

PART IV:

VOTING BEHAVIOR, DEMOCRACY,  
AND DEMOCRATIC VALUES



JOSHUA KJERULF DUBROW

## VOTING FOR DESCRIPTIVE REPRESENTATION: DEMOGRAPHIC CUES ACROSS MULTIPLE ELECTIONS

Why does the demographic composition of the Polish parliament resemble the top of the stratification system rather than its whole? Empirical evidence suggests that when descriptive representation is enhanced—a condition in which the composition of the legislature more accurately mirrors the demographics and experiences of the citizenry—the disadvantaged improve their substantive representation (Mansbridge 1999; Swers 2002; Tate 2003). In examining factors that enhance descriptive representation, such as social structures that influence who runs for office (Fox and Lawless 2004; Norris and Lovenduski 1993) and parties as gatekeepers keeping out particular demographic types of candidates (Kunovich and Paxton 2005), few consider the role of the voter. When voters vote based on the individual characteristics of the candidates, that is, demographic cues voting, it is theoretically possible that the disadvantaged can “vote in” their own descriptive representation.

In this chapter, I demonstrate how demographic cues voting works in Poland across multiple election cycles. In particular, I merge POLPAN with POLCAN, a universe of Polish candidates, to analyze individual level voting behavior of disadvantaged gender, social class, and age groups between 1993 and 2001. Through empirical analyses, I demonstrate the conditions in which demographic cues voting can produce a descriptively representative parliament.

## Theory and Hypothesis

### *Descriptive Representation in Post-Communist Poland*

In communist Eastern Europe, state suppression of conflict between and among gender, social class, and other social cleavages inhibited nationwide debates over the equitable distribution of economic, political, and cultural resources. In the aftermath of state breakdown, new democracies now contend with such conflict, along with the ensuing debate over *who gets what and why* (Slomczynski 2000; Slomczynski and Janicka 2004; Tucker 2002; Tworzecki 2003). Over time, governance solutions in the wake of profound social transformations must incorporate the multitude of voices if the political situation is to maintain stability.

To reduce representational inequality, many governments, political leaders, social justice advocates, and researchers champion the concept of descriptive representation (Pitkin 1972). Proponents of this type of representation assert that those elected officials who share similar demographic and experiential characteristics of their constituencies have sufficient empathy to evaluate and construct representative policy (Mansbridge 1999; Phillips 1995; Young 1990).

Some argue that voting behavior could have profound influences on the present and future demographic composition of the legislature (Dolan 2001; Koch 2000; Terkildsen 1993). In the absence of constitutionally mandated quotas or other government interventions in the electoral system that would guarantee a boost in the percentages of women, ethnicities, lower social classes, and extreme age groups in the legislature, voting is one of the few options left through which disadvantaged groups can reduce representational inequalities.

### *Demographic Cues*

Over the past decade, researchers examining demographic cues built a strong record empirically demonstrating that individual voters have measurable reactions to the demographic characteristics of candidates (Cutler 2002; McDermott 1997, 2005; Plutzer and Zipp 1996; Sanbonmatsu 2003). In demographic cues theory, voters' choice is, in part, a response to the demographics of the candidate, for example, the candidate's gender, social class, and age (Popkin 1994). Voters use demographic cues to infer likely policy stance and issue competence, and/or manifest some unspecified in-group attraction. For example, women are perceived as being more competent in

health and education issues and men, in economic and foreign policy issues (Koch 2000).

While it is not clear whether stereotypes, unspecified in-group attraction, or some combination of the two are at work, demographic cues theory assumes that there is at least some interaction between candidate and voter demographic characteristics. Specifically, there are three possible voter responses: (1) increasing the likelihood of voting for that candidate, (2) decreasing the likelihood of voting for that candidate, (3) no significant effect. While similar to social cleavages literature in that social structural position influences vote choice (Manza, Hout, and Brooks 1995; Nieuwebeerta and Ultee 1999), a common interpretation of demographic cues theory is that it specifically models the interaction between voter and candidate as a function of demographic distance between the two.

