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THE IMPACT OF SOCIAL CLASS AND POLITICAL EXPERIENCE ON SUPPORT FOR POLAND'S JOINING THE EUROPEAN UNION

The main objective of this chapter is to describe attitudes toward the European Union (EU) among different social groups of Poles, distinguished on the basis of economic and political factors. We examine the impact of individuals' current position in the social structure and their political experience on attitudes toward the EU. In our analyses we test several major hypotheses drawn from research on the determinants of citizen support for European integration. We focus primarily on the relative impact of two types of explanatory variables pertaining to (1) utilitarian calculations associated with individuals' location in the social structure and (2) their past and present political orientations.

Our chapter proceeds in the following manner. The next section presents the theoretical considerations that inform our analysis as well as the hypotheses we test. We then turn to a description of the impact of social class – and its main correlates, education and income – on support for Poland's joining the EU. The next section is devoted to the effects of political experience – party preferences, past party membership, and protest behavior. The core of our analysis brings together social class and political experience as independent variables. In the concluding section, we discuss the

implications of our findings both for the ongoing project of European Union enlargement and for the study of support for integration in the new democracies and market economies of post-communist Europe.

Theoretical Considerations

Two approaches dominate theoretical and empirical explanations of citizen support for European integration. The first and, until recently, the most prevalent approach focuses on economic determinants of attitudes toward the European Union associated with individuals' location in the social structure. The second approach emphasizes political sources of sentiments toward the EU, with primary attention focused on the way in which domestic politics and party preferences influence support and opposition to integration.

The emphasis on economic determinants of EU support rests on utility maximization and human capital theories of public opinion and political behavior. As Gabel (1998: 40) notes, "membership in the EU requires national economic adjustment that introduces new opportunities, competition and uncertainty for citizens depending on their personal economic assets." Insofar as individuals are made aware, through personal experience or cuing from political elites, interest groups, and the mass media, that there are winners and losers in the integration process, support for the EU will be based primarily on utilitarian calculations of costs and benefits. Hence, those who are, or regard themselves as, best poised to gain from EU membership and its policies – because of their position in the social structure, occupational experience, possession of human capital, and sense of economic well-being – will be more supportive of integration than those whose interests are likely to be harmed (Eichenberg and Dalton 1993; Anderson 1998; Gabel 1998).

Several scholars have questioned what they regard as undue emphasis placed on economic motivations as determinants of support for integration, in large part because of the EU's lack of salience to most citizens and their low level of information about its policies and their effects. As Anderson (1998: 573) remarks, ". . . how can mass publics be simultaneously ignorant about integration and act in a self-interested rational fashion when it comes to economic benefits to be secured from the integration process?" In light of this puzzle, an alternative approach focuses on *political orientations and behavior*, such as party preferences, political experience, and protest behavior, as more direct determinants of orientations toward the EU. Accordingly, "attitudes about the advantages and disadvantages of

integration are likely to reflect other . . . political beliefs that are the result of citizens' experiences with domestic political reality. As a result, economic effects, which typically have been modeled to have a direct effect on integration support, may in fact be mediated by attitudes toward domestic politics" (Anderson 1998: 573).

Initial Hypotheses and Research Questions

The traditional research expectation is that those who are favorably located in the social structure would support European integration. We intend to test the hypothesis that the majority of current winners of the economic transformation in Poland will support integration. Managers and experts are good examples of such social classes. They can expect to gain from European integration in that their skills and other assets potentially will be successfully used on the European labor market. However, we will test the self-interest hypothesis not only with respect to winners but also with respect to losers. In the case of losers – such as small traditional farmers – it is rational to oppose Poland's joining the European Union because in the future they will lose even more. For some groups the aversion to integration is a self-defense mechanism to avoid expected losses.

