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THE IMPACT OF CLASS ON VOTING BEHAVIOR IN PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS: DIRECT EFFECTS AND INDIRECT EFFECTS VIA VALUES?

At the 1958 American Sociological Association (ASA) meetings, Robert Nisbet declared that social class is dying (Nisbet 1959). Since then, a number of social scientists have logged similar arguments about the “death of class” (e.g., Clark and Lipset 1991; Pakulski and Waters 1996), contending, among other things, that class no longer has a significant influence on various forms of political behavior in contemporary societies, including Poland. But recent empirical work by Slomczynski and Shabad (2000) counters this argument. They demonstrate clearly that class position in 1988 significantly affected individuals’ participation in the partially free election of 1989, the presidential election of 1990, and the parliamentary election of 1991. Their findings serve as an initial rebuttal to the death of class argument in the case of Poland, and provide interesting insights into how class affects voter participation there. However, more work is needed to determine how class affects other forms of voting behavior, and how other factors may mediate this effect. In this chapter, I explore how class affects not only voter participation but also for whom people vote in presidential elections in Poland (the 1990 election). Additionally, I explore how values—specifically conformity—may mediate the effect of class on this important form of voting behavior. I discuss the implications of the findings for the death of class literature, the political behavior literature, and the dual issues of continuity and change in Poland.

Theoretical Background and Testable Hypotheses

Proponents of the death of class thesis argue that class and partisan dealignment are occurring in many contemporary societies. For instance, Pakulski and Waters (1996) argue that there are a number of processes of dealignment, the most important of which is a decline in class-based voting. Clark and Lipset (1991) suggest there exists a pattern of dealignment toward the development of “new politics” in many countries, whereby a variety of interests supersede purely class-based interests in people’s voting decisions. The underlying premise shared by these and other proponents of the death of class thesis is that economic interests underlie class-based voting—and since people’s economic interests are becoming less clear as a result of the changes occurring in many economies, they argue that class and partisan dealignment are taking place. There are two significant problems with the death of class thesis in regard to voting behavior, though: (1) class and voting are defined too narrowly, and (2) the potentially mediating impact of values remains virtually unexamined.

Both Clark and Lipset (1991) and Pakulski and Waters (1996) cite downward trends in the Alford index (Alford 1963) as evidence for class and partisan dealignment. The Alford index is an index of class voting that calculates the degree to which blue-collar and white-collar workers vote left or right. This index is problematic, though, given how *narrowly* it defines both class and voting options. There are more classes than just blue- or white-collar classes, and there are more choices today than “left” or “right,” particularly when different dimensions are taken into account (for instance, it is very possible for a candidate to be “left” on social/moral issues but “right” on economic issues). Analyses of class voting that add more dimensions to class and/or voting reveal not a decline in class voting, but, instead, a continuing significance of class in voting behavior.

Hout, Brooks, and Manza (1995) show that class matters in U.S. voting behavior. Using a more elaborate class scheme than simple blue- and white-collar—and using a more elaborate voting scheme that includes nonvoting and other options beyond simple left–right options—they show significant differences across class positions in voting in U.S. presidential elections, a trend that held from 1948 to 1992 (1992 was the last year for which they collected data). Further, they find no evidence of a consistent decline in this relationship—instead, they find only slight undulations in the effects of class on voting. Likewise, Slomczynski and Shabad (2000) show that class matters in Polish voting behavior. Again, using a more elaborate class scheme than that forwarded by proponents of the death of class, they

find that class significantly affects participation in Polish presidential and parliamentary elections.

The Slomczynski and Shabad (2000) study represents groundbreaking work on class and voting behavior in Poland. It not only shows that the death of class thesis does not hold up in the case of voter participation in Poland, but also examines presidential elections in addition to parliamentary elections despite the fact that presidential elections have traditionally received less research attention. This lack of attention to presidential elections in the literature likely stems from two issues: (1) presidents in Poland wield less power than presidents in countries like the United States, and (2) the underlying focus of many studies on political behavior in Poland is party, yet presidential candidates in Poland state no explicit party affiliation. Nonetheless, presidents in Poland do carry considerable executive power. Moreover, while presidential candidates do not explicitly state a party affiliation, party is implied—and the candidates provide a vast array of other cues through which voters can identify their stances on issues, with or without explicit party identification. Additionally, presidential elections draw significant numbers of Polish voters, even if classes vary in the degree to which they participate in these elections. I therefore examine Polish presidential elections more closely in this chapter, focusing on questions of who votes for whom. My first hypothesis, building on the work of Slomczynski and Shabad (2000), establishes the expected relationship(s) between class and voting behavior:

Hypothesis 1: Class significantly affects voting behavior in Polish presidential elections; (a) people in different class positions participate at different rates, (b) people in different class positions who do vote cast their votes differently from one another.