Recent studies suggest that citizens use demographic cues of candidates such as gender (Koch 2000; McDermott 1997, 1998; Plutzer and Zipp 1996; Sanbonmatsu 2002), race (Sigelman et al. 1995), religion (Cutler 2002), and occupation (McDermott 2005) as guidelines for voting behavior. The upshot is that although economic evaluations influence citizens' votes (Brooks and Brady 1999; Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier 2000), demographic cues provide citizens with a wider array of variables to consider than previously hypothesized.

However, amid mounting evidence for the causal importance of voters' use of demographic cues, the literature can be criticized on a few fronts. Methodologically, the literature suffers from an overreliance on experimental methods and lack of attention to real elections (for a review, see Matland and King 2001: 143–145). Though these researchers provide some evidence on which to build theory, their focus on a limited range of respondents and candidate data restricts the generalizability of their findings.

Next, both experimental and voter data studies generally suffer from underdeveloped models in two ways; first, researchers either posit suboptimal variables for class position for both voter and candidate, or do not include them at all. Few studies using real election data include any candidate characteristics other than gender, incumbency status, and partisanship. None has combined gender, age, and social class, three of the most salient social cleavages. Second, most researchers do not include indicators that previous literature on voting behavior suggests are important, most notably economic evaluations (e.g., socio- and egotropic voting). By not including economic evaluations, scholars following their work have little indication as to whether voter attitudes toward the economy would possibly negate the demographic cues effect. In addition, few of these studies span multiple election cycles,

and consequently are unable to account for differing sociopolitical environments that impact voters' choice. Lastly, studies are focused on the United States with none in the post-communist countries of Europe.

### *Demographic Cues in Post-Communist Democracies*

Measuring the influence of demographic cues in new parliamentary democracies requires a different formulation from that found in studies of the United States. First, parliamentary democracies with proportional representation electoral systems, especially those of post-communist Europe, tend to have more than two parties and, hence, many more candidates from which to choose. Second, electoral systems differ in the opportunity of voters to select candidates from the party lists.

In Poland, after choosing a party, voters have the choice of voting for particular candidates or agreeing to the party list as it stands. In addition, the electoral system allows for the proliferation of parties with narrow agendas and, hence, a lot of party competition. Since voters are confronted with party lists, measuring the influence of demographic cues can best be found in voting for *demographic types of parties*, rather than for demographic types of individual candidates.<sup>1</sup>

Thus, my main hypothesis is that *voters are more likely to vote for parties that are demographically similar to them*. For example, women are more likely to vote for parties that have women in them, farmers are more likely to vote for parties that have farmers in them, and so on.<sup>2</sup>

---

<sup>1</sup> That parties embody demographic types has been explored, theoretically at least, in the American literature. Plutzer and Zipp (1996) hypothesize a "gendered party system," whereby Democrats are more likely than Republicans to nominate women (33).

<sup>2</sup> For this to be a possibility, I assume that voters are aware of the demographic make-up of candidates and their aggregate in parties within their own district. Empirical evidence for this assumption comes from NORPOL, a survey of Polish citizens ( $n = 4000$ ) conducted in April 2005 by Norwegian and Polish institutes, which included attitudes on democracy, descriptive representation, and political ideology (see Dubrow 2006). Respondents were asked to, "Compare the party you want to vote for with others regarding the proportion of candidates for the Sejm who are [women] [working class] [peasantry] [young—under thirty-five] [old—fifty-five and older]." Possible responses were, "Much larger, a little bit larger, about the same, a little bit smaller, much smaller." The majority of voters were able to provide a response; when faced with multiple parties, voters can statistically discriminate to such an extent that they declare their preferred party as having greater or fewer numbers of demographic types of candidates with respect to other parties.