We assume that, within each social class, gender and age may be important variables influencing support for European integration. Past research has demonstrated that in Poland men and younger people are more likely to support European integration than are women and older people (Mach, Zaborowski, Slomczynski, Skotnicka-Illasiewicz, and Palska 1998; Karasinska-Fendler, Skotnicka-Illasiewicz, Sobotka, and Swierkocki 2000). Although it has been argued that men have fared better than women during the economic transition from a state socialist to a market economy, this claim masks significant heterogeneity among Polish women in their relative gains and losses during the past decade (Janicka 1997). Thus, on its face, gender differences in support of European integration are somewhat puzzling and deserve further investigation. Younger Poles have more opportunities than their older counterparts in the emerging domestic and transnational market economy. In this chapter, we include gender and age in our analyses as control variables insofar as both are related to our other independent variables in complex ways.

In addition to actual social class, social mobility may also have an impact on support for EU membership. Our prediction is that people who have experienced upward mobility since 1989 will be more in favor of EU

membership than people who have experienced downward mobility. Moreover, it would be interesting to examine the attitudes of two groups that did not change their class location during 1989–98: stable manual workers versus stable nonmanual workers. We will also consider the views of currently unemployed people, with the expectation that they are particularly opposed to European integration. Among class and quasi-class groups, the unemployed lost the most during the transition period in Poland.

We also take into account two basic correlates of social class: education and income. Education and income typically are used as indicators of individually held resources that enable those who possess them to adapt more easily, both psychologically and materially, to an increasingly complex, uncertain, and competitive free-market economy. We predict that more highly educated persons as well as those with higher income will be much more positive about Poland's future in the EU than will people with lower education and lower income.

In addition to social class, we assume that political experience will also have a significant effect on support for Poland's joining the EU. First of all, it is worthwhile to consider one variable directly related to the communist legacy – membership in the communist party, that is, the Polish United Workers Party (PUWP). On one hand, past members of this party might be expected to oppose EU membership, given the PUWP's negative ideological stance toward the capitalist West. On the other hand, because former communist party members tend to exhibit very pragmatic orientations toward the political and economic changes taking place in Poland, they may not differ from nonparty members with respect to their attitudes toward the EU. Thus, the impact of communist party membership on support for European integration remains an open question.

The political legacy of the communist era also manifests itself in participation in protest activities against the former regime. Are those people who were actively involved in local or general strikes, participated in street demonstrations and manifestations, or joined "Solidarity" in 1980–81 or during the period of martial law more supportive of Poland's joining the EU than Poles who refrained from such kinds of protest behavior? One might expect this to be the case insofar as opposition to the communist regime was usually associated with strong approval of the West.

The last dimension of political experience we consider here pertains to partisan preferences in the 1997 election. It has been shown that, according to their programs and electoral appeals, political parties in Poland can be grouped into distinct political families: liberal/social democratic, Christian/nationalist, post-communist, and populist (Shabad and

Slomczynski 1999; see also chapter 8 in this volume). Because voting choices are to a certain extent determined by individuals' interests, we expect that partisan preference will be related to differential support for the European Union. In this regard, we hypothesize that liberal/social democratic voters are most in favor of EU integration and populists, among whom farmers figure prominently, are most in opposition.

We expect partisan groups to differ in their opinion toward the EU for another reason as well. Because EU membership has become an increasingly salient political issue in Poland, for both programmatic and electoral considerations, parties have taken varied stances on European integration (Kucharczyk 1999; Karasinska-Fendler et al. 2000). In the 1997 election, these stances ranged from persistently staunch support (parties belonging to the liberal/social democratic political family, particularly Freedom Union) to more cautious endorsement (post-communist and especially Christian/nationalist parties like Solidarity Election Action) to outright opposition (many populist and extreme nationalist parties). Given the relatively low level of interest in and information about the EU and the consequences of membership for Poland, citizens are likely to rely on parties as proxies to form their opinions about integration (Anderson 1998; Gabel 1998; Cichowski 2000). Thus, the expectation is that, all else being equal, individuals' attitudes toward the EU will be consistent with the position of their preferred party.

Dependent Variable: Support for Poland's Joining the European Union

Our dichotomous dependent variable is based on responses to the question "If a referendum were held today, would you vote for Poland's joining the European Union or against it?" We coded affirmative responses to this question as 1, otherwise as 0. In our 1998 survey, 59.2 percent of respondents declared their support for Poland's integration with the European Union. This figure is somewhat lower than an analogous figure from another survey conducted at the same time (Kolarska-Bobinska and Kucharczyk 1998: 317).

