CHAPTER 22.

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GENDER DIFFERENCES AND EGALITARIANISM

A growing literature in political sociology addresses politically relevant attitudes and their determinants in post-communist societies, particularly those attitudes toward system transformation. This field of inquiry has offered insight into how societies adapt to radically altered political and economic landscapes, in the aggregate, but fewer studies discuss attitudinal change over time using panel data. In particular, women and men appear to differ significantly in their political attitudes and behavior, but, in spite of this, gender has been included in studies primarily as a control variable, rather than as a focus of attention in its own right. Even fewer studies address the dynamics of these gendered attitudinal differences over time.

This chapter uses Polish panel survey data to explore systematically the dynamics of gendered attitudinal differences. Specifically, it addresses gendered differences regarding a crucial dimension of the systemic transformation in post-communist societies: economic equality. Available attitudinal data illustrate that women have remained more egalitarian than men in Poland throughout the initial period of political and economic transformation. As women have disproportionately suffered economically during this period, in what is sometimes called the "feminization of poverty" (see Domański 2002; Milanovic 1998), it does make sense on its face that women—more than men—would support egalitarian principles and policies.

Women also exhibit other social and attitudinal differences, such as higher levels of religiosity, which may shape gendered attitudes.

This chapter focuses on two broad categories of explanation for the differences between women's and men's attitudes toward economic equality: first, self-interest explanations, rooted in the social-structural differences between women and men in the aggregate (social class, income, and respondents' assessments of risk and opportunity associated with systemic transformation); and second, an ideational factor particularly relevant to Poland, namely, religiosity. These possible explanations highlight the compositional differences between women's and men's experience of system change—for example, into which occupational classes they fall—as well as ideational attributes that are also hypothesized to influence their attitudes.

The analyses in this chapter also illuminate the dynamics of change in gendered attitudes, a subject that has received very little attention in scholarship on post-communist societies. The knowledge already generated by various studies of attitudinal change suggests that compositional shifts, such as changes in social position at the individual level, may be responsible for changing attitudes. But do the correlates of *gendered* views of egalitarianism change over time? Do women's and men's attitudes shift in the same direction for the same reasons? This chapter will compare this compositional model of attitudinal change with a second model, suggesting that the variation in the magnitude of difference between women's and men's attitudes may be due in part to changes in the salience of the determinants of egalitarianism from the onset of the transformation to the present.

Accounting for Differences Between Women's and Men's Egalitarianism: Empirical Theories and Hypotheses

Women and men exhibit differences in many political and social respects.

There is some research, for example, on the subject of how women in post-communist societies are markedly less positive than men toward democracy and democratic government (Oakes 2002; Waldron-Moore 1999). Other scholars note that for much of the post–World War II era women were more inclined than men to support conservative political parties (Klausen 2001).[1]

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[1] The observation that women are more likely than men to support conservative parties was also noted as long ago as 1955 in Duverger's seminal work *The Political Role of Women*.

Gender differences in political matters ranging from voter turnout to attitudes toward marketization have also been observed in Eastern Europe. Globally, women exhibit different attitudes from those of men toward justice, typically supporting a less legalistic, more context-oriented approach to punishment (Gilligan 1982). Scholars have offered a variety of theories and explanations to account for these differences, ranging from gender essentialism (see Gilligan 1982) to claims that gender is a spurious cause of attitudinal differences, because social-structural and other differences between women and men actually account for the gap between them (see Oakes 2002).

Women and men in Poland differ with respect to many politically relevant attitudes and behaviors, as well as, for example, their attitudes toward marketization and their support of political parties. As data presented in Table 22.1 show, they also differ with respect to their attitudes toward economic equality, and these differences are statistically significant and persist over time. What explanations might account for both these gendered attitudes and their dynamics? This chapter considers two dimensions of possible determinants for this gendered variation: a self-interest dimension (evaluating the effects of social class, income, and respondents' assessments of risk and opportunity associated with system change) and an ideational dimension (religiosity).

Table 22.1. Gender Differences in Egalitarianism in 1988, 1993, 1998, and 2003

	Mean			
	Women	Men	Difference	t-score**
1988	0.071	–0.074	0.145	–3.815
1993	0.096	–0.091	0.187	–3.819
1998	0.067	–0.065	0.132	–3.829
2003	0.152	–0.152	0.304	–4.517

Notes: Values for egalitarianism are scales generated by principal factor analysis*; higher positive values indicate greater levels of egalitarianism.
*See Table 22.2 for details regarding the factor analysis.
**All of the t-scores are statistically significant at $p < 0.001$.