## Electoral Context

There was considerable party fluidity in Poland between 1993 and 2001 (Slomczynski and Shabad 2002; Zielinski, Slomczynski, and Shabad 2005). Nonetheless, voters expressed rightist and leftist party identifications (Tworzecki 2003). On the “rightist” side are Solidarity splinter parties such as the UD (Democratic Union, Unia Demokratyczna) and later UW (Freedom Union, Unia Wolności). AWS (Solidarity Election Action, Akcja Wyborcza Solidarność) espoused tough lustration policies and Western-style free-market reforms. On the left, the SLD (Democratic Left Alliance, Sojusz Lewicy Demokratycznej), reformed from the former communist political party, speaks for the antilustration and procommunist voters. Straddling the political lines are specialty parties such as the PSL (Polish Peasant Party, Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe), which advocates specifically for farmers’ interests. Advocates for Catholic values found a party in the PO (Civic Platform, Platforma Obywatelska), also a rightist party, and LPR (League of Polish Families, Liga Polskich Rodzin), which leans left (for more on parties, see Castle and Taras 2002; Slomczynski and Shabad 2002; Szczerbiak 2001a).

In post-communist Poland, the disadvantaged became those whose position in the stratification system was previously at a relatively higher level, namely, women, lower class, farmers, youth, and the elderly (Domański 2000b; Heyns 2005; Slomczynski 2000, 2002). Women lost labor market protection, though their labor-force status was always second to that of men and traditional gender roles remained throughout the communist and post-communist contexts (Heyns 2005: 180–183; Siemienska 1985). Solidarity’s gradual defeat had the unintentional effect of bringing a statist, post-communist party to power while decreasing the ability of the lower class, communism’s proletariat, to regain any lost status (Ost 2005). Forced urbanization reduced farmers’ status, and post-communist economic restructuring has exacerbated urban–rural stratification (Heyns 2005: 184).

The introduction and rise of unemployment, coupled with the reduction of a strong welfare state had an impact on the age structure of Poland’s stratification system. According to 2004 statistics, 55 percent of the unemployed are under thirty-five years of age, while the median-aged Pole is thirty-seven. As for the elderly, pension systems have recently been reformed, usually toward private accounts, with the effect of lowering pension guarantees (Heyns 2005: 183). Together, young and old became members of the disadvantaged.

## Data, Variables, and Methods

### *Data*

Data come from POLPAN and POLCAN. POLCAN is a universe of parliamentary (Sejm) candidates from the 1991, 1993, 1997, and 2001 national legislature elections in Poland. Data were collected from a variety of sources and include information on sex, age, current occupation, electoral status (elected or not elected), number of votes received, Sejm chamber contested, party affiliation in year of election, and position on Sejm electoral list. I constructed relevant variables and entered them into the POLPAN data set (for details on data matching, see Dubrow 2006: ch. 5).

### *Variables*

#### *Dependent Variables*

The main dependent variable is vote for a particular party, entailing several interrelated assumptions. Between 1993 and 2001, dozens of parties formed, but few emerged as contenders for actual seats. Most were limited resource niche parties with little hope for popular election. Thus, I assume that the majority of the electorate votes strategically, such that most vote for parties that have a chance of obtaining a parliamentary seat. Moreover, I assume that those who vote for the top parties in any given election are qualitatively different from those who vote for fringe parties such as Party X, Friends of Beer, and the like.

To determine the top parties, I instituted a “6 percent rule;” only those parties that achieved at least 6 percent of the popular vote are considered to be a top party.<sup>3</sup> Examining elections between 1993 and 2001, the “6 percent rule” seems a practical choice. In 1993, I include SLD, PSL, UD, and UP as the top parties. Thus, in 1993, KPN (Confederation of Independent Poland, *Konfederacja Polski Niepodległej*) and BBWR (Non-Party Block for Reform BBWR, *Bezpartyjny Blok Wspierania Reform*), who combined for slightly over 8 percent of the seats, are considered fringe parties. Examining POLPAN, only four respondents said they voted for these parties. In 1997, AWS, SLD, UW, and PSL were the top parties, with ROP (Movement for

---

<sup>3</sup> My rule is more conservative than that instituted by Poland. After 1991, when over 100 parties stood for election, Poland instituted a 5 percent rule, such that parties gain seats when reaching at least 5 percent of the popular vote.



Rebuilding Poland, Ruch Odbudowy Polski) achieving 5.6 percent of the vote, 1.3 percent of the total seats, and only fifteen voters claimed to have voted for them in the 1998 wave of POLPAN. In 2001, six parties were considered prominent; SLD–UP alliance, PO, SO (Self-Defense, Samoobrona), PiS (Law and Justice, Prawo i Sprawiedliwość), PSL, and LPR. A reformed AWS party achieved 5.6 percent of the popular vote, but failed to obtain any seats.