Generally, from the mid-1990s until the beginning of 2000, support for Poland's joining the EU has declined. According to public opinion polls, in 1996, 80 percent of adult Poles stated that they would vote for Poland's entry into the EU in a referendum; in September 1997, 72 percent gave the same answer. By May 1998, the proportion of supporters had decreased to 64 percent. By autumn 1999, "Europhoria" in Poland had given way to a tepid "Euro-enthusiasm," with barely 50 percent saying that they would cast a

“yes” vote in a referendum (Kolarska-Bobinska and Kucharczyk 1998: 317; Skotnicka-Illasiewicz 1998: 258; Subotic 2000: A5).

Social Class and Support for Poland’s Joining the European Union

Support for Poland’s membership in the EU is in the interests of those who have experienced some degree of economic success during the period of transition to a market economy. Thus, over 80 percent of Poles belonging to the winners of the transformation and having the best prospects of being successful in the EU – experts and managers – supported Poland’s membership. Aversion to Poland’s membership in the EU tended to be strongest among unskilled manual workers and farmers, those who have been the most disadvantaged by economic change and who can expect to gain the least from accession to the EU. Only 37 percent of unskilled manual workers and 26 percent of farmers were supportive of joining the EU (see Table 15.1).

Table 15.1. Proportion of Persons Supporting Poland’s Integration with the European Union, According to Occupation and Gender

Occupational groups ^a	Proportion of those who support Poland’s joining the European Union ^b		
	men	women	total
Employers	61.9	76.9	67.6
Self-employed	73.2	69.7	72.1
Managers	82.1	100.0	86.8
Supervisors	71.4	73.8	72.7
Experts	89.3	76.9	81.3
Office workers	63.6	56.8	58.9
Skilled manual workers	58.6	45.8	57.0
Unskilled manual workers	45.9	30.0	36.8
Farmers	29.7	20.0	25.8
Owners	56.6	46.7	51.4
Nonworking	57.8	41.5	48.4
Unemployed	56.1	43.4	49.0
Total	58.1	48.0	52.9

^a For description of variables pertaining to social classes, see text.

^b An affirmative answer to the following question: *If a referendum were held today, would you vote for Poland’s joining the European Union or against it?*

Among those in lower positions in the social structure, women were more likely than men to be averse to EU membership. With the exception of those who are employers, managers, and supervisors, in most other social classes women were less favorable toward the EU than men.

The Impact of Social Mobility

Social mobility is an important factor influencing support for EU membership. In our analysis, individual occupational experience between 1989 and 1998 is defined in terms of stability, upward mobility, and downward mobility (see Table 15.2). Stable occupational status means that a person held the same position in 1988 and 1998. Upward mobility characterizes those people whose occupational position improved according to one of the following patterns: if office workers became experts, managers, or owners; if skilled or unskilled workers moved to categories of experts, managers, owners, or office workers; if farmers switched to nonfarm occupations. Downward mobility means that office workers became skilled or unskilled manual workers or farmers; experts, managers, and owners became office workers, skilled or unskilled manual workers, or farmers; skilled or unskilled laborers became farmers or farm workers.

Table 15.2. Proportion of Persons Supporting Poland's Integration with the European Union by Occupational Experience, 1988–1998, and Gender

Occupational experience	Proportion of those who support Poland's joining the European Union			N
	men	women	total	
<i>Change in occupational status</i>				
Upward mobility	66.7	57.4	63.2	125
Downward mobility	58.9	45.9	48.7	117
<i>Stability</i>				
Nonmanuals	73.7	62.7	67.6	225
Manuals	48.7	26.2	42.9	254
<i>Became unemployed</i>				
Nonmanual, 1988	69.6	53.7	60.0	200
Manual, 1988	49.6	28.1	37.9	282

Upward social mobility enhanced support for Poland's membership in the EU by 15 percent in comparison with downward mobility. However, among those who were downwardly mobile, support for Poland's membership in the

EU was still relatively high, around 50 percent. Poles who were stable within nonmanual occupations were more pro-EU than those who were stable within manual occupations.