The first dimension considered here is based in self-interest. As Pamela Davidson, Susanne Steinmann, and Bernd Wegener (1995) argue, accepting an essentialist notion of gender and its social effects preempts an examination of how differential economic and social experiences shape attitudes. "Self-interest" hypotheses underscore this claim that such differences are likely to have an effect on women's and men's beliefs. These hypotheses are strongly supported by much of the extant scholarship on economic egalitarianism. Studies of people's perceptions of social justice in the context of insti-

tutional change indicate that a person's social position is one of the strongest predictors of his or her normative preferences for the extent of income differentiation and, by extension, his or her egalitarianism (Gijsberts 2002; Kluegel, Mason, and Wegener 1995; Listhaug and Aalberg 1999).

Studies of the socioeconomic effects of the systemic change in Poland demonstrate that women have disproportionately suffered in the new regime, with respect to both employment opportunities (Funk 1993) and profound loss of social services (Rueschemeyer 1994). Women continue to bear greater responsibility for child care than men, both because of the increasing prevalence of mother-only families and persisting gendered parental roles. At the same time, they have fewer opportunities to obtain lucrative jobs, and they suffer the loss of formerly state-provided services such as day care and medical attention. This should translate into a heightened preference on the part of women for norms that would benefit them, materially.

This chapter's analyses also take into account subjective dimensions of self-interest by examining how women and men assess the risks and opportunities wrought by the changes in Poland. When an individual negatively assesses his or her prospects, or expresses general negativity about the social, economic, and political developments in post-socialist Poland, this attitude logically correlates to affirmation of egalitarian principles. Analyses of POLPAN data indicate that women and men differ, to a statistically significant degree, in their assessments of the risks and opportunities introduced by systemic change.

A second, ideational category of determinants may also contribute to gendered differences in egalitarianism. This chapter's analyses examine an ideational attribute, namely, religiosity, which is particularly relevant in Poland, as over 90 percent of Poles identify themselves as Roman Catholic. The Roman Catholic Church has long been one of the most influential institutions in Polish society, and women are markedly more observant than men, making religiosity a possible source of gendered attitudinal differences. The Church has consistently supported relatively egalitarian economic policies throughout the period leading up to and following the transition in 1989.[2] Kolarska-Bobinska has suggested that Poles' simultaneous preference for "both a welfare state and a tame market . . . without extreme social consequences" was shaped by "peasant and Roman Catholic traditions" (1994: 41). This influence of the Church may explain, through women's greater religiosity, gendered attitudinal differences in egalitarianism.

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[2] While the Church was the cornerstone of the opposition to communism, this is not to say that capitalist democracy was the absolutely preferred alternative to communist rule.

Analyses of POLPAN data indicate that women and men differ significantly in terms of the regularity of their church attendance. For example, women are far more likely than men to attend church more than once per week, and men are much more likely than women to fall into the nonreligious and low-attendance categories. Frequency of attendance is clearly gendered and reflects differences in belief and practice. Such differences, in turn, may well translate into differences of political attitudes and behavior.

The general hypothesis evaluated in this chapter regarding cross-sectional gender differences in egalitarian attitudes is that women and men will differ in level of egalitarianism as a result of economic disparities experienced post-transition, differences in perceptions of system change, and differences in levels of religiosity.

Dynamics of Gendered Attitudinal Change

Studies have indicated that attitudes toward economic egalitarianism are different in long-standing capitalist versus (post-)communist societies, both in terms of gender differences and in the aggregate (Davidson, Steinmann, and Wegener 1995; Gijsberts 2002; Listhaug and Aalberg 1999). For example, some scholars assert that the gender gap observed in post-communist societies is not found where competitive markets have long been the norm, suggesting that any differences between women's and men's preferences regarding economic egalitarianism should diminish over time (Davidson, Steinmann, and Wegener 1995).

A study of American and British justice beliefs in and after the Reagan and Thatcher eras argues that attitudes actually adapted to the pro-market reforms introduced by those political leaders (Listhaug and Aalberg 1999). The authors of the study argue further that those institutional changes are analogous to the changes taking place in the post-communist world, suggesting the possibility that in the aggregate, over time, attitudes in post-communist societies will increasingly resemble attitudes in long-lived capitalist societies, that is, they will become less egalitarian.

This chapter examines the dynamics of attitudinal differences between women and men across the four waves of the panel study, addressing two possible explanations of this variation. First, it considers the explanation that compositional change is responsible for changing attitudes. In other words, as individuals' locations in the social structure shift, for example, from a less to a more prestigious occupational class, their attitudes toward economic equality will shift accordingly in a stable and predictable way. This relationship should also be obtained in the aggregate and with respect to gender: if

women's socioeconomic circumstances improve relative to men's, then, according to self-interest explanations of egalitarianism cross-sectionally, the gap between women's and men's justice beliefs should diminish. Similarly, if men's socioeconomic circumstances deteriorate relative to women's, the gap will likewise diminish.