### *Measurement of Demographics*

The three main categories of demographics are gender, age, and social class—the only three that match what POLCAN provides. For both respondents and candidates, gender is measured dichotomously, with 1 = woman. Age is measured in three categories; young (eighteen to thirty-five), middle (thirty-six to fifty-five), and old (any age over fifty-five).

The social class of candidates is constructed from the occupation reported in POLCAN. With the help of a Polish sociologist, I qualitatively analyzed the available occupations, noting a hierarchy of occupations that fall into four main categories: high, middle, low, and farmer. High occupations include highly skilled positions such as professors of economics and managers of corporations. Middle occupations include (a) less-skilled positions that require moderate levels of education, such as technicians, and (b) those who have retired. Low occupations include factory workers and other lower-skilled positions (but not craft workers). Farmers are identified as those working in agricultural or animal husbandry fields (excluding agronomy professors and zoologists).

Social class of respondents is constructed from SKZ occupational scores.<sup>4</sup> To match POLCAN, I classified respondents and candidates into four main categories: high, middle, low, and farmer.

---

<sup>4</sup> As not all respondents are currently employed, SKZ was attributed in the following manner: if the respondent is currently employed, then social class is the SKZ score of their current, main job. Main job is defined as the one that provides the bulk of one's income and health insurance at the time of the interview in order to differentiate from the secondary job. If not currently employed, and the respondent was employed at some previous time, then the previous job is their social class. If the respondent was never employed, and the spouse is employed, then the social class is that of the spouse. If none of these conditions is met, then social class is that of the father when the respondent was age fourteen. The majority of social class attribution is for the first two contingencies. An average of 3 percent remained unclassified after all four are taken into account.

*Key Independent Variables*

Which party can be considered most demographically similar? I assume that voters rank parties according to demographics that interest them, for example, the thought process would be, “in my district, UP has a higher proportion of women candidates than PSL, which has a higher proportion than SLD,” and so on. Next, I assume that voters make these comparisons only within their district and do not take into consideration the national proportions. For example, farmers who are interested in the top parties of 2001 will compare only the proportion of farmer candidates among the top parties of 2001 in their district. Thus, parsing the list is necessarily a comparative process, but limited to the district in which the voter votes.

I measure party characteristics dichotomously, where 1 = the party in the district in which the respondent resides has the greatest percentage of a demographic attribute relative to other top parties, 0 = it does not. In each district and for each top party, I computed the percentage of women, farmers, lower class, young, and old candidates within each party.<sup>5</sup> For example, in Warsaw in 1993, SLD had 12.5 percent women candidates, PSL had 17 percent, and UD and UP had 11 percent and 20 percent, respectively. UP, then, is the party with the greatest percentage of women candidates relative to the other parties.

Positive and significant interaction terms are the critical test for whether voters from disadvantaged backgrounds are more likely to vote for the party that is demographically similar to them. Interaction terms fit the conditional hypotheses and are the only way to adequately test whether voter sentiment is a function of the specific relationship between voter and candidate (party) demographics (Brambor, Clark, and Golder 2006).

Interaction terms are computed for each voter–party pair, so that 1 denotes the following situation: voter of a particular demographic characteristic lives in a district in which the party has the largest percentage of candidates of the same characteristic. For example, if the condition that a woman voter in the district in which the party leads in the proportion of women candidates is satisfied, the variable value = 1, otherwise = 0.<sup>6</sup>

---

<sup>5</sup> Party demographic controls for party size; smaller parties, even under the 6 percent rule, have an equal chance of being the party with the greatest percentage of women, farmers, lower class, young, and old candidates. Ties are permitted such that more than one party can have the “most” women candidates. Further, it is possible that no party in a given district has the “most” women candidates, and that all parties in that district have a zero for party characteristic.

<sup>6</sup> To place this in context: in 1993, with vote choice for SLD as the dependent variable, the interaction term for women in Warsaw would be 0, as SLD did not have the most

### *Types of Control Variables*

Micro-level voting behavior under conditions of radical social change requires a different set of explanatory variables than that used by studies of stable democracies.