Surprisingly, from 28.1 percent (female manual workers) to 69.6 percent (male nonmanual workers) of those who became unemployed perceived Poland's future membership in the EU in a positive light. Taking into account the radical decline of their economic situation, one would have expected more widespread aversion to further change in the direction of a market economy. However, in Poland a large number of officially unemployed workers are engaged in the informal economy and are able to supplement their unemployment benefits. Thus, the real status of these people might not be in such decline. Moreover, many unemployed may perceive the EU in terms of new business opportunities. They may also look favorably toward the EU in that one of its conditions for Poland's accession is a reduction in the rate of unemployment to 10 percent.

The Impact of Education and Income

In accordance with past survey findings, education is positively related to support for EU membership. A favorable stance toward EU integration was most prevalent among Poles with a university degree (about 80 percent). The coefficient of correlation equals 0.286 and is statistically significant ($p < 0.01$). Those with only an elementary level of education were least supportive (about 35 percent).

Table 15.3. Proportion of Persons Supporting Poland's Integration with the European Union, According to Education and Income

Education	Proportion of those who support Poland's joining the European Union		
	Income groups ^a		
	low	middle	high
Elementary	28.7	0.0	48.7
Basic vocational	37.6	51.3	69.6
General secondary	49.3	59.0	67.9
Vocational and post-secondary	50.0	62.3	84.1

^a Low income refers to the lowest quartile, high income refers to the highest quartile, and middle income – to the rest.

As Table 15.3 shows, the segment of Polish society that is most positive toward the EU are highly educated people whose income is the highest (84.1 percent). Our findings also demonstrate that, at each level of education, support for Poland's joining the EU rises as income increases. This pattern is evident even among those with only an elementary level of education. At that level, those whose income is the lowest were about 12 percent less supportive of EU integration than those with middle income and 20 percent less than people belonging to the high income group. The regularity in Table 15.3 is also striking with respect to the covariation of education and EU support when income is held constant. At all income levels – high, middle, and low – support for the EU increases with an increase in educational level.

Effects of Political Experience

Our first two political experience variables pertain to the communist past. The first one is a dichotomous variable distinguishing former members of the Polish United Workers Party (coded as 1) from the rest (0). As is well known, membership in the communist party was unequally distributed among social classes. In 1988, among managers the percentage of communist party members was the highest (34.2 percent) while among farmers the percentage was lowest (4.0 percent). In the total population, the proportion of communist party members in 1989 was about 10.9 percent. However, the proportion of respondents who at some point between 1979 and 1989 belonged to the communist party was higher (20.3 percent). We took this variable into account in our analysis, with the assumption that even those who left the party at some point are more likely than others to have been influenced by its anti-Western ideology.

The second variable, protest behavior during the 1980s, is a summative index of (1) active involvement in local or general strikes, (2) participation in street demonstrations and manifestations, and (3) membership in "Solidarity" during 1981–83, that is, just before or during the period of martial law. Although the index ranges from 0 to 3, its distribution is skewed. For this reason, we distinguish three levels of political protest: none of the three types of activity, only one type of activity, and two or three types of activity.

The third political experience variable is a typology of party preferences, including liberal/social democratic, Christian/nationalist, post-communist, and populist (Shabad and Slomczynski 1999; see also chapter 8 in this volume). In additional analyses, we treat this variable as a set of dummies, with 1 indicating the specific value and 0 otherwise. We expect partisan

groups to differ in their opinion toward the EU because party preferences are related to interests and because people rely on party stances to form their own political opinions.

Table 15.4 summarizes the relationships between our various dimensions of political experience and support for Poland's joining the European Union. In contrast to the purely "ideological" hypothesis, members of the former communist party were quite favorable toward European integration: about 60 percent of former PUWP members said that they would vote for membership. The difference between members and nonmembers was statistically significant (9 percent). We interpret this result as indicating that former communist party members took into account the likely benefits to themselves of future EU membership and that their cost-benefit calculation was a stronger determinant of their current views than the ideology of the party to which they had once belonged. The difference between extensive protesters and nonprotesters was even greater, with protesters being more supportive.