Second, the dynamics of gendered attitudes might be affected by changes in the salience of factors from year to year. Studies of the relationship between individuals' social-structural locations and their personality and preferences has suggested in general that these relationships may change under conditions of dramatic social transformation, such as Poland's shift to capitalist democracy. One study, for example, demonstrates that between 1978 and 1993, the relationship between social structure (i.e., class) and a sense of well-being in Poland became much more similar to that in the United States (Kohn et al. 1997).

Few studies have addressed the dynamics of *gendered* attitudes over time in these terms. What determinants could help explain how the gender gap might decrease? It is possible that the salience or effect of certain determinants of attitudes for women and men changes over time. For example, in a given year, a higher level of education might predict a lower level of egalitarianism for men, whereas at the same time this determinant might not affect women's egalitarianism at all, or it might affect women's attitudes in the opposite direction. A few years later, the relationship between education and egalitarianism for both women and men may have changed; for example, this relationship may have become more similar for women and men, thereby contributing to a reduction in the magnitude of their attitudinal differences.

The general hypothesis evaluated in this chapter regarding the dynamics of gendered differences is that over time, attitudinal convergence with respect to egalitarianism is anticipated between women and men with respect to (1) similar social structural circumstances, and (2) determinants (i.e., the effect of specific determinants, such as education, upon women and men will become more similar).

Data and Measurement

Indicators

Four items common to the four POLPAN survey waves were used to create factor scales for measuring the dependent variable, egalitarianism. Degree of agreement with the following statements comprised these indicators (responses, all on a scale of 1 to 5, were recoded in order that 5 would reflect strong egalitarianism and 1 would reflect strong inegalitarianism): (1) *Large*

income differences are necessary for prosperity, (2) *The state is responsible for reducing income differences*, (3) *The state should provide jobs for all those who wish to work*, and (4) *Income differences are too large*. As Table 22.2 shows, both women and men become increasingly egalitarian between 1988 and 2003 for items (1) and (4). In relative terms, however, women remain more egalitarian than men on all items for the same years.

Table 22.2. Measurement of Egalitarianism for 1988, 1993, 1998, and 2003

Item	Mean	Standard deviation	Factor loading
Total[a]		*1988*	
1: Large income differences are necessary.	2.811	1.350	0.221
2: States should reduce income differences.	3.836	1.205	0.607
3: States should provide jobs.	4.579	0.826	0.421
4: Income differences are too large.	4.149	1.031	0.613
		1993	
1: Large income differences are necessary.	3.023	1.277	0.334
2: States should reduce income differences.	3.630	1.271	0.638
3: States should provide jobs.	4.306	1.042	0.575
4: Income differences are too large.	4.324	0.967	0.616
		1998	
1: Large income differences are necessary.	3.034	1.296	0.256
2: States should reduce income differences.	3.495	1.261	0.562
3: States should provide jobs.	4.197	1.082	0.563
4: Income differences are too large.	4.406	0.873	0.572
		2003	
1: Large income differences are necessary.	3.354	1.225	0.227
2: States should reduce income differences.	3.376	1.189	0.553
3: States should provide jobs.	4.338	0.992	0.557
4: Income differences are too large.	4.557	0.742	0.592
Women[b]			
		1988	
1: Large income differences are necessary.	2.860	1.330	0.150
2: States should reduce income differences.	3.917	1.130	0.771
3: States should provide jobs.	4.634	0.726	0.616
4: Income differences are too large.	4.220	0.938	0.799
		1993	
1: Large income differences are necessary.	3.155	1.254	0.440
2: States should reduce income differences.	3.733	1.246	0.775
3: States should provide jobs.	4.402	0.941	0.737
4: Income differences are too large.	4.390	0.898	0.783

Item	Mean	Standard deviation	Factor loading
		1998	
1: Large income differences are necessary.	3.096	1.285	0.379
2: States should reduce income differences.	3.521	1.210	0.736
3: States should provide jobs.	4.313	0.968	0.727
4: Income differences are too large.	4.448	0.814	0.759
		2003	
1: Large income differences are necessary.	3.445	1.205	0.274
2: States should reduce income differences.	3.813	1.124	0.760
3: States should provide jobs.	4.458	0.878	0.684
4: Income differences are too large.	4.608	0.638	0.736
Men[c]			
		1988	
1: Large income differences are necessary.	2.759	1.371	0.491
2: States should reduce income differences.	3.747	1.278	0.801
3: States should provide jobs.	4.515	0.925	0.617
4: Income differences are too large.	4.068	1.124	0.782
		1993	
1: Large income differences are necessary.	2.894	1.288	0.512
2: States should reduce income differences.	3.529	1.289	0.798
3: States should provide jobs.	4.206	1.130	0.720
4: Income differences are too large.	4.257	1.030	0.756
		1998	
1: Large income differences are necessary.	2.973	1.304	0.414
2: States should reduce income differences.	3.466	1.311	0.756
3: States should provide jobs.	4.075	1.179	0.747
4: Income differences are too large.	4.360	0.928	0.743
		2003	
1: Large income differences are necessary.	3.263	1.238	0.405
2: States should reduce income differences.	3.707	1.251	0.730
3: States should provide jobs.	4.214	1.085	0.768
4: Income differences are too large.	4.503	0.833	0.791

Notes: Responses to items 1–4 are on a scale of 1–5, where 1 = not egalitarian and 5 = strongly egalitarian.