#### *Partisanship vs. Ideology*

Partisanship is far less stable in post-communist countries (Slomczynski and Shabad 2002; Tworzecki 2003), calling into question the need for a partisanship variable as a control. Although partisanship in Eastern Europe is best understood as attachment to political families rather than specific parties (Shabad and Slomczynski 1999), voters were increasingly able to distinguish between parties (Tworzecki 2003). It is important to note two aspects: (1) even when parties changed names through mergers and splinters, the top parties in each electoral cycle were recognizable to voters; (2) party ideologies varied significantly within a left–right continuum (Tworzecki 2003).

The ideological stances of parties are the most optimal indicators of how voters decide whom to vote for in unstable party environments. Preferences for statist parties is likely associated with viewing socialism as beneficial in some respects, while voters who prefer rightist, or economically liberal parties are more likely to view the socialist past as negative and more likely to support privatization of state-run enterprises (Osborn 2000). I measure attitude toward socialism as 1 = socialism brought gains. I measure economic liberal attitudes as 1 = agrees that there should be privatization of profitable state-run enterprises.

Voters of anticlerical parties are more likely to view intrusion of the church in state affairs as negative, with the opposite being true for Catholic traditionalists.

#### *Economic Voting*

Economic voting, as in the West, is an important variable in post-communist Europe (Fidrmuc 2000; Kunovich 2002; Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier 2000). Perception of material gains and losses, or egotropic voting, contributes to voting behavior; perception of losses would lead to a reduced probability of voting for the ruling party, and vice versa. I measure perceived material situation as 1 = respondent believes that his/her material situation recently improved.

---

women candidates in that district. In that same year and district, however, with vote choice for UP as the dependent variable, the interaction term for women is 1, because UP had the most women candidates in that district and in that year.

*Information Shortcut*

Demographic cues may either supplement political knowledge or be used independently as a “last resort” for low-information voters. As most demographic cues researchers agree with Popkin’s (1994) claim that it is necessary to control for political knowledge, I include a measure of interest in politics, such that the higher the number the greater the interest (range 1 to 5). However, I argue that this is not a crucial variable. Results from studies using actual elections are mixed on whether variations in political knowledge cause variations in the response of voters to candidates’ demographic cues, with some claiming low-information shortcut (McDermott 1997) and others claiming lack of substantial effect (Cutler 2002). Interest in politics is a linear variable where the higher the score, the greater the interest in politics.

*Methods*

Restricting my sample to only those who voted for the top parties, I employ binary logistic regression with party choice as the dependent variable. To understand whether voters actually use demographic cues in parliamentary democracies for a spectrum of party types, I begin by analyzing a pooled sample of voters for all elections with SLD and PSL as vote choices. These are the only top parties that have survived all elections between 1993 and 2001, allowing for pooled data analysis.<sup>7</sup>

In 2001, in addition to stalwarts such as SLD and PSL, several smaller parties that would later play an important role in the 2005 elections attained seats. Two of them, PO and LPR, were emblematic of niche parties. I examine votes for these parties to ascertain how smaller, top parties that still have appeal to niche voters fare in terms of demographic cues voting.

For all analyses, I rely on the interpretation of the interaction terms as independently defined variables without the main effects. Interaction term’s main effects were typically too highly correlated with the interaction term to be included in the same model. Including the constituent variables of the interaction term hid the effects of the interaction term itself, necessitating their removal.<sup>8</sup> Moreover, I am interested only in whether being from

---

<sup>7</sup> Their party platforms did not change radically during this time, although PSL adopted a far more religious stance (Castle and Taras 2002; Szczerbiak 2001a, 2001b).

<sup>8</sup> In other analyses (see Dubrow 2006: ch. 5), I constructed separate simple models consisting of voting for SLD and PSL as the dependent variables, and the following independent variables: voter characteristics, party characteristics, and the interaction of the two, pertaining to each demographic group: women, farmers, lower class, young, and old.

a disadvantaged group in the presence of a party that is demographically similar is a positive and significant contributor to voting for that party. Thus, I am not concerned with all of the other possible situations aggregated into the residual category.