Table 15.4. Proportion of Persons Supporting Poland's Integration with the European Union, According to Political Experience

Political experience	Proportion of those who support Poland's joining the European Union			N (total)
	men	women	total	
<i>Communist party membership</i>				
Yes	0.602	0.600	0.602	359
No	0.571	0.465	0.510	1,403
<i>Political protest behavior</i>				
No	0.543	0.460	0.496	1,275
Somewhat	0.624	0.556	0.600	413
Extensive	0.760	0.615	0.711	76
<i>Party preferences^a</i>				
Liberal/social democratic parties	0.915	0.855	0.890	163
Christian/nationalist parties	0.685	0.515	0.601	419
Post-communist parties	0.575	0.506	0.541	342
Populist parties	0.354	0.386	0.370	162
Absence of party preference	0.467	0.402	0.431	678

^a For description of variables pertaining to the 1997 party preferences, see text.

In Table 15.4 we present the proportions of partisan groups in 1998 that stated that they supported Poland's membership in the EU. Because gender is one of our control variables in the analyses to follow and it proved to have

a statistically significant effect on pro-integration sentiments, we also show the distribution of opinion among partisan groups separately for men and women. Partisan groups differed in their degree of “Euro-enthusiasm” in ways that paralleled the public stances of party leaders. Contrary to our expectations, however, Christian/nationalist voters tended to be more positive toward the EU than were post-communist party sympathizers.

The data in Table 15.4 demonstrate that in 1998 there were strong relationships between political experience, on one hand, and support for EU membership, on the other. Insofar as research shows that voting choices are to a certain extent anchored in individuals’ position in the social structure (Shabad and Slomczynski 1999; Slomczynski and Shabad 2000), does the effect of social class on attitudes toward the EU diminish appreciably when political experience is taken into account? Does the impact of political experience on support for European integration remain when social class is controlled?

Basic Regression Analysis

Table 15.5 presents the results of a logistic regression analysis of support for Poland’s joining the EU on social classes and three types of political experiences. In this analysis we include four social classes, thus making other social classes – office workers and manual workers – as well as the unemployed, students, and housewives, the reference category. Communist party membership and protest behavior are dichotomies. The reference category for partisan preference is made up of those who either did not vote or did not provide information about the party for which they cast their ballot.

As can be seen in Table 15.5, in 1998, the effects of most categories of social class and partisan preference are statistically significant, sizable, and in the expected direction. Moreover, class and partisanship have a similar impact on pro-integration attitudes. Managers and experts, whose interests are likely to be most benefited by EU membership, were about twice as likely as others to be in favor of EU membership. Farmers, whose interests are most threatened in the short term by the integration process, were around 70 percent less likely than others to be supportive of Poland’s joining the EU. Similarly, voters’ views toward integration were consistent with both the programmatic statements of their preferred party and the public stances of party leaders on the desirability of Poland’s membership in the EU. With the exception of populists *cum* farmers, all partisan groups, but especially

liberal/social democratic party voters, were considerably more supportive of membership than those lacking a party preference. In 1998, both utilitarian considerations and ideological dispositions as expressed by partisan preferences had strong direct effects on support for integration. In this respect, citizens in Poland very much resemble those in the member states of Western Europe (Gabel 1998).