[a] Eigenvalues and overall Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measures of sampling adequacy for a factor analysis of these items for the total population: 1988 (0.971; 0.633), 1993 (1.228; 0.704), 1998 (1.025; 0.673), and 2003 (1.017; 0.671).

[b] Eigenvalues and overall Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measures of sampling adequacy for a factor analysis of these items in the population of women are: 1988 (1.635; 0.5973), 1993 (1.951; 0.694), 1998 (1.789; 0.660), and 2003 (1.661; 0.626).

[c] Eigenvalues and overall Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measures of sampling adequacy for a factor analysis of these items in the population of men are: 1988 (1.874; 0.661), 1993 (1.988; 0.694), 1998 (1.853; 0.680), and 2003 (1.912; 0.687).

With the exception of the first item, the factor structure is similar for both genders for the same years (see Table 22.2). This first item, which loads systematically lower for women, is better described as an indicator of what is often called "functional inegalitarianism," contrasted with "egalitarianism." Krzysztof Zagorski (1999) and others refer to two distinct dimensions of egalitarianism, both of which are separately measurable and appear to have different determinants: egalitarianism and functional inegalitarianism. The former refers to people's attitudes toward economic equality—for example, how much income inequality is acceptable. The latter refers to the degree of a person's acceptance of some inequality as being necessary for economic growth. The present study follows the lead of Wojciech Zaborowski (2000) in including indicators both of egalitarianism (2–4) and functional inegalitarianism (1) in the same index. This choice does have some nonideal consequences; it is clear from the factor loadings that the measure of functional inegalitarianism is different from the others, and its distinctiveness is even more pronounced in analyses disaggregated by gender. However, running the models with an egalitarianism index of only three indicators (excluding the measure of functional inegalitarianism) did not significantly alter the results, supporting the retention of a larger index.[3]

The self-interest portion of the model includes up to four indicators, the first three of which are objective measures of income and social privilege. Income is measured in złotys as respondents' household, rather than personal, income, in order to capture respondents' standards of living more accurately than a measure of personal income might allow. These household income amounts were divided by 1,000 in order to generate more easily interpretable regression coefficients, as the effect of very small amounts of money on egalitarianism is likely to be small, as well.

Two companion indicators serve as further objective measures of self-interest: privilege and disadvantage, each coded dichotomously. These privilege and disadvantage indicators were constructed using the social classifications of respondents' occupations. Respondents who were employers, managers, or experts were designated privileged (= 1, while all other occupations = 0); respondents who were farmers (except those farmers who employed others), unskilled workers, and skilled workers (from heavy industry) were designated disadvantaged (= 1, while all other occupations = 0). This double dichotomization demonstrates interwave reliability.[4]

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[3] Further analyses could help to explain the determinants of women's lower functional inegalitarianism as compared to men.

[4] Privilege and disadvantage indicators were constructed using the social classification of occupations, as coded by K. M. Slomczynski (Warsaw: Institute of Philosophy and Sociology, Polish Academy of Sciences, January 2005). Please see Chapter 2 in this volume for more details about this construction.

The fourth self-interest item included in these models is a subjective measure, respondents' assessments of opportunities and threats (which was measured in each wave of the panel after the transition: 1993, 1998, and 2003). This item is based upon the responses to the following question: *The changes in our country bring with them opportunities and threats. For people like you, do the changes bring more opportunities or more threats?* In the 2003 survey, the question specifically referred to changes since 1989. The possible responses varied in the three waves, so they were recoded to match, such that 1 = more opportunities, 2 = the same / don't know, and 3 = more threats. Responses available in the 1998 and 2003 surveys included "the same / half and half," but 1993 did not. Therefore, in order to code the three waves comparably without losing the information of "same / half and half" when it was available, responses of "don't know" and "the same / half and half" were coded together. A factor analysis of the three waves' "opportunity/threat" items retained one factor, on which all loaded above 0.31 with KMO scores of at least 0.55, affirming the decision to code the responses in this manner. For use in the Arellano-Bond estimation, the missing opportunity threat measure for 1988 was replaced with an item that asked respondents the following question: *Has the socialist system brought more gains or losses?* The possible responses were recoded such that 1 = more gains, 2 = the same, 3 = more losses.