I built the models so as to minimize the standard error because, in some cases, the parties I analyzed did not have enough of one particular demographic type to form an interaction term. The necessity of removing variables of this type demonstrates the degree of volatility in how the electoral system operates; some parties do not field demographic types of candidates, giving their supporters few opportunities to vote based on demographic cues.

## Findings

Tables 15.1 and 15.2 present logistic regressions for voting for SLD and PSL, respectively. Each table is similar in form: Model I demonstrates the influence of demographics, political attitudes, and party characteristics on vote choice. Model II presents attitudes and interaction effects, with demographics as appropriate. Because party characteristics and interaction terms were highly correlated, I did not include them in the same model.

In Table 15.1, model fit for both models is significant. In Model I, over the election cycles 1993, 1997, and 2001, controlling for ideology, farmers are less likely, and the lower class and old voters are more likely to vote for SLD. Where SLD has the most women in the district, voters are significantly more likely to vote for them. Where SLD has the most old candidates, voters are less likely to vote for them. In Model II, controlling for ideology, women who live in a district where SLD has the most women candidates are more likely to vote for SLD. While lower class exhibits a similar tendency, significance is at the 0.10 level.

In Table 15.2, model fit for both models is significant. In Model I, farmers are far and away the most likely to vote for PSL. The constant reveals that middle- and upper-class males are less likely to vote for PSL. Older voters are less likely to vote for PSL, but the effect is not nearly as strong as being

---

Results gave some support for the main hypothesis. However, in determining the statistical significance of the sum of the coefficients in this simple equation, *t*-tests revealed that only for farmers is the sum of the coefficients statistically significant. In all other cases the sums of the coefficients are not significant even at  $p < 0.10$  level. The partial reason for it deals with multicollinearity between the variables involved in the equation. Thus, the investigation of descriptive voting must go beyond the most elementary model.

**Table 15.1.** Pooled Logistic Regression of Vote for Democratic Left Alliance (SLD) on Selected Variables, 1993–2001

	Model I			Model II		
	b	SE	Exp(B)	b	SE	Exp(B)
<i>Voters' characteristics</i>						
Woman	0.135	0.089	1.144			
Farmer	-0.996***	0.125	0.369			
Lower class	0.259**	0.099	1.296			
Young	0.022	0.117	1.022			
Old	0.215*	0.097	1.239			
<i>Party characteristics at the district level: Party leads in proportion of ____ candidates</i>						
Woman	0.270**	0.090	1.310			
Farmer	0.063	0.226	1.065			
Lower class	-0.181	0.128	0.835			
Young	-0.085	0.144	0.918			
Old	-0.553***	0.114	0.575			
<i>Control variables</i>						
Urban				0.684***	0.090	1.981
Perceived material situation	-0.211*	0.106	0.809	-0.248*	0.102	0.780
Socialism: gains or losses?	1.065***	0.092	2.901	1.044***	0.089	2.841
Privatization state-run enterprises	-0.375***	0.107	0.687	-0.408***	0.105	0.665
Interest in politics	0.007	0.048	1.007	0.013	0.046	1.013
<i>Fit of voter-party demographics: ____ voter in district where party leads in proportion of ____ candidates</i>						
Woman				0.297**	0.105	1.346
Farmer				-0.123	0.409	0.885
Lower class				0.318†	0.188	1.375
Young				0.447	0.307	1.564
Old				-0.234	0.179	0.791
Constant	-0.442*	0.187	0.643	-0.936***	0.148	0.392
Log likelihood	3,291.228			3,359.827		
$\chi^2$	302.304***			236.491***		
Cox and Snell $R^2$	0.11			0.087		
$N$	2605			2607		

\*\*\* $p < 0.001$ ; \*\* $p < 0.01$ ; \* $p < 0.05$ ; † $p < 0.10$  (two-tailed test).