A reality often overlooked by proponents of the death of class thesis is that class has an empirically demonstrated effect on a number of other factors beyond pure voting behavior. Among other things, class affects the value orientations that people adopt and pass on to their children. For instance, the seminal work of Kohn (1969) shows very convincingly that class affects the important opposing values of conformity and self-direction, and that these values are then passed on to offspring. Subsequent work shows this clear relationship between class and values in multiple countries, including Poland (Kohn and Slomczynski 1990; Kohn et al. 1990). This leads quite readily to my next hypothesis:

Hypothesis 2: Class significantly affects values in Poland; people in different class positions exhibit different value preferences.

Related to this point, it is worth noting that people vote based not only on their concerns about economic issues but also on social/moral issues, among other things. And concerns about social/moral issues have much to do with values. In other words, it would be a mistake to ignore the potential impact of values on voting. As such, my third hypothesis follows:

Hypothesis 3: Values significantly affect voting behavior in Polish presidential elections; people who exhibit different value preferences vote differently from one another.

This leads, logically, to an interesting point that has been missed by many death of class proponents in their discussions of political behavior—the *impact of class on various forms of political behavior may operate not only fairly directly, through the class-based economic interests of actors, but also indirectly, via the class-based values of these actors.* This may be especially true in Poland in the post-communist period. In a mature capitalist economy, it is theoretically more likely that class position implies a clear set of economic interests. But in the post-communist period, particularly in the early years of transition, these direct linkages between class position and economic interests were likely in their formative (or, perhaps more appropriately, “transformative”) stages, making values an even more important form of class difference. So while proponents of the death of class thesis might contend that an impact of values on voting is evidence against the role of class, in so doing they would be excluding the very real possibility that values may mediate the effect of class on voting. Therefore, I hypothesize the following:

Hypothesis 4: The effect of class on voting behavior in Polish presidential elections is partially mediated by the values of these voters.

Variables

The variables I use in analyses, along with basic descriptive statistics and concise summaries of their coding, can be found in Table 16.1. In dependent variable(s), I am primarily concerned with who votes for whom in presidential elections. Thus, for the first dependent variable, I draw from an item on the POLPAN questionnaire asking for whom the respondent(s) voted in the first round of the 1990 presidential election. In the first round of the election, a number of candidates ran, providing a number of choices for voters. Just three candidates, however, received the bulk of the votes. I therefore construct the variable to include voting for the top three candidates as individual categories, and then combine other votes and nonvoting into a fourth, “all

Table 16.1. Variables Used in Analyses

Variables	Description	N	Mean	SD
Voted for whom in 1990?	Multiple-category nominal variable:	2,257		
	0 = Wałęsa	987	0.437	
	1 = Mazowiecki	337	0.149	
	2 = Tyminski	233	0.103	
	3 = Other candidate or no vote (ref. group)	700	0.310	
Value 1988: conformity	Likert-type scale, obedience selected as an important value for children or not:	1,897		
	1 = obedience not selected	914	0.482	
	2 = obedience selected as second choice	702	0.370	
	3 = obedience selected as first choice	281	0.148	
Value 2003: conformity	Likert-type ordinal scale, agree/disagree that obedience is the most important value for children:	1,667		
	1 = disagree	637	0.382	
	2 = somewhat agree	627	0.376	
	3 = strongly agree	403	0.242	
Value 1988: adjusted conformity	Likert-type ordinal scale constructed as original 1988 values (where not missing) and 2003-predicted values (where missing):	3,169		
	1 = obedience not selected	1,418	0.447	
	2 = obedience selected as second choice	1,176	0.371	
	3 = obedience selected as first choice	575	0.181	
Class 1988: managers	Dummy: 1 = member of class	4,445	0.030	0.169
Class 1988: supervisors	Dummy: 1 = member of class	4,445	0.075	0.264
Class 1988: experts	Dummy: 1 = member of class	4,445	0.061	0.238
Class 1988: office workers	Dummy: 1 = member of class	4,445	0.227	0.419
Class 1988: petty bourgeoisie	Dummy: 1 = member of class	4,445	0.034	0.181
Class 1988: skilled workers	Dummy: 1 = member of class	4,445	0.257	0.437
Class 1988: unskilled workers	Dummy: 1 = member of class	4,445	0.117	0.321
Class 1988: farmers	Dummy: 1 = member of class	4,445	0.201	0.401
Religiosity	Ordinal scale of church attendance	5,789	2.099	1.163