Each model that includes ideational effects uses an indicator of religiosity that was measured in 1988, 1998, and 2003, and asks respondents how frequently they attend religious services. This question was not always coded identically; thus, the responses have been recoded such that a higher value corresponds to higher religiosity: 1 = none / not religious, 2 = about once per month, 3 = between once per month and once per week, 4 = about once per week, and 5 = more than once per week. For use in the Arellano-Bond estimation, the missing religiosity measure for 1993 was filled with the religiosity values from 1988.

Three standard demographic variables known to affect political attitudes and behavior are included in the analyses as controls: education, age, and town size. As a measure for education, these models use scales composed of nine categories from each wave. The items from 1988, 1993, and 1998 were already in nine comparable categories, beginning with "incomplete elementary" and ending with "college or above," while the 2003 education item was recoded from twelve categories to nine, to match the education variable in the previous three waves. The second demographic variable, age, emphasizes that the experience of socialization in communist Poland was not uniform throughout the forty years of its duration, and it also controls for possible

psychological effects of being older. Older people in Poland may potentially be more egalitarian, for example, in the interest of continuing to receive state pensions.

The third control variable, "town size," refers to the size of the village, town, or city of each respondent's last place of residence. Values range from 1 to 9, where 1 indicates the respondent is from a rural area, and 9 stands for Warsaw (with a population of almost 2 million residents). The expectation is that not all regions of Poland were similarly affected by the transition, making it important to control for rural vs. urban as well as small- vs. large-town effects.

The final cross-sectional model for each year of the panel study includes interaction terms in order to focus on the effect of the independent variables on women's and men's attitudes, separately. In these models, the coefficients on noninteraction terms indicate the effect of the independent variables (e.g., education) on men, and the coefficients on the interaction terms indicate how those independent variables' effects differ for women. These interaction models do not include interacted versions of all of the independent variables, because numerous interacted terms were not shown to consistently contribute to an explanation of egalitarianism.

Two final models, one for women and one for men, using the full panel address autoregression effects with an Arellano-Bond estimator. Like the interaction models, the panel models do not use all of the variables discussed in this section. For the sake of parsimony, they include only the variables that were most useful in predicting egalitarianism in the cross-sectional models.

Accounting for Gender Differences: Regression Results and Discussion

Cross-Sectional Models

What do these cross-sectional models say about gendered attitudes, and, specifically, how do this chapter's hypotheses fare? Model 1 includes only gender, age, town size, and level of education and explains between 4.4 percent and 15.6 percent of the variance in egalitarianism (depending on the year), faring the worst in 1988. While all four independent variables in the 1988 model are statistically significant, this model's relatively weak predictive power when compared with the other three waves reinforces other studies' results, which show that late socialist / early post-socialist societies tended toward inconsistent ideologies and values (Mason 1995).

All four explanatory variables in Model 1 for 1993, 1998, and 2003 are also statistically significant, but, in turn, the relatively weak predictive power

of these models when compared with more extensive ones indicates that gender and standard demographic control variables do not suffice to explain attitudinal variation, nor do they offer much insight into gendered variation (see Tables 22.3, 22.4, 22.5, and 22.6).

The second model incorporates self-interest and ideational items. In all four waves of the survey, this model's predictive power is improved by the cache of additional variables. Gender, privilege, household income, and the opportunity/threat item (the subjective measure of self-interest) are statistically significant in all waves in which they were included; age, disadvantage, and town size are only sometimes significant.

Both education and religion become and remain statistically significant after 1988, but these results require further investigation. As the interaction model shows, for example, the effect of education is not the same for women and men. In the case of religiosity, while this factor emerges as a viable determinant of egalitarianism in the later 1990s (it was not included in the 1993 survey), analyses show that both women and men attended church in lower numbers in 2003 than they did in 1988. However, levels of egalitarianism among women and men have not changed accordingly (see Table 22.1); the effects of other factors appear to dominate the effects of religion.

These trends of significance in Model 2 support this chapter's first hypothesis, which posits that increased occupational status and increased household income predict lower levels of egalitarianism. Moreover, both objective and subjective measures of self-interest contribute powerfully—and distinctly—to people's levels of egalitarianism. Despite the explanatory power of these factors, however, gender remains a distinct and significant predictor of attitudinal difference in Model 2.

Given the ambiguities remaining in the cross-sectional models, the question of whether these determinants of egalitarianism are especially relevant for explaining gender differences is better answered by inspecting Model 3, which introduces gender-interacted terms. In this model, the coefficients on noninteraction terms may be read as those independent variables' effects on men's egalitarianism. The coefficients on the interaction terms in these models indicate how the effects of the interacted variables differ between women and men (e.g., the coefficient on female*education indicates the difference between the coefficients on education for women and men, respectively).