**Table 15.2.** Pooled Logistic Regression of Vote for Polish Peasant Party (PSL) on Selected Variables, 1993–2001

	Model I			Model II		
	b	SE	Exp(B)	b	SE	Exp(B)
<i>Voters' characteristics</i>						
Woman	-0.157	0.137	0.855			
Farmer	2.528***	0.165	12.524			
Lower class	0.288	0.185	1.334			
Young	-0.088	0.190	0.915			
Old	-0.671***	0.151	0.511			
<i>Party characteristics at the district level: Party leads in proportion of ____ candidates</i>						
Woman	-0.263	0.229	0.769			
Farmer	0.134	0.189	1.143			
Lower class	-0.518***	0.178	0.596			
Young	-0.176	0.385	0.838			
Old	-0.086	0.155	0.917			
<i>Control variables</i>						
Perceived material situation	-0.346†	0.191	0.707	-0.413*	0.185	0.661
Socialism: gains or losses?	0.158	0.134	1.171	0.121	0.131	1.129
Privatization state-run enterprises	-0.209	0.180	0.812	-0.202	0.175	0.817
Interest in politics	0.012	0.074	1.012	0.025	0.069	1.025
<i>Fit of voter-party demographics: ____ voter in district where party leads in proportion of ____ candidates</i>						
Woman				-0.409	0.319	0.664
Farmer				2.143***	0.138	8.527
Lower class				0.095	0.269	1.099
Young				-0.468	1.088	0.626
Old				-0.468*	0.220	0.626
Constant	-2.455***	0.334	0.086	-2.429***	0.221	0.088
Log likelihood	1,649.227			1,726.082		
$\chi^2$	372.363***			296.469***		
Cox and Snell $R^2$	0.13			0.11		
N	2,605			2,607		

\*\*\* $p < 0.001$ ; \*\* $p < 0.01$ ; \* $p < 0.05$ ; † $p < 0.10$  (two-tailed test).

a farmer. Overall, where PSL has the most lower class, nonfarmer candidates, voters are less likely to vote for them. However, even old farmers living in a district where PSL has the most lower class candidates are much more likely than any other demographic type to vote for PSL. Model II demonstrates that farmers are more likely to vote for PSL when they are the most demographically similar party. Old voters are less likely to vote for PSL in a situation of demographic similarity.

**Table 15.3.** Voting for Demographically Similar Party: Economic Liberal Party (PO) and Catholic Traditionalist Party (LPR) 2001

	PO			LPR		
	b	SE	Exp(B)	b	SE	Exp(B)
<i>Voter's characteristics</i>						
Woman	0.141	0.235	1.151			
Farmer				0.274	0.466	1.315
Lower class				0.297	0.417	1.346
Upper class	-0.135	0.281	0.874			
Young				0.062	0.548	1.064
<i>Control variables</i>						
Urban	0.938***	0.276	2.554			
Perceived material situation	0.898***	0.251	2.455	-0.476	0.571	0.621
Socialism: gains or losses?	-1.151***	0.309	0.316	-1.085*	0.451	0.338
Privatization state-run enterprises	0.634*	0.267	1.886			
Interest in politics	0.394**	0.130	1.482	-0.647**	0.199	0.524
Church too influential <sup>a</sup>	-0.742**	0.239	0.476	1.922***	0.383	6.837
<i>Fit of voter-party demographics:</i>						
<i>_____ voter in district where</i>						
<i>party leads in proportion</i>						
<i>of _____ candidates</i>						
Woman				1.052	0.697	2.864
Lower class	-0.441	0.763	0.643			
Young	0.475	0.359	1.607			
Old				0.868*	0.400	2.381
Constant	-3.615***	0.509	0.027	-2.447***	0.657	0.087
Log likelihood		536.437			246.361	
$\chi^2$		94.131***			58.300***	
Cox and Snell $R^2$		0.10			0.07	
$N$		861			854	

<sup>a</sup> For PO, yes = 1, for LPR, no = 1.

\*\*\* $p < 0.001$ ; \*\* $p < 0.01$ ; \* $p < 0.05$ ; † $p < 0.10$  (two-tailed test).



In the 2001 election, I examine PO and LPR (Table 15.3). Model fit for both is significant. As for PO, all ideology variables are significant and in their hypothesized directions. Interaction terms for women, farmers, and old were removed; no one in a district where PO had the most women voted for that party; farm and lower class interaction terms were perfectly correlated; and PO did not have one district where they had the most old candidates. Neither of the remaining interaction terms, for lower class and young, is significant.