other choices,” category. The winner in the first round, and in the data set, was Wałęsa, the former leader of the Solidarity movement. The other candidates in the top three, then, were Tyminski, the international businessman, and Mazowiecki, the former prime minister. As a second dependent variable, I construct a simple dummy variable for voting for the winner (Wałęsa) in the first round of voting versus not (1 = voted for Wałęsa, 0 = did not vote for Wałęsa) given that work by Dubrow in this book (see ch. 15) suggests that voting for the winner in an election carries significance.

For the intermediate variable—values—I am primarily interested in conformity as a value. This stems from Kohn’s (1969) focus on conformity (versus self-direction) as an important value among manual laborers. I combine two variables to create a conformity variable. The first variable is drawn from a “preferred values for children” item from the 1988 wave of POLPAN. A subsample of the 1988 respondents were asked to select from a list of preferred values for children the values they felt were most important. I incorporate one of those listed values for children, “obedience,” as a proxy for conformity. I simply create a three-category ordinal variable where 1 = obedience not selected, 2 = obedience selected as a second choice, and 3 = obedience selected as a first choice. The second variable is drawn from an item on the 2003 wave of the survey that asks a subsample of respondents to select from a list of Likert-type responses to statements. Specifically, I use their answers to the statement, “The most important thing to teach children is absolute obedience to their parents.” I code their responses such that 1 = disagree, 2 = somewhat agree, and 3 = strongly agree. Because each of these variables is based on a relatively small subsample, I combine them to create an adjusted 1988 conformity measure such that I preserve the original 1988 values where possible, and replace missing values in 1988 with the conformity values from 2003.¹ I feel confident that this combination is statistically grounded and sound because (a) there is a significant correlation between conformity in 1988 and conformity in 2003 (see Table 16.2), and (b) these two variables are related to class in remarkably similar ways (see Table 16.3). Moreover, recent work by Kohn and colleagues (2004) suggests that values are fairly consistent across time even in the midst of radical social change.

¹ The subsamples are small enough to present confidence issues in analyses when using either of the conformity measures alone in lieu of the adjusted measure. Even the 1988 measure alone, while producing findings similar to models with both measures (albeit less statistically significant), is based on a small enough *n* that when missing cases are dropped in analyses, fewer than 500 cases remain in some models, raising legitimate concerns. I therefore have greater confidence in models that include an adjusted measure in lieu of either of the conformity measures alone.

Table 16.2. Correlation Between Conformity in 1988 and in 2003

	Conformity 1988
Value: conformity 2003	0.194***

† $p < 0.10$; * $p < 0.05$; ** $p < 0.01$; *** $p < 0.001$.

Table 16.3. Coefficients from OLS Regression of Conformity 1988, Conformity 2003, and Adjusted Conformity 1988 on Class 1988 (ref.: unskilled workers, standard errors in parentheses)

	Conformity 1988	Conformity 2003	Adjusted conformity 1988
Managers	-0.467*** (0.111)	-0.615*** (0.134)	-0.492*** (0.092)
Supervisors	-0.240** (0.084)	-0.347** (0.111)	-0.256*** (0.072)
Experts	-0.358*** (0.096)	-0.485*** (0.113)	-0.369*** (0.078)
Office workers	-0.224** (0.065)	-0.308** (0.091)	-0.248*** (0.058)
Petty bourgeoisie	-0.265* (0.110)	-0.147 (0.134)	-0.221* (0.093)
Skilled workers	-0.012 (0.064)	-0.049 (0.090)	-0.008 (0.056)
Farmers	0.110 (0.067)	0.139 (0.094)	0.128* (0.059)
Adjusted R^2	0.047	0.071	0.053
N	1,447	1,025	2,144

† $p < 0.10$; * $p < 0.05$; ** $p < 0.01$; *** $p < 0.001$.