In this interaction model, education stands out in all four waves as a determinant of egalitarianism that functions differently for women and men. While the statistical significance of each term across the four waves of the

Table 22.3. 1988 OLS Regression of Egalitarianism on Demographic, Self-Interest, and Ideational Variables, with Interaction Terms

Independent variables	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3	
	B (std. error)	Beta	B (std. error)	Beta	B (std. error)	Beta
Demographic variables						
Gender	0.161 (0.037)***	0.108	0.149 (0.040)***	0.101	−0.220 (0.176)	−0.149
Age	0.002 (0.002)	0.029	0.002 (0.002)	0.033	0.002 (0.002)	0.025
Town size	−0.024 (0.008)**	−0.086	−0.021 (0.008)**	−0.077	−0.020 (0.008)**	−0.072
Education	−0.044 (0.009)***	−0.135	−0.017 (0.012)	−0.054	−0.054 (0.015)***	−0.168
Self-interest variables						
Privilege			−0.121 (0.067)†	−0.054	−0.110 (0.066)†	−0.049
Disadvantage			0.074 (0.051)	0.050	0.074 (0.051)	0.050
Household income			−0.269 (0.057)***	−0.120	−0.261 (0.065)***	−0.117
Opportunity/Threat			—	—	—	—
Ideational variable						
Religiosity			0.010 (0.018)	0.014	0.006 (0.018)	0.008
Interaction terms						
Gender*Age					0.002 (0.003)	0.070
Gender*Education					0.072 (0.017)***	0.265
Gender*Income					−0.059 (0.129)	−0.023
Constant	0.120 (0.86)	—	0.078 (0.128)	—	0.251 (0.154)	—
N	1,523		1,516		1,516	
adjusted R^2	0.044		0.058		0.067	
F(df)	18.44		12.60		10.99	
Prob > *F*	0.0000		0.000		0.0000	

†$p < 0.10$; *$p < 0.05$; **$p < 0.01$; ***$p < 0.001$.

Table 22.4. 1993 OLS Regression of Egalitarianism on Demographic, Self-Interest, and Ideational Variables, with Interaction Terms

Independent variables	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3	
	B (std. error)	Beta	B (std. error)	Beta	B (std. error)	Beta
Demographic variables						
Gender	0.221 (0.045)***	0.140	0.151 (0.048)**	0.096	0.336 (0.254)	0.214
Age	0.005 (0.002)**	0.081	0.006 (0.002)**	0.088	0.009 (0.003)**	0.130
Town size	−0.022 (0.009)*	−0.076	−0.019 (0.009)*	−0.066	−0.019 (0.009)*	−0.065
Education	−0.108 (0.010)***	−0.330	−0.062 (0.015)***	−0.186	−0.085 (0.018)***	−0.258
Self-Interest variables						
Privilege			−0.228 (0.077)**	−0.111	−0.203 (0.076)**	−0.098
Disadvantage			−0.018 (0.063)	−0.011	−0.012 (0.062)	−0.007
Household income			−0.007 (0.002)**	−0.091	−0.004 (0.003)	−0.051
Opportunity/Threat			0.233 (0.028)***	0.249	0.225 (0.030)***	0.241
Ideational variable						
Religiosity			—	—	—	—
Interaction terms						
Gender*Age					−0.006 (0.004)	−0.172
Gender*Education					0.057 (0.021)**	0.204
Gender*HHIncome					−0.034 (0.009)***	−0.178
Gender*Opportunity/ Threat					0.012 (0.067)	0.015
Constant	0.205 (0.108)†	—	−0.463 (0.155)**	—	−0.512 (0.188)**	—
N	1,025		930		930	
adjusted R^2	0.156		0.220		0.234	
F(df)	48.41		33.67		24.59	
Prob > F	0.0000		0.000		0.000	

†$p < 0.10$; *$p < 0.05$; **$p < 0.01$; ***$p < 0.001$.

Table 22.5. 1998 OLS Regression of Egalitarianism on Demographic, Self-Interest, and Ideational Variables, with Interaction Terms

	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3	
	B (std. error)	Beta	B (std. error)	Beta	B (std. error)	Beta
Demographic variables						
Gender	0.161 (0.032)***	0.108	0.141 (0.035)***	0.096	0.140 (0.157)	0.095
Age	0.002 (0.001)*	0.046	0.002 (0.001)†	0.043	0.005 (0.002)**	0.082
Town Size	−0.040 (0.006)***	−0.144	−0.037 (0.007)***	−0.130	−0.036 (0.007)***	−0.127
Education	−0.091 (0.007)***	−0.295	−0.040 (0.009)***	−0.128	−0.067 (0.012)***	−0.213
Self-interest variables						
Privilege			−0.264 (0.053)***	−0.136	−0.258 (0.053)***	−0.132
Disadvantage			0.075 (0.044)†	0.051	0.077 (0.044)†	0.052
Household income			−0.028 (0.008)***	−0.089	−0.020 (0.009)*	−0.064
Opportunity/Threat			0.170 (0.021)***	0.191	0.170 (0.022)***	0.190
Ideational variable						
Religiosity			0.039 (0.017)*	0.054	0.041 (0.017)†	0.057
Interaction terms						
Gender*Age					−0.004 (0.003)	−0.126
Gender*Education					0.052 (0.015)**	0.202
Gender*HHIncome					−0.022 (0.016)	−0.051
Gender*Opportunity/ Threat					−0.007 (0.033)	−0.011
Constant	0.388 (0.068)***	—	−0.256 (0.107)*	—	−0.270 (0.123)*	—
N	1,820		1,530		1,530	
adjusted R^2	0.145		0.217		0.223	
$F(df)$	77.80		48.00		34.70	
Prob > F	0.0000		0.0000		0.0000	