Table 15.5. Logistic Regression of Support for Poland's Joining the European Union on Selected Social Classes and Political Experience, Controlling for Gender and Age

Independent variables	Support for Poland's joining the European Union, 1998		
	B	SE	ExpB
<i>Demographic variables</i>			
Gender (1 = men)	0.190	0.151	1.210
Age (years)	0.034	0.088	1.034
<i>Selected social classes</i>			
Managers	1.416	0.501	4.119***
Experts	0.834	0.317	2.302***
Petty bourgeoisie	0.427	0.216	1.532***
Farmers	-1.222	0.223	0.295***
<i>Communist party membership</i>			
Communist party membership (yes = 1)	-0.061	0.199	0.941
<i>Political protest behavior</i>			
Protest behavior (yes = 1)	0.002	0.128	1.002
<i>Party preference</i>			
Liberal/social democratic parties	2.045	0.330	7.727***
Christian/nationalist parties	0.758	0.183	2.135***
Populist parties	0.176	0.280	1.192
Post-communist parties	0.371	0.199	1.450*
<i>Constant</i>	-0.337	0.111	
-2 Log likelihood	1,156.845		
Model Chi-square	172.095		
Cox and Snell R ²	0.162		

* p < 0.10; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01

In 1998, managers were over four times as likely to be supportive of EU membership and experts more than twice as apt to be in favor of Poland's

entry into the EU than were others. The odds of being pro-integration were even wider among partisan groups. For example, those who cast their ballot for liberal or social democratic parties in the 1997 parliamentary election were eight times as likely as those without a partisan preference to favor membership. The results are in accordance with our predictions in the sense that both social class and political experience do matter. Managers and experts – the most privileged classes during the transformation, were the most supportive of Poland's integration with the EU. Farmers were much less likely to be positive toward the EU than were other social classes. With regard to party preferences, liberal/social democratic party voters were much more likely to be supportive of the EU than were sympathizers of other parties.

When social classes and party preferences are controlled, neither communist party membership nor protest behavior in the 1980s has a statistically significant effect on EU support. The impact on each of those variables disappears because, after 1989, both communist party members and political protesters affiliated themselves with political parties whose positions on a variety of issues were in agreement with their own political orientations. For example, many past communist members supported post-communist parties in 1997 ($r = 0.225$), and, as we already indicated, post-communist parties favor Poland's joining the European Union.

Two rather straightforward conclusions can be drawn from these analyses. First, there are multiple determinants of citizen support for EU membership in Poland. Both utilitarian calculations of the costs and benefits of membership *and* political orientations and behavior (as expressed by partisan preference) have statistically significant and sizable direct effects on individuals' stances toward European integration. Economic interests do not trump ideology. Second, public opinion was polarized in 1998 as the prospect of EU membership became more real and as debate about its impact on Poland intensified in the media and among political elites. Those who stand to benefit materially from EU membership and who are ideologically disposed to European integration were more favorable toward Poland's entry in 1998. Those who stand to lose economically or who feel their values to be threatened were more hostile.

Analysis presented in Table 15.5 shows that the predictive power of the model based on social class and political experience is moderate (Cox and Snell $R^2 = 0.162$). Hence, other indicators of utilitarian calculations of costs and benefits associated with membership as well as other noneconomic factors may also be significant determinants of support for integration. In the next section, we extend our analysis to explore the impact of other variables.

Additional Analysis

In Poland, social class is strongly correlated with education and income (Slomczynski and Shabad 1997, 2000; see also chapter 1 in this volume); for all practical purposes, these two variables are alternative measures of individuals' location in the social structure. Because of the problems of multicollinearity we are not able to include social class, education, and income into one causal model predicting support for Poland's joining the European Union. Instead, we include other variables that correlate moderately with both social class and political experience.

In our additional analysis, we consider the effects of three variables that assess an individual's degree of *exposure to the West*: (1) residence in an urban center of trade and tourism, (2) knowing foreign languages, and (3) travel to the West for work or leisure. Each of these reflects useful experiences or attributes that enhance adaptation to integration with the West. We expect that those who have greater exposure to the West will be more supportive of Poland's joining the EU than those whose knowledge and experience are more parochial.

We also take into account individuals' subjective assessment of improvement or decline in their economic well-being. If change in one's economic well-being is attributed primarily to economic reforms, then those who think that their material situation has gotten better are likely to welcome further reform and to be more supportive of integration than are those who perceive that their economic situation has deteriorated (Anderson and Tverdova 2000; Cichowski 2000). We used the following questionnaire item as an indicator of the subjective assessment of one's economic well-being: *Compared with five years ago, did the financial situation of your household* (1) *substantially improve*, (2) *somewhat improve*, (3) *neither improve nor worsen*, (4) *somewhat worsen*, or (5) *substantially worsen*? To make the results more easily interpretable, we reversed the scale.