As for LPR, except for economic voting variable, all are significant and in their hypothesized direction. Privatization had an unusually large standard error and thus was removed from the analysis. Again, farmers were removed: only ten farmers lived in a district where LPR had the most farmers and none of them voted for LPR, though four nonfarmers voted for LPR in those districts. Interaction term for old is positive and significant.

## Conclusion and Discussion

In this chapter, I extended the demographic cues literature to post-communist Poland. The main finding is that voters in Poland can and do use demographic cues in voting, such that voters are attracted to political parties that have candidates who are demographically similar to them.

However, the main question of this chapter remains: if the disadvantaged vote with demographic cues, why is the Sejm so demographically homogenous?

Part of the answer is the size of the contribution demographic cues make to voting behavior. Not all voters from disadvantaged backgrounds vote according to demographic cues. For those who do, the contribution to overall vote behavior is dwarfed by political attitudes toward the economy, the socialist past, and the role of the Church in political life. Thus, considering the findings, demographic cues voting in and of itself is not likely to produce a descriptively similar government.

If not demographic cues, what shapes the future state of descriptive representation for Poland's disadvantaged? Descriptive representation does not occur in a political vacuum; thus, the ability to organize and the form and pace of political stability are prime factors.

For women, both parliamentary and social movement pressures best explain the increase in women's representation. Women's descriptive representation grew from 9 percent in 1991 to 20.4 percent in 2005. Diffusion of the candidate gender quotas that women's groups advocated for most likely had a substantial impact on the growth of women's descriptive representation over time (Caul Kittilson 2006: ch. 4; Renc-Roe 2003). Women enjoyed par-

liamentary pressure leading to increases in women's representation in which a unique voting drive by women parliamentarians exhorted voters to vote for women (Renc-Roe 2003; Siemienska 2003). By far, women have had the most consistent, concerted social movement pressure of all disadvantaged social groups in Poland. Youth is the only other major social cleavage studied here that had organizations within a social movement fighting for their descriptive representation (Slomczynski and Janicka 2004: 419). However, Poland's trend stalled at 13 percent between 1993 and 1997 and again at a little over 20 percent between 2001 and 2005, making women's ability to achieve 50 percent of the Sejm uncertain, at best.

Unlike ethnic minorities (Chan 2001) and, later, women (Siemienska 2003), in post-communist Poland the lower class was never fully considered a viable political option for legislative recruitment. This may seem strange considering that Lech Wałęsa, who rose from the lower class, is a hero of the Solidarity movement that facilitated the transition to capitalist democracy (Laba 1991; Ost 1990). Perhaps it was the rapid decline of Solidarity as a political force that inhibited the ability of many lower class political aspirants to inherit Wałęsa's stature (Ost 2005).

In any case, farmers and the lower class do vote based on demographic cues, identifying with parties that are "one of us." The extent to which parties advertise their descriptive representativeness or overtly attempt to court class votes through descriptively attractive candidate slates is unclear. What seems to be the case is that farmer and lower class voters exhibit a kind of class consciousness, whereby they can form attachments to descriptively similar parties.

An increase in the ability of the political elite to wall themselves in the Sejm with bricks made of incumbency and partisanship will also be a decisive factor in whether the disadvantaged can gain parliamentary seats in the future. In Poland, politics quickly emerged as a career choice. This is evidenced by politicians seeking to escape accountability through party switching over multiple election cycles (Zielinski, Slomczynski, and Shabad 2005). The careerification of politics has had a major impact on the social class and age structure of the candidate and parliamentarian populations and, hence, the ability of a *laissez-faire* political market to produce a descriptively similar national legislature. Like many other post-communist countries, Poland adopted West European styles of political recruitment, a decision that had the consequence of mirroring the West's pattern of middle- to upper-class male dominance of politics. Growth in middle- and upper-class parliamentarians helps to explain the decrease in youth and the increase in middle-aged politicians, as middle age is highly correlated with middle- to upper-class position.