†$p < 0.10$; *$p < 0.05$; **$p < 0.01$; ***$p < 0.001$.

Table 22.6. 2003 OLS Regression of Egalitarianism on Demographic, Self-Interest, and Ideational Variables, with Interaction Terms

	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3	
	B(std. error)	Beta	B(std. error)	Beta	B(std. error)	Beta
Demographic variables						
Gender	0.359 (0.064)***	0.133	0.201 (0.066)**	0.078	−0.009 (0.297)	−0.003
Age	0.005 (0.002)*	0.060	−0.000 (−0.002)	−0.003	0.005 (0.003)	0.055
Town size	−0.047 (0.013)***	−0.094	−0.014 (0.013)	−0.029	−0.011 (0.013)	−0.023
Education	−0.137 (0.014)***	−0.251	−0.052 (0.0918)**	−0.099	−0.071 (0.025)**	−0.133
Self-interest variables						
Privilege			−0.242 (0.109)*	−0.068	−0.217 (0.108)	−0.061
Disadvantage			0.073 (0.085)	0.028	0.093 (0.084)	0.036
Household income			−0.118 (0.021)***	−0.161	−0.197 (0.031)***	−0.268
Opportunity/Threat			0.290 (0.048)***	0.164	0.270 (0.048)***	0.153
Ideational variable						
Religiosity			0.137 (0.033)***	0.109	0.137 (0.032)***	0.109
Interaction terms						
Gender*Age					−0.008 (0.004)*	−0.171
Gender*Education					0.031 (0.029)	0.072
Gender*HHIncome					0.146 (0.040)***	0.194
Gender*Opportunity/Threat					0.055 (0.061)	0.055
Constant	0.396 (0.129)**	—	−0.546 (0.210)**	—	−0.485 (0.241)*	—
N	1,578		1,365		1,365	
adjusted R^2	0.107		0.157		0.171	
F(df)	48.44		29.23		22.65	
Prob > *F*	0.0000		0.0000		0.0000	

†$p < 0.10$; *$p < 0.05$; **$p < 0.01$; ***$p < 0.001$.

survey varies, the effect of education appears to be opposite for women and men in all years except 2003 (in which year the interacted education term is not statistically significant). Education is an attribute that ought to correlate with increased privilege and with increased receptiveness to the new political, economic, and social regime, but, while increased education does predict lower egalitarianism among men, the opposite is the case among women. In every wave, the female*education terms—the coefficients of which indicate the relative effect of education on egalitarianism among women—are positive. This suggests that among women increased education typically *increased* egalitarianism throughout the 1990s. One possible reason for this could be that women's early and relatively negative experiences with system change have given a gender-specific valence to educational attainment, making higher education translate into greater egalitarianism among women in a way it does not for men.

While not all of the terms are statistically significant, noteworthy directional changes between the noninteracted and interacted self-interest terms in Model 3 suggest that occupational and social privilege, like education, do not function in the same way for women and men. As the coefficients are not always statistically significant, however, the directional inconsistencies may simply be stochastic.

Similarly reinforcing the hypothesis that the salience of attitudinal determinants varies by gender, the opportunity/threat item is statistically significant in the noninteraction models, but *none* of the gender*opportunity/threat terms is. This result suggests that while this subjective measure may hold sway among men, it is not a determinant of women's egalitarianism.

As already noted, religiosity is statistically significant and positive in the noninteracted models in 1998 and 2003, but the relationship between religiosity and egalitarianism is less clear when it is mediated by gender. In earlier versions of the interacted model not included here, the gender*religiosity term in 1998 and 2003 was not statistically significant, but increased religiosity among men *did* correspond to higher degrees of egalitarianism in those years. Thus, while religiosity appears to affect men's egalitarianism, it does not function in the same way for women.

The interaction analyses also suggest non–gender-specific trends in the effect of self-interest factors between 1988 and 2003. As in the noninteracted models, these social-structural measures are strong and significant predictors of egalitarianism. Both household income and gender*income are intermittently statistically significant negative predictors of egalitarianism across all four waves, indicating that these self-interest factors impact women and men's attitudes similarly.

