emergence of electoral opportunities in 1992–1993 did the unions mount more effective and sustained strike actions.

The third and fourth models in Table 9.5 shift the analytic focus to industry-specific strike mobilization processes. These analyses are based on a pooled sample (to ensure sufficient sample sizes) of permanent, non-farm workers in 1992–1993 employed at the same firm since 1990 and are limited to those variables that are common to both surveys. While workers in heavy industries enjoyed wage concessions and bureaucratic privilege under state socialism, they have become politically marginalized under successive post-communist governments. As demonstrated in Table 9.4 and consistent with political process theory, workers in these industries show a greater propensity for strike action as a means of preserving their economic advantage. In this section, I seek to show that the vulnerability of these industries during market reform provides for a distinctive source of grievance formation and mobilization potential. In other words, the effects of grievances and mobilization contexts should interact with industry status in their effects on strike participation.

The results reveal dramatic differences in the effects of firm-based market grievances as measured through opinions about restructuring at the respondent's place of employment. While the effects of negative opinions of change are not significant within non-heavy industries, workers who are employed there exhibit much more severe effects of restructuring grievances on strike participation. Within heavy industries, workers with negative
opinions of change are 45 percent more likely to have participated in a strike. Indeed, resistance to reform was typical in larger enterprises with entrenched employee councils (Dabrowski et al. 1991). Although these grievances are not necessarily specific to firms in these industries, the results suggest that heavy industry workers are more likely to experience micro-mobilization attempts to frame such opinions in oppositional terms. This would be consistent with the greater likelihood of larger firms to form anti-reform alliances among powerful worker councils and union activists. It may also reflect exposure to more militant union locals in larger enterprises, such as the Solidarity-based Siec faction which adopted an increasingly confrontational stance against post-communist governments (see Kramer 1995).

The coefficients for prior activism and skilled worker have similar magnitudes across industry sub-samples, but occupation is unimportant in both cases in determining strike involvement. The results also indicate that although previous involvement in the 1980–81 Solidarity movement produces only slightly greater strike tendencies in heavy industries, the interactive effect of firm size is dramatic. Considering both effects, the findings suggest that large firms increase the likelihood that informal, activist networks will develop among heavy industry workers with shared grievances and common strike experiences. This is especially true to the extent that strikes in these industries under communism typically yielded wage concessions which fostered a sense of historical efficacy among its workers.

Overall, the results from this analysis support the major hypotheses depicted in Figure 9.2. The post-communist left, in response to increasing voter volatility, made interventionist appeals leading up to the 1993 elections that resonated with reform discontent and provided incentives to strike. The results reveal that discontent is manifested mainly in the form of anti-privatization and restructuring anxiety, and is intensified among workers in vulnerable state-dominated industries. Consistent with Figure 9.2, these grievances are partly contingent on network and organizational incentives in their effects on strike participation but (unexpectedly) are not moderated by organizational contexts as measured by trade union status.

**Conclusion**

This chapter has attempted to explain the socio-political sources of differential strike mobilization under the contrasting institutional environments of Poland in the late 1980s through the first stage of democratic transition. Several important findings emerge from the pre and post-tran-
sition survey analyses. The results from the pre-transition analyses are robust and lend support to my basic contention regarding the character of context and movement structures in state socialist regimes.

The pursuit of weak and cooptive legitimation strategies has a radicalizing effect on decisional inequalities in the workplace which promotes strike approval among those least involved in the decision making process. The models also indicate that perceptions of weak regime legitimacy exert strong effects on strike approval but are diffuse in nature and disconnected from organizational bases. Thus, the extent to which grievances are contingent on micromobilization and group incentives varies by institutional context. In other words, when grievances become anti-systemic, strikers exhibit greater potential for self-organization. This is especially true when the state plays a direct role in the organization of economic and workplace arrangements.

In contrast, results from the early post-transition analyses underscore the role of institutional environments in creating distinctive political opportunities and mobilization contexts. The results from the 1993 sample reveal that strike participation is based partly in left party identification and, thus, the political opportunities created by electoral volatility and party competition. The models also support my contention that the market transition has created a sense of class awareness and collectivism among those groups most vulnerable to the negative effects of the transition, and that these interests have independent effects on strike participation.

These results also demonstrate the need for a refined conceptualization of grievances, indicating that those which lead to strike participation under market transition are firm-specific and idiosyncratic, not diffusely anti-market. Two principal processes are evident in these results: (1) transition-related grievances are intensified in vulnerable industrial sectors and related to firm-specific resistance over different types of privatization proposals and (2) these grievances are translated into strike action partly by way of union mediation processes.

Contrary to my hypotheses, however, the impact of left party mobilization on strike action is not mediated by union membership, nor does the effect vary much by membership status. The absence of these effects points to a fractious and decentralized labor movement with cross-cutting cleavages and allegiances to competing political parties. Although at the enterprise level, alliances and cooperation have emerged over common restructuring grievances, the national integration of unions has remained underdeveloped. One major implication of this phenomenon is that while strike mobilization at the firm level is potentially greater, the possibilities for corporatist resolutions diminish. In fact, the national-level fragmentation of
labor is partially historically rooted in the splits among pre-transition Solidarity into the radical and pro-Walesa compromise factions. Ironically, those who participated in the 1988 strikes leading to the Round Table negotiations helped form the basis of resistance to government-sponsored enterprise pacts in the early post-transition period.

In sum, this chapter underscores the notion that the rapidly changing institutional environments of transitional Poland have produced distinctive sources of strike mobilization. I have demonstrated the utility of extending political process theories to better fit the unique case of state socialist regimes. Consistent with the need to develop more integrated theories of collective action, I have constructed two period-specific models that emphasize both the structural and grievance dimensions of the strike mobilization process. The results point to the unique institutional settings of state socialism and market democracies in determining the manner in which these dimensions combine to generate mobilization outcomes.