In Table 15.6, Model I, we include three items each of which measures "exposure to the West": residence in urban areas of Poland that are centers of foreign trade and investment or are heavily frequented by tourists, knowing foreign languages, and travel to the West. We also include in Table 15.6, Model I, respondents' evaluation of their economic well-being as compared with five years earlier as our indicator of individual economic self-interest in the context of a marketizing economy. As the results indicate, our hypothesis that "exposure to the West" is positively related to support for EU membership is confirmed. Individuals who possess such

Table 15.6. Logistic Regression of Support for Poland's Joining the European Union on Gender, Age, Selected Social Classes, Party Preferences, Exposure to the West, Evaluation of Economic Well-Being, Assessment of the Past and Current Regimes, and Interest in Politics

Independent variables ^a	Support for Poland's joining the European Union, 1998					
	Model I			Model II		
	B	SE	ExpB	B	SE	ExpB
<i>Demographic variables</i>						
Gender (1 = men)	0.378	0.107	1.460***	0.267	0.114	1.306**
Age (years)	0.003	0.005	1.002	0.003	0.005	1.003
<i>Selected social classes</i>						
Managers	1.255	0.508	3.507**	1.043	0.517	2.837**
Experts	0.773	0.316	2.167***	0.703	0.326	2.019**
Petty bourgeoisie	0.132	0.216	1.114	0.094	0.219	1.110
Farmers	-0.766	0.208	0.465***	-0.796	0.214	0.451***
<i>Party preferences</i>						
Liberal/social democratic parties	1.705	0.273	5.498***	1.416	0.276	4.120***
Christian/nationalist parties	0.563	0.131	1.756***	0.332	0.138	1.393***
Post-communist parties	0.239	0.140	1.270*	0.200	0.147	1.222
<i>Exposure to the West</i>						
Living in tourist/trade area	0.455	0.113	1.576***	0.377	0.116	1.458***
Knowing foreign languages	0.174	0.115	1.190	0.103	0.112	1.109
Travel to Western countries	0.645	0.122	1.907***	0.527	0.148	1.694***
<i>Evaluation of economic well-being</i>						
Perceived improvement	0.363	0.051	1.437***	0.301	0.125	1.351***
<i>Interest in politics</i>						
Interest in politics				0.267	0.064	1.306***
<i>Assessment of the past and current regimes</i>						
Negative assessment of socialism				0.269	0.062	1.309***
Positive assessment of current regime				0.374	0.065	1.453***
Constant	-1.895	0.307		-3.839	0.399	
-2 Log likelihood	2,078.662			1,996.159		
Model Chi-square	353.317			427.723		
Cox and Snell R ²	0.182			0.217		

* p < 0.10; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01

human capital were more likely than those who lack such resources to be supportive of Poland's entry into the EU. Moreover, a positive outlook on one's economic situation is associated with increased support for EU membership.

As one might expect, a comparison of the values in Table 15.6 with those in Table 15.5 shows that the addition of these variables diminishes to a certain extent the positive effects of certain categories of social class and partisan preference (e.g., managers and experts vote for liberal/social democratic parties in 1997) and enhances that of others (e.g., farmers). At the same time, the addition of these indicators of utilitarian calculations of costs and benefits associated with potential EU membership alters only slightly the effects of social class and partisanship; these two determinants of public opinion toward the EU remain the most substantively significant.