Overall, these cross-sectional results affirm the importance of social-structural factors in shaping people's attitudes and beliefs, but they also highlight the persistence of gender as a statistically significant predictor of attitudinal variation. These results also reveal a number of discrepancies between the determinants of women's and men's attitudes, for example, education impacts women's and men's attitudes very differently, and this finding complicates work that emphasizes the significance of education but does not focus upon gender.[5]

Arellano-Bond Estimation

The full panel models—analyzed for women and men, separately—were generated by an Arellano-Bond estimator (see Table 22.7), which uses previous waves' values ("first differences") to deal with autoregression effects. This estimator is one of various options for analyzing panel data; alternatives include one- or two-way models using fixed, random, between, or within effects. Like all panel regression techniques, the Arellano-Bond model presents estimates of coefficients that explain not only variation in the dependent variable between respondents, but also variation in the dependent variable across waves of the panel.

These models include measures of education, disadvantage, household income, and opportunity/threat. The results of the women's model identify the lagged dependent variable, disadvantage, and opportunity/threat as statistically significant. The results of the men's model do not identify any independent variables as statistically significant above 90 percent confidence (although disadvantage and opportunity/threat come very close to doing so, with p values of 0.107).

The directionals on the coefficients suggest that both disadvantage and household income may affect women and men's egalitarianism differently, but the relative statistical insignificance of coefficients in the men's model leaves the comparison an open question. If these directional differences were completely reliable, however, they would reinforce conclusions drawn from the cross-sectional models, which indicate that both subjective and objective measures of self-interests are relevant in parsing gendered attitudes. While the objective "feminization of poverty" clearly affects gendered egalitarianism, so, too, do women and men's subjective assessments of their circumstances.

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[5] Zagorski (1999: 198), for example, asserts that most studies of economic and political attitudes in Poland show that education is the most important determinant of these attitudes. These studies do not illuminate how gender might impact women's attitudes differently from men's.

Table 22.7. Arellano-Bond Dynamic Panel-Data Estimation for Predictors of Egalitarianism, 1988–2003

Variable	Coefficient	Std. error
Women[a]		
Egalitarianism	–0.4760***	0.1078
Education	–0.0557	0.0579
Disadvantage	–0.2007†	0.1142
Household Income	0.0066	0.0137
Opportunity/Threat	0.0900†	0.0527
Constant	0.1217**	0.0468
Men[b]		
Egalitarianism	–0.1309	0.0960
Education	–0.0494	0.0769
Disadvantage	0.2220	0.1378
Household Income	–0.0110	0.0113
Opportunity/Threat	0.0909	0.0565
Constant	0.0057	0.0497

[a] $N = 335$, Wald $c^2(5) = 32.14$
Arellano-Bond test that average autocovariance in residuals of order 1 is 0:
    H0: no autocorrelation $z = 1.28$ $Pr > z = 0.200$
[b] $N = 391$, Wald $\chi^2(5) = 8.89$
Arellano-Bond test that average autocovariance in residuals of order 1 is 0:
    H0: no autocorrelation $z = -2.53$ $Pr > z = 0.012$
†$p < 0.10$; *$p < 0.05$; **$p < 0.01$; ***$p < 0.001$.

The women's model suggests that occupational disadvantage is a rather strong predictor of egalitarianism among women. This result indicates that a woman occupied as a farmer, an unskilled worker, or a skilled worker in heavy industry is very likely to be *less* egalitarian than a woman otherwise occupied. Women are far less likely to be employed in these sectors than men, however, which might explain how, in the aggregate, women's and men's levels of egalitarianism are both increasing and converging.

Conclusions

This chapter has addressed numerous interrelated questions regarding gender and attitudinal variation. What factors underlie variation in economic egalitarianism, generally, and how does gender interact with these factors? How might the determinants of gendered attitudes change over time? This study's

analyses indicate that level of education, as well as social and occupational privilege, are strong predictors of respondents' egalitarianism, as expected. Although social-structural variables explain a great deal of the variation among men, they do not account as well for variation among women. Traditional explanations for attitudes suffice for the population at large, but they are not adequate for addressing the gender gap.

This chapter's analyses also suggest that certain determinants of egalitarianism have different salience for women and men; for example, more education appears to lead to higher egalitarianism among women but lower egalitarianism among men. Other factors, including measures of occupational and social status, were inconsistent in explaining gendered attitudinal variation.

These results highlight the importance of generating gender-sensitive attitudinal models, emphasizing that future studies should do more than just control for gender. Why, for example, does education appear to impact women's economic attitudes differently from men's? This chapter has surmised (but not tested) the idea that women's early and relatively negative experiences with system change may have given gender-specific valence to certain determinants of egalitarianism, including education. More broadly, social science models that aspire to explain attitudinal variation must account for "feminization of poverty," among other social realities.