For the primary independent variable, I am interested in social class position, particularly social class position prior to the transition from communism to capitalism. While social classes changed during this transition, research shows that class can have a lasting impact on values and orientations (e.g., Kohn 1969). Thus, it seems particularly relevant and interesting to explore how social class position prior to transition in Poland impacted voting in the first presidential election—1990—both directly and indirectly via values. This allows for examination of the all-important dual issues of continuity and change in the transition period in Poland. I thus use

class positions derived from occupational categories and coded by Slomczynski and Shabad (2000). These positions reflect years of scholarly research devoted to identifying the optimal representation of classes in communist Poland (e.g., Wesolowski and Slomczynski 1977), culminating in a scheme used by Kohn and Slomczynski (1990). The resultant class positions are: managers, supervisors, experts, office workers, skilled workers, petty bourgeoisie, unskilled workers, and farmers. They are simply coded as dummy categories: 1 = in the category, 0 = not in the category.

I also code a number of control variables considered important in voting behavior. The measure that seems most relevant based on test models, and therefore is used here, is religiosity. The religiosity variable in POLPAN is a simple ordinal coding of church attendance.

Methods

I employ a number of statistical techniques in this chapter to examine the variables, explore the relationships among them, and test my specific hypotheses. I start by performing simple univariate and descriptive statistics to examine the variables more closely. I then run bivariate correlations to better understand the relationships among the variables, particularly the conformity variables. Finally, I conduct a number of regression analyses to test my specific hypotheses. To test hypothesis 1a, I perform logistic regression because the dependent variable is a dummy variable—participation in election. To test hypotheses 1b, 3, and 4, I use multinomial logistic regression because the dependent variable—voting behavior in the presidential election—is a multiple-category nominal variable. To further examine patterns of voting, though, I also use logistic regression to examine how class and values impacted voting for the winner, Wałęsa. Finally, to test hypothesis 2, I use ordinary least squares regression since my dependent variable is adjusted 1988 conformity, measured as a three-category ordinal variable that is fairly normally distributed.

Results

Hypotheses 1a and 1b

The results in Table 16.4 suggest that class has a significant impact on participation in Polish presidential elections. Managers, supervisors, and experts are significantly (supervisors marginally so) more likely to

participate in presidential elections than unskilled workers. The coefficient for experts is quite large at 1.524, and the odds ratio score suggests that experts are around 4.6 times more likely than unskilled workers to vote in presidential elections. Hypothesis 1a is thus supported given the significant differences across class positions in voter participation.

Table 16.4. Coefficients from Logistic Regression of Participation in 1990 Polish Presidential Election on Class 1988 (ref.: unskilled workers)

	B	SE	Exp (B)
Managers	0.693*	0.345	1.999
Supervisors	0.521 [†]	0.271	1.684
Experts	1.524***	0.356	4.593
Office workers	0.149	0.206	1.160
Petty bourgeoisie	0.185	0.300	1.203
Skilled workers	-0.060	0.199	0.942
Farmers	-0.180	0.210	0.836
Cox and Snell R^2	0.026		
Nagelkerke R^2	0.039		

[†] $p < 0.10$; * $p < 0.05$; ** $p < 0.01$; *** $p < 0.001$.

Table 16.5, Model 1 suggests that class has a significant impact on who votes for whom in Polish presidential elections. A number of class positions vote significantly differently from one another. For instance, experts were significantly more likely than unskilled workers to vote for Wałęsa. Farmers were significantly less likely to vote for Mazowiecki than unskilled workers; managers, supervisors, experts, office workers, and petty bourgeoisie, however, were significantly more likely to vote for Mazowiecki than unskilled workers—and the coefficients are quite large. Finally, petty bourgeoisie were less likely (marginally significant) than unskilled workers to vote for Tyminski. The pseudo- R^2 scores in the model suggest that class by itself accounts for potentially 13–15 percent of the variance in voting. Hypothesis 1b is thus supported by these findings.