In Table 15.6, Model II, we add respondents' level of political interest to test the "cognitive mobilization" hypothesis (Inglehart 1990). As in Western Europe, the more one is interested in politics the more one is supportive of European integration (Inglehart, Rabier, and Reif 1991; Gabel and Whitten 1997). The impact of this variable is statistically significant. The last two political variables we consider here are respondents' assessments of the past and current regimes, two potentially significant determinants of EU support in post-communist societies insofar as they reflect individuals' stances toward two very different political and economic systems that they have experienced personally. The following questionnaire item was used as our indicator of assessment of the past: *In your opinion, did the socialist system bring most people in Poland only gains, more gains than losses, the same amount of gains and losses, more losses than gains, or only losses?* (Original five-point scale.) For the assessments of the current regime, we used the following questionnaire item: *Which statement reflects your opinion – the political system in Poland is basically good and needs no changes, it is good but some minor changes are needed, it has a lot of deficiencies and needs substantial changes, the entire system should be replaced by a different one?* (We reversed the original scale.)

As can be seen, each variable has a statistically significant direct effect on support for Poland's entry into the EU. The more negative one's evaluation of socialism and the more positive one's view of the functioning of the new democracy, the more one favored EU membership. The direct effect of judgments about the current regime is a strong predictor. This last finding, it should be noted, is not unique to Poland or, as Cichowski (2000) found, to

other aspiring EU countries (but see Anderson and Tverdova 2000). In member states of the EU as well, those who express higher levels of satisfaction with their democracy are more likely than those who are dissatisfied to be supportive of integration (Anderson 1998: 586).

Conclusions

In 1997, the Polish government issued a document, "National Strategy for Integration," which stated that "integration with the European Union provides an historic opportunity for the entire Polish society." In the same year, the European Commission presented "Agenda 2000," which recommended the initiation of negotiations with the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Poland, and Slovenia regarding their future membership in the EU. To gain entry, these first-wave candidate countries must prove to the satisfaction of the EU that they can make good on their "integration potential." To do so, they must put in place or expand upon rule-bound democratic and free-market institutions and enact legislation in accordance with the *communautaire acquis*. But, as Poland's President Aleksander Kwasniewski and others have made clear, public support for EU membership is also a crucial component of a candidate country's "integration potential." This is so not only because referenda over EU membership will be held once negotiations are concluded, but also because the extent and sources of popular support are critical to the success of efforts by the government to meet the institutional and policy requirements set forth by the EU for membership. And once Poland gains entry, public support will continue to be crucial for the political and economic outcomes of EU enlargement.

According to the findings presented here, the differentiating factors of EU support among Poles are both structural and political. Social class does matter for support for Poland's joining the European Union. Experts and managers are far more likely to vote for Poland's entry into the EU than are other social classes. Among farmers and unskilled workers, aversion to the EU tends to be strongest. Moreover, there are some effects of social mobility on support for European integration: (a) the upwardly mobile are more supportive than the downwardly mobile, (b) among those who have remained stable in their class position since 1988, nonmanuals are more supportive, (c) among those who are unemployed, former class position matters in the same manner as the current one.

Education, as an element of human capital and an asset on the labor market, is also a crucial determinant of support for Poland's membership in

the EU. Poles with a university degree tend to be more positive toward the EU than do those from lower education levels. Higher income groups also tend to be more supportive. In addition, such factors as exposure to the West and positive assessments of one's economic situation lead to increased support for European integration.

Political orientations and behavior are equally significant determinants of pro-EU sentiment. Considered by itself, protest behavior in the past has a positive and significant effect on support for the EU: 70 percent of those who took extensive part in protest actions said that they would vote for EU membership, in comparison to about 50 percent of those who refrained from such involvement. However, the effect of protest behavior disappears when current party preference is taken into account. This confirms previous findings that individuals' current political behavior is based to a significant degree on their political experience during the 1980s (Shabad and Slomczynski 2000). But contrary to initial expectations, members of the former communist party are quite positive about Poland's integration with the European Union. We assume that their cost-benefits calculation is the stronger determinant of current opinions than the party ideology to which they once subscribed.

In accordance with our expectations, liberal/social democrats and Christian/nationalists were the strongest supporters of Poland's joining the European Union. However, post-communists also were quite favorable, although the impact of post-communist party vote vanishes if assessments of the past and current regime are taken into account. Because we controlled for important correlates of social class and party preferences, the fact that the effects of these two types of variables remain statistically significant is remarkable. This finding supports the general thesis that social class and political experience each have an independent impact on Poles' preferences about their country's future.