Table 16.5. Coefficients from Multinomial Logistic Regression of Voting Behavior in 1990 Polish Presidential Elections (ref.: voted for another candidate or did not vote) on Class 1988 (ref.: unskilled workers), Adjusted Conformity 1988, and Religiosity

		Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Voted Wałęsa	Managers	-0.314		-0.181	-0.201
	Supervisors	-0.072		0.282	0.328
	Experts	0.745*		0.816*	0.808*
	Office workers	-0.085		0.000	-0.006
	Petty bourgeoisie	0.253		0.390	0.329
	Skilled workers	-0.007		0.131	0.141
	Farmers	-0.094		0.003	0.004
	Adjusted conformity 1988		0.117	0.117	0.140
	Religiosity				-0.027
Voted Mazowiecki	Managers	1.741***		1.421**	1.292**
	Supervisors	2.007***		2.053***	2.089***
	Experts	2.659***		2.487***	2.451***
	Office workers	1.065**		0.801*	0.796*
	Petty bourgeoisie	1.359*		1.301*	1.319*
	Skilled workers	-0.199		-0.224	-0.210
	Farmers	-1.361**		-1.616**	-1.614**
	Adjusted conformity 1988		-0.539***	-0.276*	-0.254†
	Religiosity				-0.078
Voted Tyminski	Managers	-0.790		-1.358	-0.467
	Supervisors	-0.394		-1.067	-0.051
	Experts	-0.433		-1.746*	-0.157
	Office workers	0.028		-0.850	-0.161
	Petty bourgeoisie	-0.972†		-1.928	-1.345†
	Skilled workers	-0.148		-0.431	-0.161
	Farmers	-0.370		-0.705	-0.567
	Adjusted conformity88		0.198†	0.302*	0.267*
	Religiosity			0.203*	
	Cox and Snell R^2	0.135	0.027	0.153	0.156
Nagelkerke R^2	0.147	0.030	0.166	0.169	
<i>N</i>	1,374	937	798	792	

† $p < 0.10$; * $p < 0.05$; ** $p < 0.01$; *** $p < 0.001$.

Hypothesis 2

The results in Table 16.3 show that class is a significant predictor of conformity. Conformity follows a remarkably stable pattern across classes over time. The correlation between conformity in 1988 and 2003, while significant, is a bit low at 0.194. Yet the regression models in Table 16.3 suggest that the relationship between class and conformity follows a distinct, consistent pattern across time such that most groups (with the exception of farmers) are less conformist in values than unskilled workers, and the most significant differences lie between managers, supervisors, and experts on the one end, and unskilled laborers (and farmers) on the other end. These are solid findings showing a clear relationship, as Kohn (1969) noted, between class and conformity, thus supporting my second hypothesis. Additionally, these findings provide support for my use of the adjusted conformity 1988 variable in voting models given the consistency in the behavior of these different conformity variables across the models in Table 16.3.

Hypothesis 3

The results in Table 16.5, Model 2 suggest that conformity as a value has a significant relationship with voting behavior in presidential elections. Those who value conformity highly were significantly less likely to vote for Mazowiecki, and more likely (marginally significant) to vote for Tyminski than those who do not value conformity highly. The R^2 scores in the models suggest that conformity has a discernible impact on voting behavior by itself, accounting for between 2 percent and 3 percent of the variance in voting behavior. As a whole, these findings lend support to my third hypothesis.

Hypothesis 4

Perhaps the most interesting results are those pertaining to *Hypothesis 4* in the models of Table 16.5 and 16.6. The results in Table 16.5 suggest that values and class affect voting both separately and in concert. Comparing the results in Models 3 and 4 with the results in Model 1, some of the coefficients of class grow in size or become more significant with the addition of the conformity variable, suggesting that values may enhance some of those class differences. Interestingly, values, too, become more significant in the case of voting for Tyminski. Without class in the equation, the coefficient of conformity is rather small and marginally significant. With the addition of class, this variable becomes significant and increases in magnitude. When looking

specifically at voting for the winner (Wałęsa) in Table 16.6, class again matters, but values seem important as well. While I do not include all the models from this equation in Table 16.6, including all the variables (class and conformity) increases the overall explanatory power of the model. As such, they both seem to matter even in the context of specific voting choices.

Table 16.6. Coefficients from Logistic Regression of Voting for the Winner (Wałęsa) in the 1990 Polish Presidential Election on Class 1988 (ref.: unskilled workers) and Adjusted Conformity 1988

	B	SE	Exp (B)
Managers	-0.922**	0.355	0.398
Supervisors	-0.823**	0.305	0.439
Experts	-0.704*	0.307	0.495
Office workers	-0.302	0.257	0.739
Petty bourgeoisie	0.115	0.372	1.122
Skilled workers	0.251	0.256	1.286
Farmers	0.538 [†]	0.277	1.713
Adjusted conformity 1988	0.125	0.279	1.133
Cox and Snell R^2	0.061		
Nagelkerke R^2	0.081		
<i>N</i>	974		

[†] $p < 0.10$; * $p < 0.05$; ** $p < 0.01$.

In some sense, the findings from Tables 16.5 and 16.6 present as many questions as answers. The next phase of this project will include further exploration of the interactions between class and values in how they affect voting behavior, and doing structural equation modeling to parse out the specific relationships between these interrelated factors. What is certain from these findings is that class and values both matter in Polish voting, and the ways in which the two interact beg continuing exploration and study, particularly in the context of the continuing changes taking place in Poland.

Conclusions

Despite the arguments of proponents of the death of class thesis, empirical work continues to identify instances in which class matters for political behavior. In the case of Poland, prior work suggests that class significantly

affects voter participation. In this chapter, I look at how class affects who votes for whom in presidential elections in Poland. The findings suggest that class does, indeed, matter for this form of voting behavior. The findings also suggest, though, that values may serve as an intermediate effect between class and voting behavior: class affects values; values affect voting; and when class and values are included in models together as predictors of voting, both class and values change in their relationship with voting—in some cases, both are enhanced. More work is needed to parse out the specifics of this relationship, but these findings suggest an interesting interplay between class and values in political behavior that should not go untested in future studies of political behavior.

It is important to keep in mind that the analyses in this chapter examine voting behavior in only the 1990 Polish presidential election. The 1990 election provides an ideal case to study the continuity of class and values in the midst of rapid economic and political change. As posited earlier, the economic interests so often linked with class position in mature capitalism may not apply in this immediate post-communist period in Poland. As such, value orientations such as conformity likely represent a stable form of class difference during this transformative period, and are clearly an important conduit of class differences in voting. In later elections, with the economic and political changes likely becoming more consistent in their patterned effects on class and its economic consequences, changes in the voting patterns of different classes likely ensued.

Conceivably, if the material conditions more typically associated with class positions in capitalism have become more stable in Poland, the economic interests of those class positions (and consciousness thereof) may now have new, different relationships with voting decisions. This does not imply that class (or values) no longer matter, but, instead, that there may be a change in the patterning of that presumably more direct avenue of class influence—economic interests—as a factor in voting, and, thus, a change in the patterns of class-based voting. For instance, in the communist era unskilled workers were held in high esteem in society, while in the capitalist system unskilled workers are exploited, in part by a newly emerging class—a true bourgeoisie, yielding relatively low material rewards for these workers. Similarly, other class positions have likely changed in regard to material rewards. This is the case without even accounting for the changes in the political system, such as freer elections and going from one party to a multitude of party options. These changes in material conditions related to class (in addition to political changes) have likely created changes in voting behavior across classes. Future work should examine this likelihood in more recent elections to add to the work begun in this chapter on the 1990 elections.

In conclusion, the findings of this chapter provide further evidence that the death of class thesis does not hold up to empirical scrutiny in the case of Poland. Indeed, class was a significant direct and indirect factor in the 1990 presidential election, and future study will almost certainly show the same to be true in subsequent elections (although possibly showing changes in class voting patterns). Moreover, the findings of this chapter provide evidence suggesting that values are an important factor in voting, both independently and as a conduit of class influence. Therefore, future work in this area should explore the very real possibility that values are a potentially mediating force between class and voting. Finally, and importantly, the findings presented here suggest that class—and particularly values—are significant realms of continuity in the face of rapid social change. Despite the major, abrupt changes taking place in Poland between 1988 and 1990, class position in 1988 is nonetheless an important predictor of voting behavior in the crucial first presidential election in 1990. Moreover, the values associated with class position in 1988 are not only important in the 1990 election, but also even in 2003 are still consistently associated with those earlier class positions, demonstrating incredible stability in a period of tremendous economic and political change. As such, the dynamic interplay of continuity and change is remarkably evident in the complex relationships between class, values, and voting in Poland.